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Chinese cooperation with Africa in health infrastructure in the 









Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse infrastructure cooperation projects 
China has carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa in the period 2013-2020, considering 
that since Xi Jinping’s assumption China has spread more cooperation initiatives in 
infrastructure projects in the framework of the BRI. We focus on Chinese 
cooperation in health infrastructure, since COVID-19 global health emergency 
highlighted the lack of multilateral cooperation and gave China once again the 
opportunity to consolidate itself as a big player in the international system, this 
time in health issues.  
Key words: China-Africa-BRI-Health Infrastructure-COVID19. 
 
Introduction 
The beginning of the new century has witnessed a progressive transition of 
China’s international performance. At first, it was marked by the attempts to 
prove that the country’s impressive national growth would not turn it into a 
new superpower with hegemonic ambitions (Zheng, 2006; Jisi, 2013). 
However, recently, there has been evidence of its invigorating global power, 
which started with Xi Jinping’s administration in 2013 and has consolidated 
through the international pandemic scene the beginning of 2020 (Ikenberry, 
2020; Acharya, 2020; Cooley & Nexon, 2020; Tellis, 2020). In this way, the 
Chinese government has abandoned its traditional low-profile strategy 
(Zhao, 2015; Zhou, 2019) and has adopted policies aimed at a revisionist 
multilateralism that requires changing the established regulations 
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(Sanahuja, 2017) as well as playing a prominent role in the supply of global 
public goods (GPG). 
It is in this context that China launched the ‘Silk Road’ initiative—as it was 
originally coined—which had been announced by Xi Jinping in 2013 with the 
aim of creating a trade and infrastructure network that would allow Asia to 
be connected to the rest of the world. It was renamed The Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) and experts have described it as one of the most ambitious 
and important programmes of the 21st century, striving for an integrated 
global economy architecture (Clarke et al., 2017; Oviedo, 2018). Such 
aspirations go against the tide of the global processes in the Western world, 
marked by a fragmented governance with a clear withdrawal of the 
American—and to a certain extent, European—global leadership, which 
demonstrate little capacity to articulate collective solutions for current 
unavoidable issues. 
In its modernisation process, China has strengthened its infrastructure 
sector, achieving an annual growth of 20% since 1999. In this way, it has 
become the greatest infrastructure market of the world and a global leader 
in construction services (Johnston, 2016). In the last decades, Beijing has 
consolidated its global expansion by promoting its investments in multiple 
sectors and around all the continents. In this regard, there are specific 
policies, such as the ones introduced by the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) and the ones included under the BRI, which have showed the 
Chinese interest in enhancing its large-scale infrastructure projects.  
During the first stage of the BRI, energy and connectivity infrastructure were 
the most salient priority areas. In geographical terms, the BRI originally 
assigned a modest role to the African continent, but then it gained a place of 
special relevance. It is worth mentioning that the relations between the 
People’s Republic of China and Africa have been prolific since Maoist times. 
These bonds were re-launched in the nineties—after the Tiananmen 
events—and they have further developed since the early 21st century. 
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This is illustrated by the last report of the Infrastructure Consortium for 
Africa (ICA, 2018, 48), which states that ‘China’s investments and 
construction in African infrastructure amounted to $25.7 billion in 2018. This 
is the highest level of commitments recorded since ICA started collecting 
such data, which averaged $13.1 billion per year in the 2011-2017 period’. 
China remains as the first external financing source for infrastructure in the 
African continent, surpassing ICA members1 and private investors. In the 
2011-2018 period, the amounts allocated to the sectors of energy—49 
billion—and transport—50.8 billion—remained practically stable (ICA, 2015; 
2018), being West Africa and East Africa the most benefited regions.  
In March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic 
due to the rapid global spread of COVID-19 virus, being Wuhan (China) the 
epicentre of the outbreak. In a short period, there were also cases of 
coronavirus in sub-Saharan Africa. The global health emergency unveiled 
once more the lack of multilateral cooperation distinctive of these times and 
it has given China the opportunity to thrive as a strong player in the 
international system.  
The present global health crisis, which inevitably implies a socio-economic 
crisis, leads to the following question: is it possible to reconfigure the BRI 
agenda giving the health issue higher priority? Considering the critical 
situation that the spread of coronavirus represents for Africa and its 
insufficient national healthcare systems, what cooperation policies is China 
developing towards the continent? Particularly, which health infrastructure 
projects were already running before the pandemic? Which of them have 
been enhanced? Which new health initiatives have been incorporated in the 
framework of the Sino-African cooperation? 
                                                          
1
 ICA members: African Development Bank, Development Bank of Southern Africa, 
European Commission, European Investment Bank, G7 countries and Russia, the Republic of 
South Africa and the World Bank Group. 
1 6 / 2 0 2 0  
 
16 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the infrastructure cooperation 
projects that China has carried out in the 2013-2020 period, with special 
emphasis on health infrastructure. It should be noted that before the 
outbreak of the pandemic, China’s cooperation in the region was frequently 
questioned for generating a dept trap. This means that China’s unrestricted 
loans for infrastructure to African countries have led to an increase of their 
public debt. This unsustainable situation has driven them to go into debt 
with other countries in order to pay their obligations to China (Dussort & 
Marchetti 2019).  
In this sense, the global pandemic context has revealed a world economic 
stagnation that makes past debts unlikely to be paid off. In consequence, 
some countries like China, which have provided Africa with considerable 
amounts of financial resources, are currently subject to the ‘creditors trap’, 
that is, to the fact that they cannot recover pre-pandemic loans in the near 
future. However, the Chinese government has doubled its efforts presenting 
two channels through which it will pursue debt relief for African countries: 
the G-20 Debt Suspension Initiative and bilateral support (Sun, 2020). Our 
hypothesis in this work is that the reinforcement of Chinese cooperation in 
this global crisis has given Beijing’s government the opportunity to enhance 
its international image2, validating its role as a ‘great power’ and supplier of 
global public goods.  
For the sake of this research work, from a theoretical viewpoint, it is 
relevant to make the following conceptual clarifications. From our 
perspective, international cooperation policy must be understood as a 
dimension of a country’s foreign policy (Lechini, Morasso, 2015). In this 
regard, it is defined as ‘a field of public policy that comprises the transfer of 
financial resources (refundable and non-refundable) as well as the exchange 
                                                          
2
 The need for an improvement of its national image derives from the criticism at a global 
level due to the fact that COVID-19 proceeded from China and the government took several 
weeks to recognise the seriousness of the situation and inform WHO. 
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of genuine competences between countries, with the aim of promoting 
economic and social development’ (Malacalza, 2014: 2).  
In the framework of the 2006 ‘China’s African Policy Paper’, the relations 
between China and Africa materialised in a ‘strategic association’ that 
fostered cooperation in various spheres. In terms of economic cooperation, 
specific objectives were detailed in order to develop infrastructure 
cooperation. Moreover, according to the ‘Infrastructure Consortium for 
Africa’, it is possible to conceptualise infrastructure distinguishing between 
‘hard infrastructure’, which encompasses physical infrastructure projects 
and ‘soft infrastructure’, which refers to all the measures that support 
physical infrastructure, including research, project planning and the 
development of capacities to execute them. 
Finally, it is important to resort to the studies that have analysed the great 
powers that supply global public goods. Olson and Zeckhauser (1996) were 
the first to coin this term, which emerged linked to the United States foreign 
policy as a global superpower. Afterwards, Kindleberger (1986) and Gilpin 
(1987) claimed that the hegemonic power was the only actor with enough 
capacity and incentives to supply GPG. China’s growing pre-eminence, 
emphasised in a pandemic context, has enlivened these debates. In this 
way, a GPG is defined as ‘a benefit providing utility that is, in principle, 
available to everybody throughout the globe’ (Ferroni & Mody, 2002: 35). 
Oliver et al. (2002: 40-41) identify five types or sectors of GPG: environment, 
heath, knowledge, security and governance, all of which can be achieved 
through basic activities—related to GPG supply or production—and 
complementary activities—referred to the assistance provided for the 
supply of such good. Hence, international health cooperation appears as a 
suitable field to assess China’s supply of GPG.  
With the aim of developing the presented arguments, the first section of 
this article deals with China’s ‘hard infrastructure’ in sub-Saharan countries, 
which has gained prominence in the early 21st century and has consolidated 
1 6 / 2 0 2 0  
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with the launch of the BRI. Although these initiatives were mainly associated 
with energy and connectivity sectors, it is also possible to identify projects 
within the field of health. The second section analyses Chinese cooperation 
regarding ‘soft infrastructure’, highlighting the policies aimed at building 
health capacities, which have proliferated in the present pandemic scene as 
what is known as ‘mask diplomacy’ (Verma, 2020). Finally, the purpose of 
the conclusion is to prove the working hypothesis with the intention of 
effectively clarifying whether China is behaving as a major power that 
supplies GPG. 
Pre-pandemic trends of China’s hard infrastructure projects in sub-Saharan 
Africa  
The Silk Road Economic Belt concept was introduced by President Xi Jinping 
for the first time in September 2013 during his visit to Kazakhstan, in a 
speech delivered at Nazarbayev University. After this event, Xi announced 
China would offer guidance on constructing the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road to promote maritime cooperation. At the same time, he proposed 
establishing the AIIB to finance infrastructure construction and to promote 
regional interconnectivity and economic integration3. 
Initially, the Economic Belt focused on China, Central Asia, Russia and 
Europe, while the Maritime Road went from China’s coast to Europe 
through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route. In other 
words, the African continent was being only tangentially considered. 
Nonetheless, in the ‘Action Plan on the principles, framework, and 
cooperation priorities and mechanisms in the Belt and Road Initiative’, 
released in 2015 by the Chinese government, Africa was included at the 
same level of importance than Asia and Europe. This document states that 
‘The Chinese government has drafted and published the Vision and Actions 
[…] to promote the implementation of the Initiative, instil vigor and vitality 
                                                          
3
 Information from <http://english.www.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/04/20/content_281 
475092566326.htm> (accessed 4 July 2020).  
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into the ancient Silk Road, connect Asian, European and African countries 
more closely (…)’ (The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, 2015). 
From the beginning, the Chinese government established the following 
priorities for the Belt and Road Initiative: transportation infrastructure, 
easier investment and trade, financial cooperation and cultural exchange. 
The 2015 Action Plan confirmed these priorities and it considered health-
related issues within the cooperation priority areas,4 being denominated 
‘people-to-people bond’. It is worth noting that these issues essentially 
focused on soft infrastructure. 
Therefore, as a first step, it was fundamental for the Chinese government’s 
initiative to improve physical connectivity among the countries involved. 
Regarding African countries, it is important to note that several hard 
infrastructure projects had already started before the announcement of the 
BRI. Most of them were part of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) but they were later framed within the global initiative. 
In this sense, from 2000 onwards, Beijing has increased its role as provider 
of physical infrastructure in African countries. This is illustrated by the 
existing projects in sub-Saharan Africa that promote the transport sector, 
that is, railways, ports, roads and airports. As for railways projects, the most 
distinct are the following: Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, Zambia-Malawi 
Railway, Mali-Senegal Railway, the Benguela Corridor, the Lagos-Kano 
Railway, the Nairobi-Mombasa, the Belinga-Santa Clara Railway in Gabon 
and another railway in Mauritius that connects Nouakchotta Bofal (Foster et 
al., 2009; The Economist, 2016). 
With regards to ports, at the beginning of 2019, there were at least 46 
projects planned, financed, built or controlled by Chinese entities 
(operational or not): Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, 
                                                          
4
 The other mentioned cooperation priorities were policy coordination, facilities 
connectivity (infrastructure), trade and financial integration.  
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Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Nigeria, Togo, 
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde and Guinea (Devermont et al., 
2019). It is worth mentioning that in some cases, there is more than one 
proposed port for the same country.  
In terms of kilometers of built roads, Ethiopia, Botswana and Angola appear 
as the largest beneficiaries (Foster et al., 2009). Moreover, Chinese state-
owned companies participated in the construction of airports in Angola, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo, 
Togo, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Liberia and Ethiopia (China Daily, 2015).  
In this context, there are three considerations of central importance to be 
taken into account. In the first place, although health-related infrastructure 
projects were not an initial priority of the BRI, since 2017, they received a 
special denomination within this Chinese policy: the Health BRI—which will 
be analysed in the following section. In the second place, it was 
acknowledged that without physical connectivity projects among 
countries—such as roads or airports—it would not be safe to take patients 
or persons with serious health conditions to hospitals; and additionally, the 
provision of health assistance would be slow and problematic—namely, 
providing medical equipment, supplies or specialists. In the third place, 
China’s health-related hard infrastructure projects were never a matter of 
low politics, but a crucial point in the FOCAC agenda, mainly since 2006. 
Within FOCAC’s framework, China has improved the level of investment and 
financial cooperation by supporting Africa’s infrastructure construction 
needs and capacity building in attaining universal health coverage. These 
comprised the construction of regional and community hospitals, treatment 
centers, infrastructure and facilities to combat infectious diseases and 
medical care delivery teams to tackle public health and sanitary crises 
(Tambo et al., 2016; Tambo et al., 2019). In 2006, China spent 35 million 
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dollars on health projects in Africa. By 2014, the Chinese government had 
disbursed an estimated 150 million annually (Wang & Bateman, 2018). 
To be more specific, from 2010 to 2014, China helped build 30 hospitals and 
30 malaria prevention and control centers in the African continent. 
Furthermore, it invested about 123 million dollars in supplies, anti-malaria 
drugs and medical equipment (such as ultramodern infrastructure and 
facilities used in emergency, resuscitation, pediatrics, surgery, obstetrics and 
gynecology, medical imaging, etc.). In addition, it trained over 3,000 health 
care workers from various African countries (Tambo et al., 2016; Shuang et 
al., 2016). During the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, China 
worked to contain and control the epidemic in 13 countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa providing technical and non-technical assistance through bilateral and 
multilateral channels. In this framework, Chinese financial cooperation with 
the UN Response Multi-partner Trust Fund was meant to support the 
recovery and rehabilitation process of the affected countries (Tambo et al., 
2016: 122).  
In sum, the information mentioned above proves that even though the BRI 
has drawn the attention of the media and of a considerable part of Western 
scholars, China’s strategy in Africa has not been reduced to the outline of 
ports, roads, bridges, trains and airports. The actions that were meant to 
strengthen the health sector in African countries have been included in the 
FOCAC agenda since the first decade of the 21st century. Possibly, this was 
also a way of providing medical assistance to the large number of Chinese 
workers in Africa5, who were in charge of executing the millionaire projects 
of physical connectivity. 
Therefore, these facts highlight that the China’s media image during the 
pandemic months does not represent a detached effort with the only 
                                                          
5
 One of the distinctive features of Chinese infrastructure projects is that they are mostly 
executed by national personnel, in the role of Chinese migrant workers. This has been often 
questioned as it disregards local African workers. 
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purpose of enhancing its international image and reaffirming its global 
power. On the contrary, it is the corollary of a long-term strategy with a 
sophisticated planning, which can show concrete results. In effect, building 
30 hospitals and 30 health centres implies establishing an average of one 
hospital per country throughout the African continent.  
China’s ‘soft infrastructure’ as an asset in Africa 
Apart from the mentioned significant results that China’s government 
achieved regarding ‘hard infrastructure’, it is possible to observe the 
progress made in terms of ‘soft infrastructure’, that is, research and project 
development. In this regard, the present section focuses on soft 
infrastructure related to policies aimed at building health capacities. 
The Chinese Center of Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) started in 
20026 and it is a governmental and national-level technical organization, 
which specializes in disease control and prevention and public health. China 
CDC has actively participated in the development of strategies, techniques 
and resource mobilization within the field of global health. It has established 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation mechanisms, which have been 
efficiently implemented. Among its main initiatives, the most remarkable 
are the successful exchanges and collaboration with international 
organisations, bilateral governmental organisations and international NGOs. 
In August 2016, the Chinese government inaugurated the new Centre for 
Global Public Health (CGPH) as part of China CDC. This new entity has the 
primary responsibility to formulate China’s global health strategy and to 
plan and manage international cooperation projects on public health. The 
CGPH has been working on the dispatch of experts, technical cooperation, 
emergency response and foreign aid projects. In addition, it has provided 
support for the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa 
CDC), a specialised technical institution of the African Union (AU), officially 
                                                          
6
 Information available from <http://www.chinacdc.cn/en/> (accessed 6 July 2020). 
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launched in January 2017. Its objective is to support member states in their 
efforts to strengthen healthcare systems, to contribute to disease control 
and prevention in the region and to formulate response plans before 
continental health emergencies7.  
It is noteworthy that China CDC professionals were dispatched to Africa to 
train public health personnel. At the same time, China CDC received African 
visitors in order to make technical exchanges or collaborate in projects. 
Every year from 2002 to 2016, China CDC has financed or jointly organised 
more than ten international conferences or academic workshops and over a 
hundred collaboration projects with international partners (China CDC, 
online). 
In the same line of strengthening health cooperation, in January 2017, 
Beijing signed a memorandum of understanding with WHO in Genoa to 
provide an additional voluntary contribution of 20 million dollars with the 
purpose of supporting the global efforts of this organisation. In this 
framework, the idea of building the Health Silk Road began to take form. In 
effect, Xi Jinping’s speech expressed his intention of strengthening health 
collaboration with BRI members with the object of reducing the impact of 
health emergencies and reinforcing national healthcare systems. 
In August of that year, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-
General, visited China on the occasion of the seminar entitled ‘Belt and Road 
Forum on Health Cooperation: Toward a Health Silk Road’, where they laid 
the foundations for a more solid and strategic collaboration between the 
organization and the Asian country (Lancaster et al., 2020). In that 
opportunity, Dr. Tedros stated that ‘health reforms introduced in China 
prove that it is possible to achieve big-scale and high-standard 
transformations in a short period. The access to medical assistance provided 
for 95% of Chinese population is a model that other countries could imitate 
                                                          
7
 Information available from <https://africacdc.org/about-us/our-history/> (accessed 6 July 
2020). 
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in order to move towards a fairer, safer and healthier world. We all have 
something to learn from China’ (WHO, 2017). 
The 2018 FOCAC Summit also laid particular emphasis on health issues. 
Before the summit, during the preparatory meetings took place the High-
Level Forum on China-Africa Health Cooperation themed ‘Deepen China-
Africa Health Cooperation, and Jointly Build the Health Silk Road’. Among 
the debated topics were the African pharmaceutical industry, treatment of 
diseases and the improvement of healthcare systems (Kennedy, 2018). 
These events show that China’s participation in global health issues started 
before the COVID-19 pandemic. Probably, the previous planning of actions 
framed within the Health BRI was what allowed Beijing to react rapidly 
shortly after the coronavirus outbreak and its global spread. 
The case of Africa was a clear proof of this situation. On 14 February 2020, 
Egypt detected its first case of COVID-19, caused by the arrival of an infected 
Chinese tourist and on 24 February, the sub-Saharan region had its first case 
when an Italian arrived in Nigeria. From then on, the rest of the countries of 
the continent have begun to become infected and on 13 May, coronavirus 
was also detected in Lesotho, the last border that remained virus-free. 
The continent then faced the challenge of coping with the pandemic with 
highly vulnerable national healthcare systems. The administrations of some 
countries like Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, reacted in advance declaring 
a lockdown, which implied travel restrictions, schools closures, bans on large 
gatherings and the creation of analysis centres (Wood, 2020). 
Within this context of health and humanitarian crisis, China’s response was 
not long awaited. When only a few cases had been reported, the 
representative of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian (2020), 
announced the engagement to deepen healthcare systems and boost 
epidemic prevention and control capacity with the aim of ensuring regional 
and global public health security. Consequently, China dispatched medical 
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expert teams and trained over 20,000 local doctors, making virtual learning 
indispensable. In effect, thanks to China’s experience against COVID-19, the 
specialists could share their expertise through teleconferences so that 
Africans could gain the necessary theoretical and practical knowledge to 
withstand the pandemic.  
This situation proves that within the COVID-19 crisis, Chinese efforts 
devoted to soft infrastructure in Africa were of enormous importance, 
notwithstanding the fact that cooperation on hard infrastructure has never 
been neglected, as we have mentioned in the previous section. 
In addition, China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA8) 
has had an active participation sending anti-epidemic supplies including 
personal protection kits, N95 masks, protective medical suits, safety glasses, 
gloves, thermometers and ventilators, among others. Eventually, deliveries 
increased and by mid-June, ‘China ha[d] ensured the supply of 30 million 
testing kits, 10,000 ventilators and 80 million masks each month for Africa’ 
(CIDCA, 2020). The supplies have been sent in various stages, having as 
initial arrival points Ethiopia and Ghana, before being redistributed to other 
countries of the continent. In this context, Africa CDC adopted a central role 
in handling the pandemic since it has worked as a distribution centre of the 
obtained resources. 
An aspect that deserves particular consideration is the shift in the 
cooperation modality and the instruments used before and after COVID-19. 
Prior to the pandemic, cooperation was essentially focused on low-interest 
concessional loans and multilateral assistance. However, coronavirus 
changed the way of managing cooperation. The new modality incorporates 
                                                          
8
 The China International Development Cooperation Agency was launched in 2018. 
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multiple actors, including China’s government, private-owned companies9 
and civil society (Africa Report, 2020). 
As for the aid offered by businesspeople and philanthropists, reference 
should be made to the arrival of the first Chinese humanitarian aid load on 
22 March 2020 in the Ethiopian capital. It contained over 1.5 million rapid 
diagnostic tests and 100 tons of other medical supplies offered by 
philanthropist Jack M., owner of Alibaba Foundation. These supplies were 
distributed around the continent by Africa CDC and they represented the 
first of many deliveries that the continent began to receive.  
At a governmental level, on 17 June 2020, the presidents of China, South 
Africa—who chairs the AU—and Senegal—who co-chairs FOCAC—organised 
a virtual extraordinary China-Africa Summit on solidarity against COVID-19. 
The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and the WHO Director-General 
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus attended the summit as special guests. 
President Xi Jinping affirmed his commitment to continue cooperating with 
the continent through the dispatch of medical supplies in order to further 
the construction of CDC hospitals and infrastructure and accomplish the 
health agreement signed within the FOCAC framework. Moreover, South 
African President Ciryl Ramaphosa expressed the African peoples’ gratitude 
and Senegalese head of state Macky Sall reaffirmed the solidarity between 
Africa and China. 
In the mentioned summit, Xi Jinping referred to the possibility of an external 
debt relief for African countries. This is a crucial issue in the debate about 
the post-pandemic international scene, yet Beijing has not taken a decisive 
                                                          
9
 Among these companies, Huawei made a financial donation to South Africa, Huajian 
Group provided masks and other medical supplies to eight countries—Kenya and Rwanda 
amongst them—and China Star provided medical supplies to Rwanda. There were also 
donations from Chinese nationals to the African communities where they live. In other 
words, the Chinese government international cooperation has been complemented by 
private-owned companies with paramount interests in Africa and by a large diaspora that 
lives throughout the continent. 
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position so as not to pronounce in favour of a generalised debt forgiveness. 
In fact, in that occasion, the Chinese president stated that ‘China will cancel 
the debt of relevant African countries in the form of interest-free 
government loans that are due to mature by the end of 2020 within the 
FOCAC framework’(CIDCA, 2020; Xi 2020). He also declared that he would 
work within the G20 to implement an initiative to postpone the debt service 
for the poorest countries. 
Nevertheless, debt forgiveness is one of the pending issues that remain 
unsolved in the Sino-African relation, as it was explained at the beginning of 
this article. This stems from the extremely high African indebtedness with 
China and the deeply questioned debt trap. Some examples of this can be 
illustrated by Djibouti’s debt, which represents 80% of its annual economic 
production; Ethiopia’s debt, which represents 20% (Abi-Habib y Bradsher, 
2020) and Kenya, whose government must face a mounting external debt, 
being China its main creditor accounting for 66% (Anzetse Were, 2018). 
On balance, China’s cooperation in Africa regarding health issues 
demonstrate a remarkable resilience. Its ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances leads us to conceive that in a pandemic context, Chinese 
decision to focus on soft infrastructure serves as an ideal complement to the 
previous and widely known efforts devoted to hard infrastructure.  
Final remarks  
Throughout this work, we have analysed the infrastructure cooperation 
projects that China has carried out in sub-Saharan Africa. In this sense, it has 
been proved that projects related to energy and connectivity have had a 
central place. Nevertheless, it was also possible to identify the 
implementation of projects within the field of health. Initially, in the early 
21st century, the focus of the actions was put on hard infrastructure 
projects, mainly framed within FOCAC, which were enhanced when the BRI 
was launched. This has evidenced that China’s role in the COVID-19 
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pandemic has not represented a detached effort but a corollary of a long-
term strategy, which can show concrete results, such as the construction of 
hospitals and primary healthcare centres in various African countries. 
During the second decade of this century, new projects associated with soft 
infrastructure started to be outlined, taking advantage of the progress made 
in hard infrastructure over the previous years. In view of this, there were a 
series of governmental agencies that created an institutional network aimed 
at formulating the Chinese global health strategy. Therefore, China CDC 
established the CGPH, a department to implement its international actions. 
China also promoted closer cooperation ties with WHO and the African 
Union’s Africa CDC and in 2017, it outlined the Health Silk Road. 
Hence, as the coronavirus pandemic spread in 2020, Beijing’s government 
reacted rapidly and efficiently given an action scheme that was already 
working. Virtual training and the provision of medical supplies were the first 
manifestations of China’s soft infrastructure in Africa during the pandemic. 
China’s cooperation scheme in Africa over the last decades has been 
frequently questioned due to the debt trap problem. However, despite the 
fact that pandemic context foretells a world economic stagnation and an 
imminent creditors trap, Chinese cooperation, far from declining, has 
increased. Accordingly, Beijing has offered national economic resources to 
alleviate a critical situation that does not seem to have a clear solution in 
the near future. 
Considering all the presented arguments, we believe that the reinforcement 
of Chinese cooperation in this global crisis has enabled Beijing’s government 
to enhance its international image and validate its role as a ‘great power’ 
and supplier of global public goods. The launch of the Health Silk Road 
together with the improvement of China’s health assistance by investing in 
hard and soft infrastructure in Asia and Africa, strongly influence the idea of 
a global health engagement. 
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These new efforts suggest an encouraging innovative direction for China, 
which demonstrates a more explicit commitment to other global public 
goods rather than merely hard infrastructure related to physical 
connectivity or strategic resource extraction. The present analysis is 
important in the context of the withdrawal of traditional powers (United 
States, Germany, Great Britain) at a regional and international level. In an 
environment of prevailing individualism, China has undoubtedly sustained 
its presence and engagement with all the developing countries in the North 
and the South in this dramatic scenario. 
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Durabilité des relations sino-burundaises. Soutien 





Abstract: Des nouveaux Etats élargissent actuellement leur champ de coopération à 
d’autres pays qui étaient jusque–là la sphère d’influence des anciennes puissances 
coloniales. Cet élargissement s’accompagne d’une intensification des relations 
politiques matérialisées, entre autres, par des rencontres au plus haut sommet et 
un accroissement des échanges économiques. La présente contribution traite des 
relations particulières entre le Burundi et la République populaire de Chine; il s’agit 
de relations multiformes ayant commencé dans les années 60, et qui continuent à 
se diversifier depuis ces dernières décennies. L’auteur analyse les fondements d’une 
si longue coopération et les facteurs qui expliquent la persistance d’une relation 
devenue privilégiée. Enfin, les résultats de cette recherche permettent de 
comprendre d’une part les ressorts de la politique étrangère des deux pays, et 
d’autre part, au-delà du cas particulier du Burundi, pourquoi les pays africains 
continuent à promouvoir une coopération intense et multiforme avec la Chine. 




L’apparition de l’ouvrage «Quand la Chine s’éveillera, le monde tremblera» 
(Peyrefitte A., 1973) semble ouvrir le monde sur un pays-continent quasi 
inconnu. L’auteur part de l’hypothèse qu’eu égard à sa taille et à sa 
croissance démographique, la Chine finira par s’imposer au reste du monde 
dès qu’elle aura suffisamment maîtrisé la technologie. Cette citation 
paraphrase plutôt une pensée prémonitoire de Napoléon Ier qui affirme déjà 
en 1816 sur l’île Sainte Hélène que «laissez donc la Chine dormir car lorsque 
la Chine s’éveillera, le monde entier tremblera». Encore sans grande 
technologie, la Chine s’était déjà réveillée sur le monde comme certains 
facteurs le démontrent telles des découvertes archéologiques (tombes, bols 
1 6 / 2 0 2 0  
 
36 
en porcelaine, carte) sur la côte Est, de la Somalie à l’Afrique du Sud en 
passant par les îles de l’Océan indien attestent d’une présence chinoise sur 
le continent, probablement entre le IXème et XVème siècle, des populations 
d’origine africaine déjà présentes en Chine dès le VIIIème témoignant de vieux 
contacts entre Chinois et Africains.1  
Pourtant, le renforcement des relations entre la Chine et les pays Africains 
suscite appréhension et espoirs de la part de certains Etats et des 
chercheurs. D’aucuns y voient une menace à la suprématie occidentale, 
décèlent des risques de néo-colonialisme, de danger de surendettement des 
pays pauvres malgré les exonérations de la dette des institutions de Bretton 
Woods etc.2 Et ainsi, les relations entre la Chine et l’Afrique sont traitées 
dans leur ensemble à travers des titres comme «la Chine et l’Afrique»3, «La 
Chine, une puissance africaine»4, ou une menace à la souveraineté des pays 
africains eu égard à la conclusion de gros contrats dans les domaines des 
infrastructures, d’acquisition de terres, ou encore une forte présence de 
ressortissants chinois œuvrant sur le continent.  
D’autres, plus optimistes, y trouvent, par contre, une chance inespérée pour 
les pays africains de diversifier leurs partenaires étrangers avec des 
réalisations tangibles, comme des infrastructures modernes, un modèle de 
développement à suivre, et pour les gouvernants en place une occasion de 
se légitimer et de se défaire des conditionnalités des aides des bailleurs de 
fonds classiques, tant «le regard tranche tous les débats.»5  
                                                          
1
 François Bart, «Chine et Afrique, une longue histoire, une nouvelle donne géographique,» 
Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer, 253-254, 269-292 (2011), http://com.revues.org/6243 
(30.09.2018); Gilbert Etienne, La voie chinoise (Paris: PUF, Collection Tiers-Monde, 1962). 
2
 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s gift: The real story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
3
 François Bart, «Chine et Afrique.» 
4
 François Lafargue, «Une puissance chinoise,» Perspectives chinoises 90 (2005): 2-10. 
5
 Etienne de Tayo, Tous les chemins mènent en Chine (Yaoundé, 2018). 
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Bref, polarisation stérile et suspicion réciproque paralysent une analyse des 
relations sino-burundaises tenant plutôt compte des intérêts, des intentions 
réelles, des objectifs des acteurs en présence. Si cette approche nous 
rappelle les vieilles rivalités de la guerre froide au sortir de la deuxième 
guerre mondiale, elle imprègne pourtant la production scientifique sur cette 
thématique contribuant à comprendre la Chine et la région de l’Asie du Sud-
Est, et les enjeux qui en découlent pour la politique internationale. 
Le monde académique s’intéresse davantage à la Chine dans ses dimensions 
politique, économique, militaire et autres. Cet intérêt grandissant se traduit, 
sur le plan structurel, par l’ouverture, entre autres, de centres de recherche 
sur la Chine contemporaine (instituts, centres, groupes de recherche etc.) 
dans des universités, la tenue de conférences et autres évènements 
scientifiques à travers le monde. Ce facteur témoigne également 
l’importance multiforme que connaît aujourd’hui la Chine dans les affaires 
internationales qui se matérialise à travers la reconquête d’un siège 
permanent aux Nations Unies depuis 1971, sa puissance économique, une 
projection de la force militaire au point d’ouvrir une base militaire à 
Djibouti, la participation aux opérations de maintien de la paix comme au 
Sud-Soudan, ou encore un nouveau Représentant spécial du Secrétaire 
Général des Nations unies pour les Grands Lacs d’origine chinoise. 
L’évolution en cours est d’analyser lesdites relations sur le plan thématique, 
militaire ou sécuritaire, économique,6 mais aussi les rapports spécifiques 
entre la Chine et un pays, en l’occurrence le Burundi.  
Les premières tentatives des nationaux et des étrangers d’analyser les 
relations du Burundi avec d’autres pays ont été conduites jusque dans les 
années 1990. Il s’agit, pour la plupart, des travaux de mémoire et de thèses 
de fin d’études relatifs aux relations entre le Burundi et d’autres pays en 
général en se focalisant sur un domaine bien précis. Ces travaux ont porté 
                                                          
6
 Oita Etyang et Simon O. Panyako, «China and Africa’s Peace and Securit Agenda: The 
Burgeoning Appetite,» Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 (2016). 
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sur des aspects généraux de la politique étrangère du Burundi ou sur les 
relations entre le Burundi et différents partenaires bilatéraux comme la 
Tanzanie, la République Démocratique du Congo, le Rwanda, la Belgique, la 
Suisse, la France, l’Allemagne, les Etats Unis d’Amérique (USA).  
D’autres travaux ont porté leur attention sur certaines institutions 
burundaises comme le parti Uprona encore dominant la scène politique 
nationale (1966-1992), des organisations régionales comme l’Union 
Européenne, des organismes des Nations Unies comme le Programme des 
Nations Unies pour le Développement (PNUD) etc. La période de 
consolidation de la paix a suscité des recherches sur le processus d’adhésion 
du Burundi à la communauté de l’Afrique de l’Est comme une des réponses 
à l’enclavement géographique du Rwanda et du Burundi.7  
Des écrits sur les rapports sino-burundais vont par la suite fleurir avec 
l’intensification des relations entre les deux pays. L’Agence de presse 
chinoise Xinhua est présente dans notre pays avec une partie du staff 
composé de journalistes burundais travaillant au niveau régional, des visites 
entre dirigeants des deux pays à tous les niveaux font que la Chine et le 
Burundi sont présents dans diverses publications de leur pays respectifs 
démontrant ainsi le caractère exceptionnel de cette relation. A cet effet, le 
récent ouvrage d’une journaliste burundaise ayant vécu six mois en Chine et 
l’évènement ayant accompagné sa publication est un facteur révélateur de 
l’évolution de ces relations.8  
Dans cet ordre d’idées, la présente contribution entend analyser les 
relations entre la République Populaire de Chine et la République du 
Burundi sous différents aspects politique, économique, culturel en vue de 
                                                          
7
 Joseph Gahama, «La Communauté d’Afrique de l’Est: Une jeune organisation régionale 
promise à un bel avenir?» Les perspectives de l’Afrique au XXI
ème
 siècle, 65-77 (Dakar: 
Codesria, 2015); Jéremy Révillon, L’intégration régionale dans les Grands Lacs: analyse 
comparée Rwanda / Burundi, Thèse de doctorat (UPPA, 2016). 
8
 Blandine Niyongere, La Chine vue par une journaliste burundaise (Paris: Ed. Horizon 
oriental, 2018). 
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mettre en exergue les motifs bien compris des deux Etats d’intensifier leurs 
relations et dans des contextes très évolutifs. Quels sont les fondements 
d’une si longue coopération ? Quels sont actuellement les facteurs qui 
expliquent la persistance de ces relations? Autant de questions auxquelles 
nous nous adressons dans cette contribution. La recherche d’une alternative 
diplomatique, d’un soutien politique et économique expliquent l’intérêt 
croissant des deux pays à coopérer si étroitement d’une part, et d’autre 
part, des facteurs spécifiques de leur politique intérieure respective, de 
l’environnement politique international fondent la diversification de leurs 
instruments de coopération.  
La présente contribution analyse, dans un premier temps, les concepts de 
conflit et coopération et les instruments y relatifs soit que les parties 
entendent exacerber leur confit soit qu’elles décident de les mitiger et 
collaborer. Deuxièmement, l’auteur aborde les différentes phases de la 
coopération sino-burundaises, depuis le contexte difficile de l’établissement 
des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays en 1964 que les deux 
acteurs ont nouées faisant fi du contexte géopolitique du moment jusqu’à 
l’intensification en cours de leurs relations. Dans un troisième temps, il sied 
de mener une analyse qualitative des relations sino-burundaises se 
traduisant par des accords et traités bilatéraux dans des domaines variés, et 
des relations qui évoluent en phases. Enfin, nous allons apprécier, évaluer 
l’enjeu de ces relations pour les deux parties et les facteurs d’évolution 
desdits rapports à la lumière des politiques internationales à l’égard de la 
Chine, et l’impact de la pandémie du Coronavirus 2019 dit Covid-19 sur de 
futurs choix en politique extérieure. 
1. Conflit et Coopération comme modes d’interaction entre Etats 
L’interaction entre les Etats est caractérisée soit par le processus de 
coopération, soit par l’entrée en conflit, latent ou ouvert. Le conflit existe 
lorsqu’une action d’un Etat, ou le système d’un acteur A (personne, groupes 
sociaux ou gouvernement) porte préjudice à un autre acteur, Etat B, ou à 
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son système dans son ensemble. Par contre, la coopération entre deux Etats 
ou acteurs A et B s’entend comme un profit, une connexion mutuelle des 
changements positifs et égaux dans les deux systèmes d’Etats.9 Elle est ainsi 
le contraire ou le côté positif du conflit, ce que les hommes politiques 
appellent «coopération» (ou «cooperari» en latin) qui se définit comme un 
«act of working together to one end». La coopération signifie également 
«l’action de coopérer, de participer à une œuvre commune, à un projet 
commun.»10 Elle lie deux pays, sur base d’accords entre eux traduisant des 
échanges réciproques dans des domaines variés.  
D’après Siitonen Lauri, des concepts proches peuvent avoir d’autres 
contenus. Dans la coopération, «there is a common goal, toward which the 
interaction is oriented, and which is shared by the actors»11; la coopération 
cherche un intérêt réciproque et requiert un consentement de tous les 
acteurs. D’une façon générale, la coopération porte en soi une connotation 
positive où deux parties interagissent en vue d’atteindre des objectifs 
partagés. Des concepts aussi proches peuvent avoir des connotations 
différentes. La compétition veut dire «seeking or endeavouring to gain what 
another is endeavouring to gain at the same time». Une partie entend plutôt 
aboutir à ses intérêts tels qu’elle les définit dans une interaction étatique; 
un travail de rivalité fera qu’une partie empêche sa rivale d’atteindre ses 
propres objectifs et implicitement l’en empêcherait également d’atteindre 
les siens. Dans la compétition, «the common goal is no more shared». 
Par contre, en matière d’assistance, «they may be common goals, but the 
very action of giving aid is oriented towards helping the other part to realize 
his or her own goals»; et enfin, dans la rivalité («the goal is to hinder another 
                                                          
9
 Frank R. Pfetsch, Internationale Politik (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1994), 212; 
Philippe Braillard & Braillard Philippe / Mohamed Reza-Djalili, Les relations internationales, 
Collection «Que sais-je» (Paris: PUF, 2016). 
10
 www.laToupie.org (15.09.2020). 
11
 Lauri Siitonen, Political Theories of development cooperationn - A study of theories of 
international cooperation (Tokyo: World Institute for Development Economics Research of 
the United Nations University, 1990), 2-14. 
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to gain his or her own goals.»12 L’assistance sous-entend une relation 
asymétrique entre deux parties, où l’une reçoit d’une autre en vue de 
réaliser ses propres objectifs avec comme conséquence que la partie qui 
donne peut également définir la nature de ces liens dans cette interaction, 
et enfin de compte c’est la partie favorisée par les rapports de force en 
présence qui, en principe, arrive à ses propres fins en les manipulant. 
Pourtant, la coopération, vue sous l’angle du développement apporte de 
nouveaux aspects à ces différents concepts. D’un côté, il s’agit de pays 
riches, plus ou moins indépendants, coopérant ou rivaux sur la scène 
internationale, qui entendent établir de relations avec des pays pauvres 
dont le fonctionnement de l’Etat reste encore en question. A la différence 
du colonialisme où les rapports étaient caractérisés par la coercition et la 
logique de profit dans le plus grand intérêt d’une partie, la décolonisation a 
débouché sur une formation de nouveaux Etats indépendants confrontés à 
des problèmes multidimensionnels, depuis la création de structures 
étatiques fonctionnels jusqu’aux problèmes de défense, de sécurité pour les 
régimes et les individus, la satisfaction des besoins collectifs pour leur 
population. 
2. Coopération et Développement 
La coopération au développement implique de nouvelles considérations 
tant les acteurs ne sont pas au même niveau si l’on considère des facteurs 
tels que la consolidation de l’Etat, l’industrialisation, le niveau de 
structuration de la société etc. Les acteurs sont d’un côté les pays du Nord, 
riches, démocratiques, avec des institutions étatiques renforcées; et de 
l’autre, des pays situés pour la plupart dans l’hémisphère Sud dit-on, en 
Amérique latine, en Afrique et en Asie. Cette coopération au 
développement trouve ses racines dans le processus de décolonisation de 
ces Etats et par la suite dans les rapports entre anciens colonisateurs et les 
                                                          
12
 The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory, 2018 ed., s.v. 
«Foundations of rivalry research». 
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pays indépendants suite au processus d’autodétermination dès la fin des 
années 50 et au début 1960.13  
Après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, une forme institutionnalisée existe 
suite à diverses circonstances. Au regard de la destruction du continent 
européen après cette guerre, et la difficulté de l’économie européenne à 
redémarrer sans une reprise par l’Allemagne de ses capacités industrielles 
d’avant la guerre, l’ancien Secrétaire d’Etat américain Georges C. Marshall 
(1880-1959) prononce à l’Université de Harvard le 05 juin 1947 un discours 
dont le plan de redressement des économies ruinées en Europe occidentale 
portera son nom (Plan Marshall, 1947-1952 ou «European Recovery 
Program», ERP). Ce plan était doté de 13,3 Milliards ainsi réparti : Grande 
Bretagne (24%), France (20%)), Italie (11%), Allemagne de l’Ouest (10%), 
Pays-Bas (8%), Grèce (5%), Autriche (5%), Belgique et Luxembourg (4%).14  
Des pays dits du Tiers-monde rentrent à leur tour, deux ans plus tard, dans 
la liste des pays bénéficiaires. Ainsi, le Président américain Harry Truman 
(1884-1972) prononce dans son discours inaugural du 20 janvier 1950 le 
fameux «Point four» où il décline la volonté des USA de faire bénéficier les 
Pays en Voie de Développement (PVD) de la science et de la technologie 
américaine, invitant à la même occasion toutes les autres nations riches à 
octroyer une assistance technique et financière plus accrue aux régions sous 
développées dans le monde.15  
Les motifs de cette générosité s’explique, dans les deux cas, par les facteurs 
du moment: sur le plan économique, une volonté en effet de reconstruire 
l’Europe détruite par deux guerres mondiales en moins de 20 ans, de créer 
un nouveau marché économique et sur le plan idéologique, il s’agit de 
contrer le communisme aux portes de l’Europe occidentale et qui gagnait 
                                                          
13
 www.acodev.be (21.11.202); Lauri Siitonen, Op. Cit., 18. 
14
 www.latoupie.com (08 mars 2020). 
15
 Plus détaillé dans Michael A. Heilperin, «Le point IV du Président Truman,» Politique 
Etrangère 15, 2 (1950): 165-177, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3406/polit.1950.5753. 
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dans les pays du Tiers-Monde et ainsi offrir au bloc soviétique et au reste du 
monde un modèle d’organisation politique et économique alternatif. 
3. Cadre structurel des mécanismes de coopération coordonnée 
La science économique s’enrichit de nouveaux concepts aussi divers que 
«aide étrangère, aide au développement, Development Aid, Foreign Aid etc.» 
dans lesquels ces différents concepts se confondent parfois dans les faits. 
«Foreign assistance» (ou «Overseas Development Assistance») désigne 
l’ensemble des moyens financiers et autres rendus disponibles en vue 
d’aider d’autres Etats en vue d’accélérer leur développement économique 
ou tout simplement satisfaire leur besoins humains fondamentaux.16 A cet 
effet, la structure de cette assistance se subdivise en fonction des alliances. 
Le Comité de Assistance au Développement («Development Assistance 
Committee», DAC) regroupe les Etats d’Amérique du Nord, de l’Europe de 
l’Ouest, du Japon, et du pacifique dont les ¾ des aides vont directement aux 
gouvernements du Sud.  
En outre, la coopération connaît différentes formes: d’une part, elle peut 
être bilatérale directe (d’Etat à Etat) ou bilatérale indirecte (en passant soit 
par une agence d’implémentation créées par un Etat, soit par des 
Organisations Non gouvernementales, des Eglises, soit par la coopération 
universitaire ou d’autres organismes proches). Des institutions d’exécution 
des programmes et projets des Etats sont à cet effet créés par leur Etat 
respectif comme la «Deutsche Internationale Gesellschaft für Entwicklung 
Zusammenarbeit» (GIZ allemand), l’Administration Générale de la 
Coopération au Développement (AGCD belge devenue Enabel), ou encore le 
«Japan International Cooperation Assistance» (JICA).  
D’autre part, un quart des aides est canalisé à travers les Nations Unies et 
ses agences et se veut ainsi multilatérale ou indirecte (par le biais d’une 
                                                          
16
 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations (Boston: Pearson, 
2013), 485. 
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organisation internationale) par exemple le «Basket Fund» où les pays 
donateurs contribuent en versant dans un fonds leur aide destinée aux pays 
en phase de consolidation de la paix.  
Enfin, la coopération connaît généralement trois piliers17: elle se réalise sous 
forme de coopération technique ou l’envoi de personnel ou d’experts 
auprès d’un gouvernement étranger pour une durée limitée en fonction de 
la tâche d’exécution d’un projet (étude de faisabilité, d’évaluation, de 
conseiller auprès d’une institution étatique, formation de la future élite d’un 
pays etc.). Sur le plan financier, des prêts peuvent être octroyés en vue 
d’acheter des produits dans le pays donateur, formant ainsi un marché futur 
pour les même produits (fourniture de matériels de haut niveau 
technologique, équipements en laboratoire par exemple); un envoi de fonds 
comme un appui budgétaire ou financement direct d’un projet ; des prêts 
garantis ou des dons peuvent être octroyés.  
Il existe deux autres formes de coopération: premièrement, la coopération 
militaire avec ses propres exigences dans la mesure où ces fonds ne sont pas 
considérés comme rentrant dans la promotion économique d’un pays. 
Deuxièmement, la coopération en matière de politique étrangère entre pays 
européens par exemple qui vise à harmoniser les politiques étrangères 
nationales sur une base purement inter-gouvernementale. Les 
gouvernements se trouver obliger de se consulter avant d’adopter une 
position définitive sur toute question de politique étrangère ayant un intérêt 
général européen18, une dimension que d’autres d’organisations régionales 
n’ont pas encore atteinte.  
Il faudra néanmoins, sur le plan technique, considérer le niveau de 
développement du pays receveur d’aides, et analyser davantage le type 
d’aide (une assistance militaire par exemple se diffère sur le plan technique 
                                                          
17
 Ibid., 487-495. 
18
 Michel Drain & Cécile Dubernet, Relations internationales (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2018), 
316-317. 
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des autres formes d’aide), les sortes de garanties offertes etc. en vue de 
mieux évaluer l’efficacité et l’opportunité d’une aide. 
4. Research design, Méthodologie, et Cadre opérationnel 
En vue de réaliser cette contribution, nous avons fait recours d’abord à la 
recherche documentaire: Travail sur documents, interview semi-directive 
auprès des académiciens, hommes / femmes politiques travaillant sur les 
relations sino-africaines; des entretiens avec des acteurs des relations sino-
chinoises au Burundi ont également été conduits en vue de recueillir des 
points de vue variés sur la matière sous revue. Il s’agit des membres de 
l’administration publique, des diplomates et universitaires chinois et 
burundais, des acteurs économiques. Une observation personnelle vient 
compléter les techniques employées pour avoir eu l’occasion de visiter la 
Chine populaire deux fois au cours de l’année 2019 en participant à des 
visites et conférences sur ledit pays.  
Nous partons du fondement des relations entre la Chine et le Burundi 
entendent exclure par principe les conflits et se focaliser plutôt sur la 
coopération, «la confiance mutuelle». La Chine n’entend pas formellement 
recourir à des instruments de coercition à l’égard d’autres Etats en vue 
d’atteindre ses objectifs de politique étrangère, elle privilégie ainsi le 
recourt à la coopération et d’autres instruments de «soft power». Cette 
approche suscite d’autres conflits avec les puissances déjà présentes sur le 
continent africain pour un pays n’ayant pas eu des de véritables anciennes 
relations interétatiques avec des pays lointains.  
Le professeur Pfetsch Frank dresse une liste de dix instruments possibles19, 
de la diplomatie bilatérale à l’intégration régionale en passant par la 
diplomatie multilatérale, les moyens économiques, militaires, etc. pour 
lesquels l’on distingue des approches positives et négatives selon qu’elles 
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 Frank R. Pfetsch, Internationale Politik, 178-179. 
1 6 / 2 0 2 0  
 
46 
ont pour finalité soit d’aplanir les relations, soit d’exacerber les conflits et 
conduire à l’escalade entre Etats. 
Tableau N°1: Instruments des relations interétatiques 
Instruments Réduction / 
désescalade des 






Reprise des relations 
diplomatiques; 




Recours à un 
médiateur; 




Suspension / Rupture 
des relations 
diplomatiques; 
Note de protestation; 
Report d’une visite; 
Arrêt de négociations; 
Actes ou propos 
malveillants; 








Recours à une 
Boycott d’une 
conférence ou d’un 
évènement 
international; 






Résolution / prise de 




Résolution contre un 
Etat; 
Soutien à des groupes 
d’opposition en exil 
voire une rébellion; 




Usage intentionné de 
moyens de propagande 
en vue d’une influence 
positive. 
Recours à une 
désinformation 
intentionnée, entre 
autres, dans les 
médias. 
Moyens économiques Arrêt de préférence 
économique; 
Octroi de crédits, 
Octroi d’aides 
économiques etc. 
Droits de douane 
élevés; 
Embargo, arrêt des 
exportations; 













ressortissants du pays 




Envoi de conseillers 
militaires; 
Livraison d’armes; 
Envoi de «troupes de la 
paix»; 
Retrait de troupes. 
Envoi / stationnement 





Arrêt ou suspension de 
l’aide militaire. 










Refus de participation. 
Source: Auteur sur base de Pfetsch R. Frank, Op. Cit., 178-179. 
RESULTATS 
Les relations entre la RP de Chine et le Burundi se déclinent en trois phases: 
la première étant d’ordre idéologique et se heurte aux politiques 
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internationales dans la Région des Grands Lacs, la deuxième consacre le 
retour de la RP de Chine au Burundi et enfin, la troisième se caractérise par 
une expansion desdites relations dans les années 2000. 
1. Idéologie et solidarité avec les peuples du Tiers-Monde (1955-1971) 
1.1 Contexte de l’accession à l’indépendance 
Le Burundi accède à l’indépendance le 01 juillet 1962 dans un contexte 
régional et international structuré par la guerre froide consécutive à la 
rivalité des puissances victorieuses sur le futur sort et le contrôle de 
l’Allemagne vaincue. Ce facteur structurant ne manque pas d’impacter la vie 
politique intérieure du Burundi, et les relations extérieures du jeune pays 
fraichement indépendant en 1962 mettant fin à soixante ans de présence 
belge (1922-1962). Ses liens avec les anciens partenaires belges et 
occidentaux restent très étroits surtout pendant les dix premières années, 
de 1962 à 1972, année marquée par des tueries politico-ethniques avec 
pour effet de restructurer la vie politique nationale tandis que les 
partenaires étrangers, Belges en particulier, revoient leurs instruments de 
coopération avec le Burundi après une forte présence dans tous les secteurs 
de la vie nationale même après l’indépendance.20  
Cette indépendance politique suppose que les nationaux deviennent 
maîtres de leur destin et doivent ainsi conduire les affaires étatiques de leur 
pays, réaliser le développement politique, économique et social souhaité. Le 
jeune Etat fait pourtant face à des défis d’ordre structurel tels que 
l’enclavement au «Cœur d’Afrique», dit-on, l’exiguïté du territoire et du 
marché national, et enfin une pression démographique galopante. Ces 
facteurs auxquels faut-il ajouter une volonté d’émancipation expliquent 
sans doute les raisons de la coopération internationale et la diversification 
de ses partenaires qui entendent prendre pied dans le pays et la région.  
                                                          
20
 Jean-Pierre Chrétien et Jean-Marie Dupaquier, Burundi 1971. Au bord de deux génocide 
(2007). 
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A côté de ces contingences physiques, le Burundi entame une instabilité 
politico-ethnique caractérisée par des tentatives de déstabilisation des 
institutions établies et une violence politico-ethnique (et quatre drapeaux 
de 1962 à 1966!!). Au-delà des dates sinistres de l’histoire postcoloniale du 
Burundi, et la volonté de la politique coloniale d’influencer sur le groupe 
devant contrôler l’Etat pendant la période postcoloniale, il est question de 
donner une réponse à trois questions fondamentales, à savoir, sur le plan 
structurel, trouver le fondement de la légitimité du pouvoir, et sur le plan 
conjoncturel, bannir le recours à la violence pour des fins d’accès et de 
maintien au pouvoir, et enfin, et surtout repenser les voies de solution au 
défi du développement afin de résoudre les problèmes collectifs. 
1.2 Un intérêt croissant de la Chine dans une région troublée 
La Chine s’intéresse à l’Afrique au sortir de sa révolution dans le contexte 
d’une décolonisation possible. La Conférence de Bandung en 1955 suivie de 
cinq autres conférences afro-asiatiques tenues en Afrique devient une 
occasion de nouer des relations avec les pays fraichement décolonisés. Sur 
un plan général, elle entend afficher une solidarité envers les pays du Tiers–
Monde face aux puissances occidentales en apportant un appui multiforme 
aux mouvements de libération nationale (contacts, formation, aide en 
matériels etc.). La Chine commence à organiser sa coopération avec 
l’Afrique par la création d’une Direction des Affaires Africaines au sein du 
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères en octobre 1960. 
C’est dans ce cadre qu’intervient la visite sur le continent africain du Premier 
Ministre chinois d’alors, Chou En-Laï, du 14 décembre 1963 au 05 février 
1964, dit le «périple du missionnaire chinois en Afrique», dans le but de 
marquer la présence et l’action chinoises sur le continent, de gagner la 
confiance des pays africains et de «rétablir les droits légitimes de la Chine 
aux Nations-Unies». C’est également l’occasion de reformuler les «cinq 
principes de coexistence pacifique» («the Five Principles of Coexistence in 
Peace») formant la base des relations entre la Chine et les pays africains et 
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du Tiers-Monde, à savoir le développement pacifique, l’établissement des 
relations économiques dans le cadre du «mutual benefit», l’appui à une 
résolution pacifique des conflits. Enfin, la Chine élargit ses relations avec 
tous les Etats, et sur le plan symbolique, elle s’investit dans la construction 
de grands chantiers, et accueille de plus en plus des milliers d’étudiants 
africains, future élite de leur pays d’origine.  
La Chine et le Burundi décident de nouer des relations diplomatiques au 
niveau des ambassadeurs au mépris du contexte géopolitique régional. 
Ainsi, le Ministre burundais ad intérim des Affaires Etrangères et du 
Commerce Extérieur, Pierre Ngendandumwe, accueille l’Ambassadeur de la 
République Populaire de Chine, Monsieur HO YING, et décident ensemble le 
21 décembre 1963 d’établir des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays. 
Deux jours plus tard, le premier Ministre chinois, Chou En-Laï envoie un 
message au Ministre burundais des Affaires Etrangères saluant 
chaleureusement l’établissement de ces relations. Cette décision sera 
immédiatement suivie d’effets, le premier Secrétaire de l’Ambassade de 
Chine, Monsieur CHAN-TEN présente ses lettres de créances au Premier 
Ministre et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de l’époque le 13 janvier 1964 
l’accréditant en qualité de Chargé d’Affaires ad intérim.  
Ces excellentes relations diplomatiques en perspective ne manqueront pas 
dans l’immédiat de dégénérer. Les nouvelles relations entre la Chine et le 
Burundi se retrouvent inscrites dans la politique d’influence géopolitique de 
la Région des Grands Lacs Africains. Ainsi, l’indépendance accordée aux trois 
anciennes colonies belges (RD Congo, Rwanda et Burundi) n’empêchent pas 
pour autant aux pays influant dans la région de chercher à garder leur 
influence sur la politique et les acteurs régionaux. C’est dans ce cadre que le 
Burundi revêt une importance stratégique pour les puissances extérieures. 
Considéré par les Belges comme «un simple appendice du Congo», tandis 
que pour les USA «comme un poste d’observatoire placé à l’Est du glacis 
congolais où leurs positions solides à la Tanzanie dont les étroites et 
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amicales relations avec le Gouvernement de Pékin les inquiétaient 
beaucoup.»21  
Nous sommes dans une période où toute démarche diplomatique d’un Etat 
est analysée sous l’angle structurant de la rivalité Est-Ouest. Le camp 
occidental redoute d’un revirement du gouvernement du Burundi vers la 
sphère d’influence communiste, un pays en Afrique centrale aux confins de 
l’actuelle RD Congo tant convoitée pour sa position stratégique dans la 
région des Grands Lacs Africains (neuf pays limitrophes) et les immenses 
richesses de son sous-sol; et la Tanzanie, au sortir d’une tentative de 
renversement des institutions en 1964 contre Nyerere est qualifiée de 
prosocialiste. Sans doute, «pour prendre l’Afrique, il faut prendre le Congo; 
mais pour prendre le Congo, il faut prendre le Burundi (…); celui qui possède 
le Congo sans posséder le Burundi n’est jamais tranquille puisqu’il n’est pas 
sûr de posséder l’Afrique aussi longtemps que le Burundi lui échappe.»22 
Dans ce contexte, les nouvelles relations entre le Burundi et la RP de Chine 
inquiètent les autres puissances occidentales craignant, un revirement du 
pays vers le camp communiste à travers des actes tels que le parti UPRONA 
au pouvoir se veut le frère du Mouvement Nationaliste Congolais (MNC) et 
d’autres mouvements rebelles congolais taxés de communistes par les 
Occidentaux auxquels elle accorde installation et hospitalité en Février 1964 
à Bujumbura, l’envoi d’une forte délégation à l’occasion de l’indépendance 
du Congo, l’ouverture d’une ambassade à Moscou, des faits auxquels il faut 
ajouter cette arrivée de diplomates chinois arrivent au Burundi en 1964 
etc.23  
Une violence multidimensionnelle accompagne encore ces relations: 
Premièrement, la Chine affirme de son côté sa vision du Burundi car d’après 
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 Le Monde diplomatique, «Un avant-poste du socialisme en Afrique centrale,» décembre 
1971, 5. 
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 Philippe Siriba, La colonisation et la tribalisation au Burundi (Paris: ICP Thèses en Sciences 
sociales, 1977), 438. 
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 S. Sindaye, Aspects de la politique étrangère du Royaume du Burundi (1962-1966) (UB: 
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le diplomate chinois, Toung Tchi- Ping, le «Burundi est notre tremplin majeur 
contre le Congo dont Mao Tse-Toung veut s’emparer pour dominer le 
continent…»24; tandis qu’un un Chargé d’Affaires chinois disparaît 
mystérieusement dans la capitale Bujumbura, et l’on ne le retrouvera plus. 
Deuxièmement, le Congo accède à l’indépendance le 30 juin 1960 avec des 
velléités d’émancipation à l’égard de l’ancienne puissance colonisatrice la 
Belgique et l’éclatement de la violence politique: Destitution du Premier 
Ministre Patrice Lumumba en 1961 qui ravive les tensions déjà existantes, 
une rébellion voire un mouvement sécessionniste éclate dans le Sud-Est du 
pays, au Katanga, tandis qu’une rébellion contre le nouveau pouvoir établi à 
Kinshasa se forme également dans l’Est du Congo. Pour mâter cette 
rébellion à l’Est du Congo et garder une emprise sur ce géant africain, il 
fallait disposer de bases-arrières dans les pays limitrophes, particulièrement 
au Rwanda et au Burundi. Troisièmement, le gouvernement du Burundi de 
l’époque ne s’accommode pas de certaines pratiques peu diplomatiques des 
USA et de la Belgique. Un raid belgo-américain en 1964 sur la frontière 
burundo-congolaise attire également le courroux du gouvernement de 
Bujumbura considéré comme une violation flagrante de son espace aérien 
et terrestre. Dans son discours aux Nations Unies, le Ministre des Affaires 
étrangères du Burundi de l’époque condamne cette «agression caractérisée 
et un défi au continent africain.»25 Bujumbura se solidarise avec les autres 
pays africains pour porter la question congolaise à l’analyse du Conseil de 
Sécurité des Nations Unies et faire condamner les acteurs. 
1.3 Une expérience diplomatique interrompue 
C’est dans cette période d’instabilité qu’est mis fin l’embellie des relations 
diplomatiques entre la Chine et le Burundi. L’assassinat du premier ministre 
burundais, Pierre Ngendandumwe, le 15 janvier 1965, impacte à la fois cette 
l’évolution politique du pays et ses relations diplomatiques. Le nouveau 
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 G. Nzeyimana, Trente ans de coopération américano-burunsaise (1963-1993), (UB, FLSH, 
Mémoire, Histoire, 1994), 49. 
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Gouvernement du Burundi remet le 29 janvier 1965 (14 jours après 
l’assassinat) à l’Ambassadeur de Chine au Burundi une note diplomatique lui 
signifiant la suspension des relations diplomatiques entre le Burundi et la 
Chine, et intimant les membres de l’Ambassade de Chine de quitter le pays 
endéans quarante-huit heures. En guise de justification, le Représentant 
Permanent du Burundi aux Nations-Unies d’alors déclare en 1965 que «la 
suspension temporaire des liens diplomatiques avec la Chine était imputable 
aux seules raisons de politique intérieure»26 avant d’ajouter que le Burundi 
renouera dans un avenir proche ses relations diplomatiques avec Pékin. Le 
Gouvernement chinois se plia à la mesure prise unilatéralement et qualifiée 
par Pékin «d’absolument injustifiée et sans fondement.»  
Malgré la rupture des relations diplomatiques par le Burundi, la RP de Chine 
s’est employée à garder la porte ouverte en vue d’une éventuelle reprise 
des relations diplomatiques. L’Ambassadeur chinois de l’époque, Liuye-
Fene, déclare plus tard que si le Gouvernement du Burundi envisage à 
l’avenir la reprise des relations entre le Burundi et la Chine, le 
Gouvernement de Pékin la prendra en considération et avec sympathie. 
L’Agence Chine Nouvelle abonde dans le même sens en déclarant que « le 
Gouvernement chinois a toutes les raisons de demander aux autorités du 
Burundi de revenir sur leur demande concernant la suspension des relations 
diplomatiques. Cependant, nous avons évité de le faire (…) parce que nous 
ne voulons pas que le gouvernement royal se trouve placé dans une situation 
difficile. Nous sommes persuadés qu’en agissant ainsi, nous permettons au 
gouvernement royal et au peuple du Burundi de discerner plus clairement qui 
sont leurs amis et qui sont leurs adversaires.»27  
Le départ des Chinois ne semble pas améliorer les relations du Burundi avec 
l’étranger. Une rupture des relations diplomatiques est consommée entre le 
Etats-Unis et le Burundi, car en effet, les USA invitent Le 12 janvier 1966 
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 P. Mertens et P. F. Smets, L’Afrique de Pékin (Bruxelles: Ed. Mertens et Smets, 1966), 61. 
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l’Ambassadeur du Burundi à quitter le territoire américain dans les plus 
brefs délais suite à l’expulsion par le gouvernement du Burundi de trois 
diplomates américains en poste dans le pays. Le gouvernement du Burundi 
affirme «soupçonner les trois diplomates américains d’avoir maintenu des 
contacts avec des conspirateurs complotant contre le Burundi.»28  
Au-delà des faits historiques, comment peut-on expliquer cette rupture des 
relations diplomatiques entre la Chine et le Burundi? Cinq ans viennent de 
passer après l’accès des pays de la région à l’indépendance et l’ensemble 
des institutions, des acteurs étrangers, belges en particulier, dominent 
encore la vie politique, économique et culturelle du pays et de la région. De 
surcroît, le système international est structuré par la guerre froide, et la 
grande préoccupation des grands acteurs internationaux est de garder dans 
leur influence sur les autres Etats du continent et d’ailleurs. Ces acteurs 
bénéficient déjà d’une position avantageuse héritée de la colonisation qu’ils 
entendent exploiter à leur avantage. D’un côté, cette expérience avortée 
s’explique par une volonté chinoise de pénétrer dans le pays et la région 
alors que, de l’autre, les puissances occidentales exercent encore une forte 
influence sur le Burundi. Ainsi, aussi longtemps que ces deux facteurs, à 
savoir l’influence héritée de la colonisation et la guerre froide, une 
puissance étrangère comme la Chine qui se voulait un nouvel acteur sur la 
scène internationale, aurait du mal à pénétrer au Burundi et dans la région. 
Il faudra attendre la fin de la première décennie d’indépendance 
caractérisée par l’avenue de régimes militaires, le retrait et la diminution 
progressive de la domination des anciennes puissances coloniales pour que 
la Chine s’implante définitivement et pour longtemps dans le pays. 
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2. Reprise des relations diplomatiques entre la Chine et le Burundi (1971-
2000) 
La reprise des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays se réalise dans un 
contexte où la China a repris sa position de membre permanent du Conseil 
de Sécurité des Nations Unies et ce grâce en grande partie au vote favorable 
des pays africains dont le Burundi. La Chine connaît encore des défis 
économiques internes entamant certes sa capacité à mener une politique 
étrangère, mais l’influence et l’intervention directes des puissances 
étrangères dans la région diminuent; ainsi, les relations entre la Chine et le 
Burundi vont s’inscrire dans la durée.  
Au moment de la création des Nations Unies en 1945, le siège de la Chine 
était occupé par le Représentant de la République de Chine. Après son 
départ pour l’Île de Taiwan en 1949 et l’arrivée au pouvoir du Parti 
Communiste Chinois, le gouvernement chinois en exil continuait pourtant à 
occuper le siège de la Chine. Il a fallu d’une part le rejet en 1961 par 
l’Assemblée générale (AG) des Nations Unies d’une résolution selon laquelle 
toute motion ayant pour effet d’expulser «la Chine de Formose» des Nations 
Unies serait considérée comme une «question importante» qui devrait alors 
recueillir une majorité des deux tiers; d’autre part, l’adoption par ladite AG 
de la Résolution 2758 dans la nuit du lundi 25 au mardi 26 octobre 1971 
présentée par l’Albanie (par 76 voix pour, 35 contre et 17 abstentions) qui 
«décide le rétablissement de la République populaire de Chine dans tous ses 
droits (en tant que membre originaire et permanent des Nations Unies, du 
Conseil de Sécurité et disposant le droit de veto) et la reconnaissance des 
représentants de son gouvernement comme les seuls représentants légitimes 
de la Chine à l’Organisation des Nations Unies (…).»29  
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2.1 Une volonté de regarder en avant 
Les relations sino-burundaises reprennent sept ans après leur rupture 
coïncidant avec la commémoration du dixième anniversaire de l’assassinat 
du héros national, le Prince Louis Rwagasore. Un communiqué conjoint 
publié simultanément à Bujumbura et à Pékin le 13 octobre 1971 à vingt 
heures locales stipule qu’«en vue de développer les relations amicales et de 
coopération entre la République Populaire de Chine d’une part, et la 
République du Burundi d’autre part, les deux pays ont décidé de rétablir les 
relations diplomatiques au niveau d’Ambassadeurs à partir du 13 octobre 
1971.»30  
Ce début d’implantation de la Chine est encore emprunte de considérations 
idéologiques et non d’intérêts commerciaux. Ainsi la logique de l’aide 
directe l’emportait sur la logique commerciale; derrière «cette idéologie qui 
précède l’entreprise», la Chine se préoccupe avant tout d’élargir sa sphère 
d’influence politique et son désir de reconnaissance diplomatique tandis 
que son engagement sur le continent africain est mû par l’idée qu’entre 
l’Afrique et la Chine il existait une «communauté de destin et d’intérêt.»31  
C’est pourtant le début d’une coopération intense, couvrant quasiment tous 
les domaines de la coopération bilatérale et multilatérale. Les principes 
fondateurs de la politique étrangère du Burundi et de la République 
Populaire de Chine semblent modérément formulés, servant de base pour la 
coopération entre les deux pays. Pour le gouvernement du Burundi d’alors, 
il s’agit du bon voisinage qui se ressource dans la Charte des Nations Unies 
dont le Préambule invite «les Etats membres à pratiquer la tolérance, à vivre 
en paix, les uns avec les autres, dans un esprit de bon voisinage» (Charte des 
Nations Unies, Préambule). Cette politique se prolonge dans la coopération 
sous régionale ayant conduit à une intégration régionale matérialisée par la 
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participation à des organisations sous régionales telles que la Communauté 
économique des pays des Grands lacs (CEPGL), la Communauté économique 
des Etats d’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC), la Communauté Est-Africaine (CEA), la 
Zone d’échange préférentiel (ZEP) etc. Les autres lignes directrices sont la 
non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des autres Etats, la coopération 
internationale, le non alignement positif et le soutien aux mouvements de 
libération nationale.  
Lors de sa visite sur le continent africain effectué du 20 décembre 1982 au 
17 janvier 1983, le Premier Ministre Chinois Zhao Xiang réaffirme en 
d’autres termes les cinq principes de coopération économique et technique 
appliquée par la R P de Chine à l’égard des pays africains à savoir les 
principes de solidarité et d’amitié, d’égalité, et d’avantages réciproques 
respect de la souveraineté pas de conditionnalité politique ni un privilège 
quelconque; une coopération qui se fonde sur les besoins et des possibilités 
réels des partenaires, réalisation des projets en brefs délais; tenir compte 
des conditions locales et sous forme multiples comme la fourniture des 
services techniques, la formation des praticiens et des cadres de gestion; le 
but de la coopération est de permettre aux partenaires de se compléter et 
de s’aider mutuellement de manière à accroître leur capacité d’autonomie 
respective et à promouvoir le développement de leur économie 
respective.32  
Quoique autrement formulés, ces principes rencontrent l’approbation des 
pays africains car ils convergent sur tous les égards. Encore faut-il ajouter 
d’autres aspects développés par les dirigeants chinois, à savoir d’un côté, 
que la Chine et les peuples africains sont des pays en voie de 
développement et appartiennent tous au Tiers Monde, et qu’il s’agit d’une 
coopération sud-sud (Jouve E. 1978: 21); et de l’autre, le rôle prépondérant 
joué par Chou Enlai lors de la Conférence de Bandoeng en 1955 où il 
encourageait les leaders africains à une lutte farouche contre «le 
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colonialisme et l’impérialisme occidental» leur assurant que «la Chine 
s’efforcera de prendre part à la décolonisation» (Etienne G., 1962: 296). Il 
s’agit en quelque sorte d’étendre l’expérience révolutionnaire de la R P de 
Chine en Afrique en vue de se frayer un chemin diplomatique sur le 
continent et ainsi renouer avec les pays africains dont elle se profile comme 
un partenaire avec lequel elle partage plutôt les mêmes préoccupations. 
3. Expansion des relations bilatérales dans tous les domaines (2000-2018) 
3.1 Diversification des domaines de coopération 
La troisième phase des relations sino-burundaises s’ouvrent dans un 
contexte d’offensive de la Chine sur la scène internationale en diversifiant et 
en structurant davantage les instruments de sa coopération. Elle se 
concrétise par la création en 2000 du «Forum on China-Africa Cooperation» 
ou («Forum sur la coopération sino-chinoise», dit FOCAC) en vue de 
développer les relations entre la RP Chine et le continent africain, qui se 
veut un «mécanisme institutionnel de consultation» rassemblant, et tous les 
trois ans, les cinquante-trois Etats africains membres de l’Union africaine 
ayant noué des relations avec la Chine. Cette rencontre ayant lieu de façon 
alternative en Chine et sur un pays africain attire depuis lors beaucoup de 
délégations africaines, il constitue un forum de cadrage de la coopération 
économique et diplomatique des relations entre la Chine et les Etats du 
continent africain. C’est un mécanisme de diplomatique de dialogue entre la 
Chine et l’Afrique et facilite le développement d’un agenda politique et 
économique. L’intérêt que les deux partenaires portent sur ce forum se 
remarque par les fortes délégations qui y participent, les décisions 
économiques prises en matière d’investissements, d’infrastructures et enfin 
le volume des échanges commerciaux d’un sommet à un autre. Depuis 2000, 
premier sommet du FOCAC, le volume des échanges commerciaux entre la 
Chine et l’Afrique s’est multiplié par quatre, la China devenant le troisième 
partenaire du continent africain derrière les USA et la France. Ainsi, le 
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FOCAC a adopté, à sa 6ème édition en Afrique du Sud, le «Sino-African 
Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)». 
Sans être exhaustif ni mener une analyse des politiques publiques en la 
matière, la coopération avec la Chine s’étend désormais sur presque tous les 
domaines. La coopération politique et diplomatique: des visites au plus haut 
niveau symbolisant une confiance accrue. Dans cet ordre d’idées, le Burundi 
et la Chine ont conclu un accord portant sur la gratuité du visa pour les 
ressortissants désireux de se rendre dans l’un ou l’autre pays, tandis que les 
détenteurs de passeport diplomatique et de passeport de services sont 
exemptés du visa. Cette décision pallie aux difficultés rencontrées par les 
ressortissants des pays du Tiers-Monde en général en matière de libre 
circulation des personnes et de biens lorsqu’ils entendent voyager dans les 
pays occidentaux, particulièrement européens et nord-américains. Cette 
décision facilite en retour le trafic des biens et services entre le Burundi et la 
Chine, et au-delà la région des Grands Lacs dans la mesure où des 
ressortissants congolais et autres ont, pour premier contact avec la Chine, 
son ambassade basée à Bujumbura (Agence PANA du 28.08.2014). Ainsi, 
membres du gouvernement, hauts fonctionnaires, agents du secteur 
paraétatique à différents niveaux, professeurs d’université, étudiants, 
commerçants visitent souvent la Chine à travers des programmes de visite, 
de stages, de mobilité «en vue de mieux comprendre la Chine»33. Cette 
mobilité dans les deux sens finit par renforcer les échanges entre le Burundi 
et la Chine dans d’autres domaines comme les relations économique et 
commerciales.  
Les relations économiques et commerciales: depuis 01.01.2005, exemption 
de taxes sur 190 catégories de marchandises pour 28 pays les moins 
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avancés, s’accompagnant d’une facilité d’octroi de visa pour les opérateurs 
économiques et des personnes visitant la Chine à divers titre. Cette 
procédure fait du Burundi un centre régional où des citoyens congolais 
passent par l’Ambassade de Chine au Burundi pour leur formalité de 
demande de visa et de voyage à l’étranger.  
La construction d’infrastructures comme le Ministère des finances, le Palais 
présidentiel, la rénovation de l’Aéroport International Melchior Ndadaye de 
Bujumbura, la construction future  d’un Mall à Bujumbura, les routes 
Bujumbura-Source du Nil, Mutambara-Bururi, Gitega-Bururi en partie, 
Mugina (Mabanda)-Nyanza-Lac, des barrages hydro-électriques comme celui 
de Mugere, en province de Rumonge en cours de construction etc 
permettent d’atténuer la dépendance du Burundi vis-à-vis de l’extérieur, de 
diversifier en qualité et quantité les ressources en énergie, dans une période 
où le pays développe son secteur industriel et que le taux d’urbanisation 
augmente34.  
Le domaine de la santé comme la construction d’hôpitaux, livraison de 
matériels sophistiqués (Hôpital de Mpanda), envoi de «missions médicales». 
Le secteur agricole comme le projet Rukaramu des années 1990; dans le 
redéploiement industriel (Cotebu, Cogerco). La «diplomatie militaire» 
comme l’équipement de la marine nationale, l’octroi de stages de 
perfectionnement et divers équipements.  
Dans le domaine culturel et social: Construction des bâtiments de l’Ecole 
Normale Supérieure dans les années 2000, l’Ecole de Formation 
professionnelle (EFP) de Kigobe, l’octroi de bourses d’études et de stages, et 
la création des Instituts Confucius (CI), véritable instrument de la diplomatie 
publique: 48 CI en Afrique dont 5 en Afrique du Sud, 4 au Kenya, et un au 
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Burundi dans les enceintes de l’Université du Burundi. En contrepartie, 
l’université des langues étrangères de Pékin va bientôt créer un 
département dédié à l’enseignement du Kirundi en Chine dès 2020 
contribuant ainsi au rayonnement de la langue et de la culture burundaise. 
Numérisation des équipements de la RTNB, la société «StarTimes», 
émissions de Radio Chine Internationale (RCI), équipement de «villages» et 
écoles en matériels de réception d’émissions TV, la présence de l’agence de 
presses Xinhua News Agency, littéralement «Chine nouvelle» créée en 1937, 
connaît son expansion à l’étranger depuis 1983, elle travaille au Burundi. 
Tableau N°2: Volume des échanges commerciaux entre le Burundi et la 
Chine 
Exportations Importations 
1. Emirats Arabes 
Unis 
38,4 M$ (24%) China 11M $ (14%) 
2. DR Congo 24,1 M$ (15%) Inde 103 M $ (13%) 
3. Pakistan 13,2 M$ (8,1%) Arabie Saoudite 62,4M$ (8,1%) 
4.  Inde 10,8 M$ (6,6%) Tanzanie 56,2 M$ (7,3%) 
5. Belgique-
Luxembourg 
8,95 M$ (5,5%) Kenya 50,4 M$ (6,5%) 
6. China 7,3 M$ (4,5%) Emirats Arabes 
Unis 
50 M$ (6,5%) 
Source: Auteur basé sur les données publiées par www.oec.world 
(03.03.2020). 
  




1. Coopération & Développement 
En les instruments de relations interétatiques (tableau N°1: 7), force est de 
constater que, cinquante ans après, les relations sino-burundaises couvrent 
tous les instruments d’interaction interétatiques. Après l’intermède de 1964 
à 1971, les relations reprennent avec la conclusion d’un Accord de 
Coopération Economique et Technique signé le 06 janvier 1972 entre les 
deux pays et suivis par la suite de nombreux Accords et Protocoles en 
matière de coopération politique, économique et culturel. 
Sur le plan politique et diplomatique 
Les principes des relations de la Chine avec l’Afrique et le reste du monde 
sont marqués par un pragmatisme évident consistant à «laisser de côté les 
différences et exploiter les points communs.» Les cérémonies d’inauguration 
d’une exposition de photos le 30.12.2013 et marquant le cinquantenaire 
anniversaire de l’établissement des relations diplomatiques entre le Burundi 
et la Chine ont été une occasion pour les deux pays de retracer les piliers de 
leur coopération autour de quatre axes, à savoir les visites de haut niveau et 
la confiance politique mutuelle; la coopération économique, commerciale et 
technique; les échanges sociaux, culturels et humains; ainsi que l’assistance 
militaire (Agence Xinhua du 20.12.2013). Nous ne prétendons pas à 
l’exhaustivité ni à la quantité ni de la qualité des données présentées, ce qui 
est important pour nous est de présenter cette diversité des domaines de 
coopération entre la Chine et le Burundi et plus tard d’en discuter la portée 
et les limites d’une telle relation.  
Cette coopération permet au Burundi de diversifier ses partenaires et se 
libérer de la coopération classique avec les pays occidentaux et des 
institutions de Brettons Wood assortie de conditionnalités comme le respect 
de la bonne gouvernance, de l’état de droit etc. surtout en période de 
tensions diplomatiques de différente nature ayant caractérisé les relations 
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entre le Burundi et le monde occidental depuis l’indépendance en 1962. 
Face aux tensions entre la Belgique et le Burundi dans les années 70 ayant 
conduit à l’interruption unilatérale de la coopération civile et militaire, un 
diplomate fait remarquer que «l’hypothèse de plus en plus crédible d’une 
assistance chinoise rendait l’assistance belge moins indispensable.»35 Cette 
assistance continue sans relâche tant le «consensus de Pékin» interdit 
l’intervention dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre Etat. En période 
d’embargo politico-économique décidé par les pays limitrophes de 1996 à 
2000, la Chine a continué sa coopération en matière d’aide et de bourses 
d’études. Elle a constitué une bouée de sauvetage pendant les moments de 
crise, pendant la guerre civile où tous les bailleurs bi- et multilatéraux 
s’étaient détournés du Burundi, allant pour certains jusqu’à fermer leur 
ambassade. Actuellement les relations entre les puissances occidentales et 
le Burundi sont tendues depuis 2015, et la Chine constitue pour le Burundi 
un appui multiforme, défend le pays dans les instances internationales 
empêchant la prise de résolution sinon de sanctions sévères à l’égard du 
Burundi36. Bref, il s’agit d’un retour de bâton, puisque le Burundi avait 
soutenu en 1971 l’adhésion de la Chine à l’ONU et sa place au Conseil de 
sécurité des Nations Unies.  
De son côté, la Chine est assurée que son partenaire burundais le soutiendra 
également au moins en ce qui concerne des questions qui relèvent pour la 
Chine de sa «High politics» comme l’Île de Taiwan (Formose) qu’elle 
considère comme une partie intégrante de son territoire et les tensions 
existant avec les autres pays de sa région, la question de  Hong Kong et des 
Ouigours sur lesquelles le gouvernement du Burundi affiche un soutien 
avoué à la République de Chine. Rappelons à cet effet que le Burkina Faso a 
repris ses relations avec Pékin en mai 2018 suite à la rupture avec l’Île des 
                                                          
35
 Jean-Pierre Chrétien et Jean-François Dupaquier, Burundi 1972 au bord de deux génocide 
(Paris: Ed. Karthala, 2007), 392-394. 
36
 «Les relations sino-burundaises sont dominées par beaucoup de consensus importants», 
dans les différents domaines de coopération bilatérale et multilatérale, déclaration du 
Ministre assistant des Affaires Etrangères de Chine en visite au Burundi, samedi 07.12.2017. 
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relations diplomatiques vielles de 24 ans. La Chine ne pouvait également pas 
financer un projet régional impliquant ce pays37. 
Depuis trois ans, le Burundi est en froid avec ses partenaires traditionnels 
qui, en guise de pression, ont coupé le robinet de la coopération bilatérale 
et structurelle. Le gouvernement chinois reste fidèle à ses principes de 
coopération en continuant à soutenir le Burundi sur tous les piliers de la 
coopération. «Nous continuerons à fournir au Burundi des aides, aussi bien 
alimentaires que budgétaires, sans contrepartie»; et cela par «respect de la 
souveraineté nationale et la lutte contre toute ingérence extérieure»38. Il 
s’agit d’une position de principe justifiant pourquoi la Chine (avec la Russie) 
refuse de voter une résolution ou des sanctions contre le pouvoir de 
Bujumbura au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. La récente visite du 
Ministre chinois des Affaires étrangères au Burundi du 11 janvier 2020 
renforce la primauté de ces relations dont les échanges entre les autorités 
des deux pays ont abordé des questions aussi diverses que l’octroi d’un don 
financier, la lutte contre le terrorisme, le renforcement des relations 
bilatérales, la création de nouveaux axes de développement (Chine 
magazine: Les échanges entre la Chine et le Burundi se renforcent, 15 
janvier 2020). Cette embellie des relations entre les deux pays se traduit par 
des visites et d’échange d’entretiens téléphoniques en cas de nécessité au 
plus haut niveau avec pour objectif l’instauration d’une confiance mutuelle 
entre pays.  
Ces relations s’accompagnent d’un nouveau langage traduisant un nouvel 
esprit dans l’approche de la coopération, incitant les Etats et les peuples 
africains à se prendre en charge. Mao affirme que «nous avons toujours 
considéré que compter sur ses propres forces est le fondement même de la 
                                                          
37
 Le Burkina Faso rétablit les relations diplomatiques avec la Chine, RFI du 26 mai 2018. Les 
visites servent également à s’assurer, à réaffirmer les positions des deux pays en ce qui 
concerne l’Île de Taiwan. 
38
 Déclaration de Li Yuanchao, Vice-Président chinois à l’issue de son entretien avec le Chef 
de l’Etat burundais Pierre Nkurunziza, le 11 mai 2017; voir également Gros Marie-France: 
Burundi. La Chine à la rescousse du régime Nkurunziza, La Libre Belgique du 12 mai 2017. 
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révolution et de l’édification d’un pays (...). Que l’Afrique ouvre les yeux sur 
la Chine, elle verra comment l’histoire n’aide que ceux qui s’aident tous 
seuls.»39  
Si cette assertion traduit la dimension idéologique des débuts de la 
coopération chinoise, il faudra néanmoins que chaque pays définisse le type 
de développement qu’il voudrait atteindre et le niveau de sa prise en 
charge. Car, au-delà des questions de légitimité, de satisfaction des besoins 
collectifs, les pays africains ont besoin de créer des systèmes, des ordres 
politique, économique, culturel etc. en vue de résoudre la question des 
éléments de diversité.  
Les relations politiques entre la Chine et même les autres pays africains ont 
cette particularité que les nouveaux partenaires des pays africains, y 
compris la Chine, contrairement à l’époque coloniale et postcoloniale, ne 
sont pas des exportateurs d’idéologie politique. Ils ne fournissent pas un 
modèle de pensée comme dans le temps duel marxisme-léninisme, fer de 
lance des mouvements révolutionnaires dans le Tiers-monde.40  
De surcroît, des accords de jumelage ont été conclus en 1986 entre les villes 
de Bujumbura et Hefei (Province d’Anhui) et un deuxième conclu en mars 
1991 entre les provinces de Gitega (Burundi) et Qinghai. L’objectif de ces 
jumelages entre villes et provinces des deux pays est de renforcer ensemble 
des moyens de coopération et d’échange d’expérience dans les domaines de 
coopération économique, sociale et culturelle. Cette forme de coopération 
décentralisée n’a pas encore connu de fruits, car «il serait souhaitable que 
des visites soient programmées entre les deux pays afin de relancer cette 
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 L. Ma et N. Wang, «La diplomatie,» 18. 
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 Thierry Vircoulon, Entretien dans la Croix, du 04.04.2018. 
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forme de coopération et explorer les possibilités de promouvoir la 
coopération entre les villes susmentionnées.»41 
La réalisation d’infrastructures 
Notons que la réalisation de grands travaux tels que des routes, barrages 
hydro-électriques, travaux d’irrigation, des hôpitaux, des écoles exerce un 
impact évident tant sur l’économie, la circulation de biens et services 
diminuant un tant soit peu la dépendance du pays vis-à-vis de l’étranger. 
Ces chefs d’œuvre de la coopération sino-burundaise accordent une 
certaine légitimité aux dirigeants à cause de leur visibilité et la satisfaction 
d’un besoin urgent pour la population. En outre, pour un pays aussi exigu 
comme le Burundi, toute réalisation exerce un impact évident du fait qu’il 
profite dans l’immédiat à une partie importante de la population et sur une 
grande portion de son territoire. Il faudrait néanmoins que d’autres secteurs 
de production se développent en même temps pour éviter toute inflation 
artificielle (augmentation de la demande due à la mobilité, faiblesse de 
l’offre).  
Ce développement de la collectivité exige une planification rigoureuse tant 
les efforts fournis dans un domaine tel que la construction d’infrastructures 
augment la demande alors que d’autres secteurs comme l’agriculture, 
l’urbanisation non planifiée n’accroissent pas pour autant l’offre. Cela 
revient à développer séparément les secteurs nationaux, tout en 
réfléchissant aux implications de l’ensemble sur le développement souhaité, 
une démarche qui constitue également une autre façon de se prendre en 
charge. 
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 République du Burundi / Ministère des Relations Extérieures et de la Coopération (DAA) 
(1994): Mémorandum sur les Relations entre la Chine et le Burundi, Bujumbura. 
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Dans le domaine de l’éducation  
Les étudiants bénéficiaires des bourses de la coopération chinoise affirment 
que la formation est très solide, assortie même de beaucoup de stages sur 
terrain, alliant la théorie et la pratique, une forme de transmission de 
savoirs et de compétence largement appréciée des étudiants (Propos d’une 
ancienne étudiante en Chine). La coopération chinoise s’avère, dit-on peu 
onéreuse, et adaptée aux besoins des pays d’intervention et de surcroît 
efficace dans sa réalisation. Un membre d’une ONG africaine n’avait-il pas 
déclaré au Forum de Nairobi que «les Chinois ne font pas les choses à moitié. 
Ils ne perdent pas leur temps en réunion. Ils vont de l’avant et construisent 
des routes.»42 Elle est accordée dans des conditions apparemment non 
offensantes pour le pays bénéficiaire avec des experts qui mènent un style 
de vie proche de celui des citoyens qu’ils assistent (Partage de moyens de 
transport, de logement, des équipements bref une vie en communauté 
rendant peu l’ensemble de l’aide au développement). Néanmoins, la Chine 
devrait travailler sur son image; une tension due à une promiscuité sans 
réels contacts entre communauté africaine hôte et chinoise surgit souvent 
dans certaines capitales africaines, car des communautés chinoises prestent 
dans les mêmes secteurs que les nationaux comme le commerce de détail, 
la restauration devenant des concurrents sans chercher à s’ouvrir. Une 
étude de 2018 monter le niveau de satisfaction des populations à l’égard 
des Chinois; Nigéria 61%, Kenya 67%, SA 49% ailleurs y compris au Burundi 
entre 20 et 40% d’opinion favorable; pourtant ils sont 67% en Russie, et 70% 
en Tunisie.43  
Dans le domaine commercial 
Il va sans dire que le volume des échanges n’est guère intéressant pour la 
Chine, mais pour le Burundi, le pays constitue une alternative de débouchés 
à cause du rapport entre prix et qualité des produits qui vont inonder le 
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 Laurent Delcourt, «La Chine en Afrique,» 10. 
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 Denis Kat, Ibid., 2018. 
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marché local. Rappelons que la balance commerciale entre la Chine et 
l’Afrique en général est positive pour le continent africain dans la mesure où 
70% des importations chinoises proviennent de quatre pays exportateurs de 
matières premières (Angola, Congo Brazzaville, Afrique du Sud, Soudan) 
tandis que trente-sept autres pays africains, dont le Burundi, sont 
déficitaires en raison de la structure des productions de la Chine qui exporte 
vers l’Afrique des produits manufacturés à forte valeur ajoutée. 
Coopération piégée? 
La coopération avec la Chine et les pays africains suscite également des 
débats au point de s’interroger si cette relation privilégiée ne serait-elle pas 
piégée. Le surendettement des pays bénéficiaires alors que la Chine évoque 
plutôt qu’il est dû aux aides antérieures accordées par d’autres pays. 
Delcourt évoque des accords de financement de projets recourent à un 
maillage savant ou les fonds ne sont pas directement versés à un Etat 
africain44. Une entreprise publique chinoise réalise les travaux, en 
contrepartie une entreprise privée reçoit l’exploitation d’une ressource 
naturelle, le tout s’accompagnant de dons consacrés à la construction 
d’hôpitaux, d’écoles, de stades de football. Ce «package deal» trouve son 
fondement dans la perception par la Chine de la coopération qui se réalise 
au nom de la «solidarité Sud-Sud», dans un partenariat «d’égal à égal», et 
dans l’idée que se fait la Chine du développement, à savoir le renforcement 
de la base économique qui doit en retour profiter à l’ensemble de la 
collectivité.  
D’autres évoquent des pratiques en matière d’octroi de l’aide et de marché 
qui s’accompagnent d’une confusion telle que l’on ne peut difficilement 
distinguer ce qui relève de dons, d’assistance personnelle, matérielle et 
financière, et de marché. Il est courant de constater, à l’occasion d’accords 
de construction d’une route par exemple, des stipulations telles la prise en 
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charge par le gouvernement local des dépenses relatives aux frais locaux, 
l’engagement de rapatrier des experts et techniciens chinois, la partie 
chinoise s’engage à financer le coût du matériel technique employé au cours 
de l’exécution des travaux et le paiement des salaires du personnel chinois 
etc. Ces prescrits sont en rapport avec la construction par exemple d’une 
route, d’un barrage dont la réalisation devrait en principe être confiée à une 
entreprise privée, soit-elle chinoise. Cette imbrication d’aspects juridique, 
financier et économique requiert un recourt systématique à l’expertise dans 
ces différents domaines et l’implication des institutions nationales au-delà 
de l’exécutif pour toute forme de contrat avec les pays étrangers. 
Enfin, Tull D. (2014) explique le succès rencontré par les relations sino-
africaines en général. La Chine trouve par contre des opportunités, investit 
dans des pays où les occidentaux, souvent les partenaires classiques voient 
des difficultés et se replient. Il décrit particulièrement la stratégie chinoise 
qui consiste d’une part dans la multipolarité se traduisant par la pénétration 
tous azimuts  dans tous  les pays tout en privilégiant les pays fournisseurs de 
matières premières (Angola, Nigéria, Afrique du Sud, Kenya), et d’autre part 
la non-intervention dans les affaires intérieures. Moratoire de la dette, 
baisse des droits de douane, opportunités de nouveaux investissements à 
cause des infrastructures construites, rapprochement avec la population 
sont autant de facteurs ayant pour conséquence, entre autres, des 
avantages tant pour la Chine que pour les élites qui gouvernent les pays 
africains.45  
2. Trends dans les relations entre la Chine et le reste du monde 
Trois facteurs peuvent certes influencer les relations futures entre la Chine 
et le reste du monde dont le Burundi, mais ils dépendront de l’évolution 
interne du pays et des décisions que la RP de Chine prendra en vue de 
s’adapter à un nouvel environnement politique et économique. 
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Premièrement, les rapports entre la Chine et ses voisins immédiats sont 
empreints de conflits multiples de souveraineté autour des îles, de 
délimitation de frontières terrestres, et partant de la maîtrise des routes 
maritimes devant permettre voire favoriser le commerce maritime de ce 
pays et d’autres dans la région obligeant Pékin à intensifier ses relations 
avec la Russie, le Pakistan et le Myanmar qui lui permettent de contourner 
un isolement fatal en cas d’escalade. De surcroît, la Chine développe, à 
travers l’Initiative de la Route de la Soie («Road and Belt Initiative», RBI), des 
routes maritimes et terrestres devant booster la construction des 
infrastructures et, en conséquence, favoriser son commerce international.  
Rappelons à cet effet que d’après Ischinger, le statut de grande puissance 
repose actuellement, non seulement sur la puissance militaire ou 
économique, mais aussi sur la capacité à convaincre et gagner des 
partenaires tant au niveau régional qu’international.46 Et dans cet ordre 
d’idées, la Chine, n’ayant pas un véritable modèle politique à «exporter», 
elle fait recourt à des instruments politiques de «soft power» et surtout 
économiques en vue de s’attirer la sympathie et gagner des Etats et peuples 
étrangers: des visites de ressortissants étrangers permettent de mieux 
comprendre la Chine, son organisation politique et économique, sa capacité 
à mettre sur pied un Etat fonctionnel devant gérer 1,4 Mds d’individus sur 
un immense territoire couvrant quatre fuseaux horaires. 
Deuxièmement, la dimension politique et économique de la Chine actuelle 
fait du géant chinois à leurs yeux une puissance rivale des pays occidentaux, 
un pays au besoin à combattre au moyen d’instruments de sanctions 
économiques, individuelles et étatiques tout en coopérant sur d’autres 
thématiques. Dans les années de la présidence Obama aux USA (2008-2016), 
la tension portait plutôt sur la Russie accusée de violer le droit international, 
notamment le libre choix des peuples à l’auto-détermination et sanctionnée 
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Russland auf eine neue Doppelstrategie setzen,» IP, January / February 2015, 32-33. 
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à cause de son intervention en Géorgie en 2006, puis en Ukraine. Au cours 
de la présidence Trump (2017-2021), la Chine est considérée comme la 
véritable rivale des USA et du monde occidental au point d’infliger des 
sanctions économiques et personnelles à ce pays et donner une nouvelle 
dimension du choc des civilisations exprimées dans les années 1990.47  
Dans les deux cas russe et chinois, il s’agit de limiter les sources de 
puissance politique et économique de deux pays rivaux, d’affaiblir et 
décrédibiliser le système de pouvoir en place, les obliger à terme à 
collaborer avec l’occident ou alors perdre de leur aura international. 
Ces pays occidentaux restent néanmoins des partenaires politiques et 
surtout économiques importants pour la Chine ne pouvant à être remplacés 
par de nouveaux rapports avec l’Afrique et le reste du monde. Ces 
mauvaises relations ont des incidences économiques et impactent les 
relations de la Chine avec les autres pays dans leur dimension économique 
car elles obligent la Chine à terme à définir de nouvelles stratégies et 
priorités.  
Troisièmement, l’autre facteur consiste en l’actuelle expansion de la 
pandémie dite Coronavirus 2019 ou Covid19. Le virus apparaît en Chine dans 
la ville de Wuhan et, la Chine reconnaît officiellement au 30.12.2019 
l’existence du Coronavirus avant d’enregistrer la première victime au 
11.01.2020. Et l’Afrique, jusque-là épargnée, est atteinte à son tour avec le 
premier cas découvert trouvé en Egypte le 14 février 2020. L’organisation 
Africa CDC publie au 20.03.2020 un document de Stratégie Continentale 
Africaine face au Covid19 avec certes une difficulté évidente de coordonner 
les programmes spécifiques de chaque pays, mais devenant un centre de 
ressources importantes en vue de mieux connaître la pandémie, de produire 
des statistiques actualisées et fiables y relatives. Pour une population en 
Afrique de 1,3 Milliards soit 17% de la population mondiale, l’organisation 
                                                          
47
 Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order (New 
York: Simon & Shuster, 1996, 1997: version française). 
E U R O P E A N  S T U D I E S  /  S T U D I I  E U R O P E N E  
 
73 
panafricaine, Africa CDC, a enregistré, au 19.11.2020, 48.408 décès dus au 
Coronavirus, l’équivalent en Grande-Bretagne, et 2.013.388 de porteurs du 
virus.  
Il s’avère néanmoins difficile de coordonner les programmes de lutte contre 
la pandémie au niveau international. Le Burundi connaît en mars 2020 trois 
défis majeurs: un contexte politique marqué par la préparation et la 
campagne électorale de mai à septembre 2020, une vie précaire de la 
majorité de la population, et enfin l’impact perceptible de mesures 
drastiques comme le confinement («lock-down») sur le pays en général. Les 
premières réactions face aux informations alarmantes sur la propagation de 
la pandémie auront été ambiguës pendant trois mois, allant du déni 
manifeste de la réalité à des mesures de précaution que le ministère de la 
santé, des missions étrangères, des organismes internationaux, des ONG, et 
des églises ont prises.  
La pandémie a été déclarée quand, au 31.03.2020, deux cas confirmés de 
Covid19 sont détectés chez des personnes ayant voyagé au cours des 14 
jours précédents à Dubaï (EAU) et à Kigali (Rwanda). En guise de réaction, le 
Ministère de la Santé et de la lutte contre le Sida esquisse un Plan de 
Contingence et de réponse à la pandémie. Une campagne de dépistage 
général a eu lieu du 06.07 au 05.10.2020 et continue dans des centres 
appropriés. D’après le Rapport de Situation sur la Réponse à la pandémie 
due au Covid19 du 16.11.2020, il existe depuis le 31.03.2020, sur 59.834 
personnes testées, 631 cas positifs, 1 décès soit un taux global de positivité 
de 1,05%.  
Certes, la pandémie n’a pas évolué de façon significative comme on l’avait 
envisagé, mais les conséquences s‘avèrent énormes sur le plan structurel 
(déclin de la production interne, difficile commerce extérieur, tourisme en 
berne, rareté de certains produits vivriers etc.), sur le plan conjoncturel 
(perte d’emploi, diminution des revenus), au plan régional (diminution ou 
cherté du trafic transfrontalier, suspension de certains vols internationaux) 
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sur le plan social et personnel (arrêt des voyages, mesures barrières à 
respecter, suspicion, remise en question de l’entourage, peur diffuse et 
désorientation, incertitudes, recours à l’automédication) etc. Les défis 
restent un renforcement du dépistage du Covid-19 dans toutes les provinces 
sanitaires du Burundi et aux différents points d’entrée, l’identification, la 
gestion et le suivi des alertes, et le traitement efficace des cas positifs. 
Conclusion 
La présente contribution avait pour objectif d’analyser les facteurs de 
durabilité des relations sino-burundaises. Elle s’adresse à l’un des domaines 
de politique étrangère, la coopération entre deux pays du Sud par 
opposition à la coopération classique entre un pays africain et son ancienne 
puissance coloniale. Le Burundi noue des relations de coopération avec la 
Chine dès les premières années de son indépendance en 1963, relations vite 
interrompues à cause de l’enjeu régional du pays et de la Région des Grands 
Lacs. Cette expérience a duré sept ans et les deux pays ont renoué leurs 
relations au niveau diplomatique et des ambassades en 1971.  
L’article analyse de surcroît les fondements des relations sino-burundaises 
qui ne cessent plutôt de s’intensifier, de se diversifier en dépit des crises 
internes ou au niveau international. Il s’agit de deux pays aux niveaux de 
développement économique certes différents, mais qui trouvent ainsi 
matière à coopérer. Leur approche est d’éviter les conflits dans les relations 
et insister sur la confiance mutuelle et la solidarité. Ils ont besoin d’un 
soutien politico-diplomatique et économique réciproque et constant de 
nature à les renforcer mutuellement tant au niveau interne qu’international.  
La coopération sino-burundaise constitue une alternative stratégique 
permettant de contourner depuis des décennies les mauvaises relations 
avec les partenaires classiques occidentaux, et pour la Chine des relations 
difficiles avec les pays limitrophes, et l’objectif de se ravitailler en matières 
premières. Elle se veut efficace, assure une grande visibilité des actions 
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offrant ainsi une certaine légitimité aux pouvoirs en place et à la Chine 
d’étendre son influence politique et surtout économique dans le monde, de 
s’assurer de l’approvisionnement en matières premières après des 
centenaires d’autarcie sans ouverture sur le monde.  
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Impact of the Pandemic on China-Nigeria Trade and Investment 
Relations 
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Abstract: This paper explores the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on China-
Nigeria trade and investment cooperation in the contexts of oil-backed loans and 
infrastructure development. In this paper, I make three primary claims. First, the 
suspension and cancellation of Nigeria’s debt to China will reinforce Beijing’s 
economic principle of mutual benefit and its idea that international trade should 
not take a dominance-dependence structure. Second, it is likely to enhance China’s 
credibility in its move to create a new global economic and investment order. Third, 
the provisions of the China-Nigeria BIT on diplomatic and negotiated trade dispute 
resolution have the potentials to deepen trade and investment relations between 
China and Nigeria, even in the face of global commercial and economic 
uncertainties. 




China is arguably the most important emerging state actor in transnational 
trade and investment and a growing major operator in natural resource 
extraction in Africa. Nigeria - Africa’s most populous country and the 
continent’s largest petroleum1 exporter is currently one of the major 
                                                          
1
 In this paper, we will be using the words ‘petroleum’ and ‘oil’ interchangeably. Generally, 
petroleum is the umbrella word for oil and natural gas as both resources are usually 
extracted together and separated through the refining process. Etymologically, the word 
petroleum comes from two Latin words petra – which means rock, and oleum – which 
means oil. See Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, I Need to Know: An 
Introduction to the Oil Industry & OPEC, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Austria: Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2013). See also “What Is Petroleum?,” About, American 
Association of Petroleum Geologists (AAPG): Petroleum Through Time (accessed July 2, 
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recipients of China’s oil investment. China’s ‘Going Out’ strategy and 
international petroleum policy are two key political and economic 
frameworks that are driving Beijing’s oil investment in Nigeria and Africa at 
large. The “Going Out” strategy is a plan of action by Beijing for entering and 
navigating the mainstream global trade and investment landscape through 
its state-owned enterprises (SOEs).2 The objectives of China’s international 
petroleum are to implement the “Going Out” strategy, diversify the 
country’s petroleum imports, build globally competitive flagship oil 
companies, and conduct petroleum diplomacy, among others.3 In terms of 
the institutional framework, China and African governments have 
increasingly used the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which 
was established in 2000 to forge stronger trade and investment 
partnerships.4 The FOCAC initiative was set up to deepen Sino-African 




 “Better Implementation of the ‘Go Global’ Strategy,” The Central People’s Government of 
the People’s Republic of China, March 15, 2006, <http://www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-
03/15/content_227686.htm>, <https://perma.cc/T28R-UHUM>. The objectives of the 
“Going Out” strategy are to expand the space for China’s economic development, promote 
common development, supplement the resources that the Asian country needs, drive the 
export of goods and services, cultivate the country’s multinational companies and well-
known brands, promote the employment of host countries’ citizens, and ease investment 
and trade. In this paper and the context of China, state-owned enterprises and national oil 
companies are used to refer to companies recognized by a national regulation as an 
enterprise in which the state exercises ownership either by the state being the ultimate 
beneficiary owner of the majority of voting shares or otherwise exercising an equivalent 
degree of control. See, for example, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises, 2015th ed. (Paris: OECD Publishing, n.d.). See also Curtis Milhaupt J. and 
Wentong Zheng, “Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm,” Georgetown 
Law Journal 103, no. 3 (2015): 665. 
3
 Bo Kong, China’s International Petroleum Policy, Energy and Security Series (Santa 
Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 61s. 
4
 “FOCAC Mechanisms,” About FOCAC, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation | Forum Sur La 
Cooperation Sino-Africaine, <https://www.focac.org/eng/ltjj_3/ltjz/> (accessed July 10, 
2020). For a detailed objective of FOCAC, its establishment as well as the politics and 
challenges surrounding its existence, see Ian Taylor, “The Institutional Framework of Sino-
African Relations,” in China-Africa and an Economic Transformation, ed. Arkebe Oqubay 
and Yifu Justin Lin (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2019), 98–125. 
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economic cooperation and to create a new international political and 
economic order in the 21st century. The China-Nigeria trade and investment 
relations through the FOCAC have resulted in the execution of critical 
national infrastructure projects valued at US$5 billion.5 In addition, 
successive Nigerian and Chinese presidents have exchanged official visits to 
each others’ countries and have used the platforms to reach important 
milestones on economic cooperation. The adoption and implementation of 
China’s “Going Out” strategy, international petroleum policy, the principles 
of FOCAC, and the presidential reciprocal visits have cemented Sino-Nigeria 
trade and investment cooperation and resulted in some quid pro quo deals 
between the two countries. 
To address Nigeria’s infrastructure deficit, China signed an oil-for-
infrastructure (OFI) deal with the African country. Under the Sino-Nigeria 
OFI pact, Chinese state-owned financial institutions (SOFIs) give long-term 
loans to the host state to finance its large infrastructure projects such as 
refineries, railways, highways, seaports, airports, electricity-generating 
plants, and free trade zones. Some of the loans are repaid with oil sales and 
drilling rights to China and its national oil companies (NOCs).6 China’s trade 
and investments in Nigeria, as will be seen in figure 1 below, straddles 
various industries such as oil and gas, transport, real estate, information 
technology, agriculture, education, and manufacturing. 
  
                                                          
5
 “President Buhari Greets President Xi Jinping on Chinese Lunar Year,” Press Release, The 
State House, Abuja, January 21, 2020, <https://statehouse.gov.ng/press-releases/president-
buhari-greets-president-xi-jinping-on-chinese-lunar-year/>. 
6
 Others will be repaid with internally generated revenue from the projects. See “Amaechi 
On Railway Service Infrastructure, Governance Under Buhari - Amaechi,” Youtube, 
Newsnight (Abuja, Nigeria: Channels Television, December 16, 2019), <https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=HReyKLYLJHw>. 
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Figure 1: China’s Sectoral Investments and Contracts in Nigeria (2005-2019) 
 
Source: American Enterprise Institute.7 
Research Problem 
Data from the Debt Management Office of Nigeria shows that as of the end 
of the first quarter of 2020, Nigeria’s debt to Exim Bank of China stood at 
                                                          
7
 “China Global Investment Tracker,” American Enterprise Institute - AEI, <https://www.aei. 
org/china-global-investment-tracker/> (accessed April 30, 2020). 
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US$3.121 billion.8 It appears very challenging for Nigeria to repay the 
Chinese loans as the country is in a post-recession era9 with huge external 
debt and budget deficit.10 More crucially, since the outbreak of the 
coronavirus in late 2019, there has been a steep downward plunge in the 
international oil price which has begun to adversely affect the profitability of 
crude oil and the suspension of some lucrative oilfield development 
activities in Nigeria. As of July 15, 2020, Bonny Light - which is a light sweet 
crude oil grade produced in Nigeria and which serves as a regional 
benchmark crude for West Africa sold for as low as US$43.44 per barrel.11 
Nigeria had budgeted US$57 per barrel of oil for the 2020 fiscal year.12 
Nigeria’s federal lawmakers are currently calling for a review and 
renegotiation or outright cancellation of the Chinese loans because of the 
COVID-19 pandemic and the nosedive in oil prices which have made it 
                                                          
8
 “Press Release - Facts About Chinese Loans to Nigeria,” News & Events, Debt Management 
Office Nigeria, June 18, 2020, <https://www.dmo.gov.ng/news-and-events/dmo-in-the-
news/press-release-facts-about-chinese-loans-to-nigeria>. 
9
 “Nigeria: Out of Recession and Looking Beyond Oil,” IMF News, International Monetary 
Fund, March 15, 2018, <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/03/15/na031518-
nigeria-out-of-recession-and-looking-beyond-oi>. 
10
 “Debt Management Office Nigeria,” Debt Profile, External Debt Stock, 
<https://www.dmo.gov.ng/debt-profile/external-debts/external-debt-stock> (accessed 
June 12, 2020).  
11
 “Oil Price Charts,” OilPrice.com, https://oilprice.com/oil-price-charts (accessed July 15, 
2020). In the same vein, the price of Qua Iboe crude stood at US$43.46 on July 15, 2020. 
Qua Iboe crude is a light crude produced from numerous offshore fields in the Bight of 
Biafra in southeastern Nigeria. It has very low levels of sulfur, metals, and asphaltic 
material; and when refined will provide similar low sulfur specification products. Qua Iboe 
crude oil is a well-balanced intermediate crude that produces high quality, low sulfur 
products after simple refining. The naphtha produced can be reformed to produced high 
octane gasoline blendstock. See, for example, “Qua Iboe,” Crude Oils, ExxonMobil, 
November 21, 2018, <https://corporate.exxonmobil.com:443/Crude-oils/Crude-trading/ 
Qua-Iboe>. 
12
 Felix Onuah, “UPDATE 2-Nigeria to Scale Down Budget in Face of Oil Price Crash,” Reuters, 
March 9, 2020, online edition, <https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-oil-idUSL8N2B 
25KB>. 
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impracticable to repay the loans.13 Some of the lawmakers argue that the 
award of oil blocks to Chinese NOCs was bereft of transparency, that the 
executive branch is pledging away the nation’s resources through excessive 
borrowing which could mortgage the country’s future.14 If the proposal of 
the lawmakers is accepted and carried out by the executive arm of 
government, it may lead to a trade war between China and Nigeria, derail 
the infrastructure developments in the host state, and inevitably trigger 
legal actions under international investment regime. The lawmakers appear 
to not have carefully considered the effects of their proposal on bilateral 
trade and investment relations between the two countries and the relevant 
provisions of China-Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Furthermore, it 
has not yet been specifically addressed whether the Nigerian government 
can rely on the doctrine of force majeure in contract law. Legal scholars and 
political economists have engaged in analyses and counter-analyses of the 
Sino-Nigeria trade and investment cooperation and the oil-backed loans and 
have critiqued the economic relations based on the opacity of the 
arrangement.15 However, the literature has not adequately addressed how 
                                                          
13
 Ihuoma Chiedozie, “DMO Faults Reps, Says Lawmakers Approved $3.18bn Chinese 
Loans,” Punch Newspapers, May 29, 2020, <https://punchng.com/dmo-faults-reps-says-law 
makers-approved-3-18bn-chinese-loans/>. 
14
 “Chinese Loans Shrouded With Secrecy, Rep Member Claims,” Video, Sunrise Daily 
(Channels Television, May 14, 2020), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6gOW9 
Fw_YA>. 
15
 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, “Constructing Africa: Chinese Investment, Infrastructure Deficits, 
and Development,” Cornell International Law Journal 49 (2016): 101. Deborah Brautigam, 
The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Ian Taylor, “The Pathology of Dependency: Sino–Nigerian Relations as a Case Study,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics, ed. Carl Levan and Patrick Ukata (Oxford University 
Press, 2018). Omolade Adunbi and Howard Stein, “Political Economy of China’s Investment 
in Nigeria: Prometheus or Leviathan?” in China-Africa and an Economic Transformation, ed. 
Arkebe Oqubay and Yifu Justin Lin, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 192. Cyril 
Obi, “The Changing Dynamics of Chinese Oil and Gas Engagements in Africa,” in China-Africa 
and An Economic Transformation, ed. Arkebe Oqubay and Yifu Justin Lin (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2009), 173. Ian Taylor, “Chinese Interest in Nigeria’s Oil 
and the American Context,” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des 
Études Africaines 48, no. 3 (2014): 391–404. 
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these recent and novel developments can impact the economic relations. It 
is these crucial questions that this paper attempts to address.  
Research Methods 
This paper does not draw from one established epistemological tradition as 
it is broadly analytical and at the same time embraces both legal methods 
and interdisciplinary approach in social sciences. As an interdisciplinary 
research, it relies on a collection of primary data on Chinese economic 
engagements with Nigeria which are assembled by research institutes, 
centres, and media organizations. In terms of secondary data, it relies on 
scholarly literature in social sciences.  
China-Nigeria Bilateral Trade and Investment Cooperation in Historical 
Context  
From pre-colonial Nigeria in the mid-twentieth century, China and other 
Asian states have forged bilateral relations with Africa for the advancement 
of their collective political and economic cooperation.16 Beginning in 
February 1971 when China and Nigeria established diplomatic relations, 
bilateral business ties between the two countries have experienced 
continuous growth17 and their trade relations have since entered a new 
stage of rapid development with prominent achievements.18 The latest 
bilateral investment treaty between China-Nigeria was signed in 2001 and 
                                                          
16
 The Asian-African Conference of 1955 which was convened and coordinated by the 
Indonesian government and held in Bandung is one example of such political and economic 
partnership. 
17
 “Ministry of Commerce: Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office, Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in the Federal Republic of Nigeria,” Brief Introduction of Bilateral 
Relations, July 22, 2014, <http://nigeria2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bilateralcooperation/in 
brief/201407/20140700669579.shtml>, <https://perma.cc/DNC7-TDYH>. China and Nigeria 
signed the first economic and technical agreement in 1972.  
18
 “Remarks of Ambassador Zhou Pingjian at the Forum on China-Nigeria Production 
Capacity and Investment Cooperation,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, August 18, 2018, <http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/cne/ 
t1586187.htm>. 
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entered into force in 2010.19 In contemporary times and specifically since 
2011, Sino-Nigeria economic cooperation has grown at meteoric rates. As 
figure 2 below shows, Nigeria is China’s third-
second export market in Africa, only next to South Africa; while China is 
Nigeria’s number one import source. 
Figure 2: China’s Foreign Direct Investment in
2004-2014 
(Official Cross-Border Flows
Source: McKinsey & Company, 2017. 
                                                          
19
 “China-Nigeria BIT (2001),” Bilateral Investment Treaties, United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD): Investment Policy Hub, <https://investmentpolicy.unc 
tad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bilateral
china---nigeria-bit-2001-> (accessed July 2, 2020). 
largest trading partner and 
 Eight African Countries - 
 Only) 
-investment-treaties/949/ 
E U R O P E A N  S T U D I E S  /  S T U D I I  E U R O P E N E  
 
87 
An Overview of China’s Oil Investment in Nigeria 
China has deepened its trade and investment cooperation with Nigeria by 
increasingly establishing oil and gas production base in Nigeria. As figure 3 
illustrates, China has acquired oil blocks, signed biofuel production pact, and 
crude oil supply contracts with the host state. According to Nigeria’s 
national oil company, China’s investment in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry 
has reached US$16 billion.20 There are three Chinese NOCs that are 
operating with their subsidiaries in Nigeria, namely, China National Offshore 
Oil Company (CNOOC), China Petroleum & Petrochemical Corporation 
(Sinopec), and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The 
acquisition and development of many oilfields in Nigeria by the Chinese 
NOCs are hugely significant for Beijing. First, in addition to the gargantuan 
sizes of the oil blocks, the prolificacy of the assets largely represents the 
actualisation of China’s “Going Out” investment strategy and international 
petroleum policy which we saw earlier. Second, it brings to limelight one of 
the corporate hues of China’s NOCs as implementers of both the “Going 
Out” strategy and the country’s international petroleum policy. For the part 
of the host state, China’s oil investments act as a stimulus for the expansion 
and further development of its offshore projects and economy. This is 
because most of the oil platforms are primarily developed locally to 
accelerate the pace of industrial fabric and the transfer of technology.21 
  
                                                          
20
 Chika Oduah, “China Invests $16 Billion in Nigeria’s Oil Sector,” Voice of America, August 
28, 2019, <https://www.voanews.com/africa/china-invests-16-billion-nigerias-oil-sector>. 
21
 “Egina: A Flagship Offshore Project Driving Local Development and Expertise,” Total.com, 
<https://www.total.com/energy-expertise/projects/oil-gas/deep-offshore/egina-nigeria> 
(accessed May 4, 2020). 
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22
 “Nigeria: Deepwater Reserves Deliver Steady Production,” CNOOC - Operations - Nigeria, 
<https://en/operations/middle-east-and-africa/nigeria> (accessed May 6, 2020). 
23
 Kate Linebaugh and Shai Oster, “Cnooc Pays $2.27 Billion For Nigerian Oil, Gas Stake,” 
Wall Street Journal, January 10, 2006, sec. Markets, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB113680307278841473>. Peter S. Goodman, “Cnooc Buys Oil Interest In Nigeria,” 
Washington Post Foreign Service, January 10, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/09/AR2006010901779.html>. 
24
 In this license area, the NNPC is the concession holder. ExxonMobil’s subsidiary – Esso 
Exploration & Production Nigeria (Offshore East) Ltd is the operator with a 30% interest. 
Other partners include Chevron (30%) and Total (30%). “Crude Oils - Usan,” ExxonMobil, 
November 26, 2018, <https://corporate.exxonmobil.com:443/Crude-oils/Crude-trading/ 
Usan>. In Nigeria, oil blocks and fields are identified by a unique designation after a licensee 
or lessee must have obtained the written approval of the Department of Petroleum 
Resources. The designation of a block consists of the name of the oil well to be drilled and 
the serial number which indicates the chronological order in the drilling sequence for the 
field. All oilfields bear names in a Nigerian vernacular language which generally refers to 
any geographical or topographical features in the vicinity of the field. The names of fields 
are chosen from the names of the flora or fauna of Nigeria. See “Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production) Regulations,” Legal Notice 69 § 34 (1969). 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on data from various sources.25 
  
                                                          
25
 Oil companies’ websites, Nigeria’s Department of Petroleum Resources, and media 
reports. 
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China’s Infrastructure Investment Projects in Nigeria 
As we shall see in figure 4 below, beginning in 2003, Chinese state-owned 
engineering and construction firms have increasingly pursued the ambitious 
execution of infrastructure projects in many sectors of the Nigerian 
economy. As Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria’s president stated on China’s 69th 
anniversary, “the Peoples’ Republic of China is Nigeria’s valued partner in 
progress. We have cooperated extensively in the fields of trade, technology, 
security infrastructure, and human development.26 From investments in 
commuter trains and high-speed railway transit systems to the construction 
of deep seaports, from mega power projects to boost electricity generation 
to the construction of airports in major cities, China is gradually making 
major strides in infrastructure development in Nigeria. Some of the OFI 
projects have been completed and handed over to the host state while 
others are in progress.27 All the railways, seaports, airports, and 
transnational highways projects in Nigeria are being handled by Chinese 
state-owned engineering and construction firms. About 85 percent of the 
infrastructure projects are funded with the oil-backed loans from China and 
Nigeria provides a counterpart fund of 15 percent. 
  
                                                          
26
 “President Buhari Congratulates China on 69th Anniversary,” Press Release, The State 
House, Abuja, September 29, 2018, https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/president-buhari-
congratulates-china-on-69th-anniversary/. 
27
 “President Muhammadu Buhari’s Address at the Commissioning of the Abuja Light Rail 
System,” Speeches and Remarks, State House, Abuja, July 12, 2018, https://statehouse.gov. 
ng/news/president-muhammadu-buharis-address-at-the-commissioning-of-the-abuja-light-
rail-system/. The following projects have been completed including but not limited to the 
Abuja light rail, Papalanto Power Plant, Omotosho Power Plant Phase 1, and Abuja, Port-
Harcourt, and Lagos airports, respectively. 
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Figure 4: Some Key Infrastructure Projects Financed by China 
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Corporation Limited, February 19, 2008, <http://english.crcc.cn/art/2008/2/19/art_21578 
_2435561.htm>.  
29
 Supra “President Muhammadu Buhari’s Address at the Commissioning of the Abuja Light 
Rail System.”  
30
 Supra “Abuja-Kaduna Rail Line,” Projects, Railway Technology (accessed May 28, 2020), 
<https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/abuja-kaduna-rail-line/>. 
31
 Okechukwu Nnodim, “FG, China Sign $3.9bn Abuja-Itakpe-Warri Rail Contract,” Punch 
Newspapers, October 11, 2019, Online edition, <https://punchng.com/fg-china-sign-3-9bn-
abuja-itakpe-warri-rail-contract/>. 
32
 “Nigeria ICRC PPP Platform,” Project, LEKKI DEEP WATER PORT (accessed May 28, 2020) 
<https://ppp.icrc.gov.ng/project/118/lekki-deep-water-port>. 
Year Project Project Cost 
2003 Maintenance & 
Construction of Nigeria 
Railway System & Supply 
of Locomotives28 
RMB4.4 billion 
2016 Abuja Light Rail29 US$824 million 
2011 Abuja-Kaduna Rail Line30 US$876 million 
2019 Abuja-Itakpe-Warri Rail 
Line31 
US$3.9 billion 
2003 Lekki Deep Sea Port32 US$1.6B 
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 “Nigeria ICRC PPP Platform,” Projects, AJAOKUTA-KADUNA-KANO (AKK) GAS PIPELINE 
(accessed May 27, 2020), <https://ppp.icrc.gov.ng/project/295/ajaokuta-kaduna-kano-akk-
gas-pipelinenbsp>. 
34
 Supra “China Helps Light up African Countries,” Ministry of Commerce - People’s Republic 
of China/China Daily, July 16, 2019, <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/ 
counselorsoffice/westernasiaandafricareport/201907/20190702882058.shtm>. 
2017 Ajaokuta-Kaduna-Kano 
(AKK) Gas Pipeline33 
US$2.8B 
2017 Mambilla Hydroelectric 
Plant34 
US$5.8B 
2019 Gurara II Hydropower 
Project 
US$1B 
2014 Zungeru Hydropower Plant US$1.29B 




2018 Port-Harcourt International 
Airport 
US$600M 
2018 Abuja International Airport US$600M 
2013 Lagos International Airport 
(Terminal 2) 
Not Known 
2013 China-Nigeria Friendship US$12M 
1 6 / 2 0 2 0  
 
94 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from the Nigerian government’s 
website, companies’ website, Global Development Policy Center at Boston 
University, and Aid Data, respectively. 
We have seen so far that crude oil and infrastructure development projects 
have been pivotal in the Sino-Nigeria trade and investment relations. In 
what follows, we attempt to map out the consequences of the COVID-19 
pandemic on the dearth of health facilities in Nigeria.  
Nigeria’s Vulnerability to COVID-19 and China’s Contributions 
The Coronavirus (COVID-19) is a novel and highly deadly disease which is 
caused by a virus that is in the same family with the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome.36 The initial known cases were reported to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in late 2019 from Wuhan City, in the Hubei Province of 
China.37 The COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the global health body 
and at the time of writing, has no scientifically proven vaccine. The 
pandemic has increasingly ravaged almost all the countries in the world, 
including Nigeria and China – the two most populated countries on two 
continents. On February 27, 2020, Nigeria with a population of about 202 
million people reported its first case of the virus involving an Italian national 
                                                          
35
 “China-Assisted Hospital Commissioned in Nigeria,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of 
China in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, January 29, 2013, http://za.china-embassy.org/ 
eng/zfgxss/ca00/t1009068.htm. See also “China Donates Federal Staff Hospital / China-
Nigeria Friendship Hospital,” Projects, China Aid Data, 2017, <https://china.aiddata.org/ 
projects/30629#amount>. 
36
 “Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus That Causes It,” Diseases: 
Technical Guidance, World Health Organization, <http://www.who.int/emergencies/ 
diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(cov 
id-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it> (accessed July 4, 2020). 
37
 “Pneumonia of Unknown Cause – China,” Disease Outbreak News, World Health 
Organization, January 5, 2020, <http://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-
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who works in Nigeria and had returned from Milan.38 He later recovered and 
was discharged from a hospital. As of July 4, 2020, Nigeria has a total 
number of 28,167 confirmed cases of COVID-19.39 Out of that number, a 
total of 11,462 persons have been discharged from hospitals and isolation 
centres. About 634, including government and ruling party officials,40 have 
succumbed to the virus.41 
Although there has been an economic intervention by the Nigerian 
government to fight the pandemic, the human population in the African 
country is highly vulnerable to the COVID-19.42 Since the attainment of 
independence in 1960, there has been an abysmal lack of investment in 
healthcare facilities by Nigeria’s federal and state governments. Poor 
healthcare infrastructure, inadequate funding of the health sector, and lack 
of robust health policy frameworks have led to the high hospital mortality 
rate in the country.43 In an on-going case in a Nigerian court, an anti-
corruption non-governmental organization - the Socio-Economic Rights and 
Accountability Project are seeking to compel Nigerian state governors to use 
public funds budgeted for their security votes44 and life pensions to fund the 
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health sector and address the impact of COVID-19 on Nigerians, among 
other requests.45 Healthcare workers in government-owned hospitals are 
usually owed salaries for many months leading to industrial actions that 
paralyze the health sector.46 There is a high rate of medical brain drain from 
Nigeria which has shown no sign of abating.47 For lack of standard medical 
facilities in government hospitals, the Nigerian elite, including current and 
former government officials48 and their family members usually seek 
medical care in foreign countries such as Germany, United Kingdom, the 
United States, and India.49 Empirical data indicates that Nigeria is not 
prepared to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic as it currently has the 
                                                                                                                                                      
heads of government with or without legislative appropriation, supposedly - on security 
without the requirement of disclosure on how the money is spent. Thus, what constitutes 
security vote may not have been appropriated by the relevant legislature; and even where 
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imperative duty of making any disclosure. See Ngozi Joy Ezeilo, Uchechukwu Nwoke, and 
Ndubuisi Sylvester Anya, “The (Un)Constitutional Appropriation and Expenditure of Public 
Funds in Nigeria: Analysing the ‘Security Vote’ Paradigm Through the Law,” Journal of 
African Law 62, no. 2 (2018): 225–53. 
45
 “COVID-19: SERAP Asks Court to Compel Govs to Fund Healthcare with Security Votes,” 
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Adebayo, “Africa’s Leaders Forced to Confront Healthcare Systems They Neglected for 
Years,” Text, CNN, April 10, 2020, <https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/10/africa/african-
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capacity to test only 2,500 samples a day, and just half of these are 
administered each day because of a shortage of human resources, testing 
kits, and laboratories.50 Before the outbreak, Nigeria had only 350 
ventilators and 350 intensive care unit beds for its entire population of 
about 200 million.51 In April 2020, the country acquired 100 more 
ventilators.52 Given that there has been a continuous rise in the number of 
cases and deaths in the country and no flattening of the curve has yet been 
observed,53 the facilities are not enough, and Nigeria may plunge into a 
health catastrophe if there is no foreign or international assistance and 
cooperation.  
Notwithstanding that scores of xenophobic attacks against Nigerian 
residents in China in the wake of COVID-19 has triggered diplomatic rows 
between Beijing and Abuja,54 there has been some level of cooperation and 
solidarity between China and Nigeria in the area of healthcare. In 2013, for 
example, a 150-bed China-Nigeria Friendship Hospital was built in Abuja as a 
gift from Beijing to mark the 42nd anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries.55 Beijing and Abuja have 
supported each other in the fight against the global pandemic through the 
exchange of medical and scientific knowledge. China Railway Construction 
Corporation has sent a team of health workers from Beijing to assist Nigeria 
                                                          
50
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July 2, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/07/02/how-well 
-has-nigeria-responded-to-covid-19/>. 
51
 Siddharth Dixit et al. 
52
 Siddharth Dixit et al. 
53
 Siddharth Dixit et al. 
54
 Zaheena Rasheed, Qazi Ramy Allahoum, Shereena, “‘Unacceptable’: Nigeria Condemns 




 “China-Assisted Hospital Commissioned in Nigeria.” 
1 6 / 2 0 2 0  
 
98 
in the fight against COVID-19.56 Beijing has also donated various types of 
medical supplies to Nigeria.57 In May 2020, following a request by the 
Nigerian government, the China Civil Engineering Company built, equipped 
and handed over a Dome Treatment Centre to their host state to help in the 
treatment of COVID-19 patients.58 Crucially, the Sino-Nigeria trade and 
investment cooperation recently received a new impetus at the 
Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity against COVID-19. During 
the Summit, President Xi Jinping pledged China’s continued support to 
Africa’s response to COVID-19.59 President Jinping’s promise to cancel the 
debt of African states to China and extend the period of debt suspension for 
some other countries who have been hit hard by the pandemic and are 
currently under huge economic stress60 gives additional impetus to Beijing’s 
trade relations with African states. For its part, the European Union has 
demonstrated global leadership and cooperation by supporting Nigeria on 
its fight against COVID-19 through a donation of EUR 50 million.61  
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Mapping the Consequences of COVID-19 on Chinese Oil-Backed Loans to 
Nigeria 
The Sino-Nigeria trade and investment relations have been greatly 
strengthened through the grant of loans to the host state. The crucial place 
of Chinese loans in the economic relations is patently evinced by the 
Nigerian president’s speech to the Board of Directors of the country’s 
Economic Summit Group where he stated: 
“We send our gratitude to the Chinese for all their support to Nigeria. Since 
independence, no country has helped our country on infrastructural 
development like the Chinese. In some projects, the Chinese help us with 85 
percent payment, and soft loans that span 20 years. No country has done 
that for us.”62 
Chinese loans to Nigeria are concessional in that they are given on 
substantially more generous terms than those of Bretton Woods and the 
Paris Club. The concessional loans have low interest rates of 2.50 percent 
per annum with a tenor of 20 years and a grace period of 7 years.63 The 
Chinese SOFIs such as the Export-Import Bank of China, China Development 
Bank, and China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation administer the loans 
on loans on behalf of their home government.  
However, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the current plunge in 
international oil prices pose serious threats to the Sino-Nigeria trade and 
investment cooperation and the successful completion of the many critical 
infrastructure projects which we saw earlier. This is because as we stated 
above, a huge part of the Chinese loans to Nigeria are collateralized with 
crude oil. The projects that can generate huge revenues to fund the cost of 
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their construction such as seaports have not been completed. That many of 
the loans are collateralized with crude oil exacerbates Nigeria’s debt profile 
to its creditor as the means of repaying the loans are currently complicated. 
Crude oil is the major source of revenue for the Nigerian government, 
accounting for about 86 percent of its total export earnings.64 Nigeria’s fiscal 
revenues is currently in deficit and may go into a deep recession in late 2020 
as a result of declined petroleum exports in light of the global financial crises 
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.65 
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated Nigeria’s already battered 
economy and its rising debt to China. The Nigerian government borrows 
from Chinese state-owned financial institutions to carry out huge 
infrastructure projects. Data from the Debt Management Office of Nigeria 
shows that as of the end of the first quarter of 2020, Nigeria’s debt to Exim 
Bank of China stood at US$3.121 billion.66 Beijing is facing pressure from 
some African leaders to cancel debts owed by countries in the continent 
since the early 2000s. In light of the plunge in the prices of oil and the global 
economic meltdown, scholars and commentators are cynical about the 
prospects of the successful execution of China-funded projects in many 
African countries. However, despite the economic threat posed to Sino-
Nigeria trade and investment cooperation by COVID-19, China has continued 
to fulfill, albeit gradually, its contractual obligations under the OFI 
arrangement. On June 30, 2020, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari 
virtually flagged off the construction of a US$2.5 billion Trans-Nigeria gas 
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pipeline project which was awarded to a consortium of Chinese engineering 
and construction firms and financed by Bank of China and Sinosure.67 
COVID-19 and the Doctrine of Force Majeure in Sino-Nigeria Oil-Backed 
Loans 
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, many health and safety restrictive 
measures such as lockdowns, suspension of non-essential travels, social and 
physical distancing have been put in place and enforced in national and 
transnational spaces. Generally, COVID-19 and the restrictive68 measures 
have made the performance of the contractual obligations undertaken by 
investors and their trading partners almost commercially impracticable.  
COVID-19 and its attendant restrictive measures are supervening events in 
which parties to an agreement could not have foreseen or avoided at the 
time of entering into the contract and which prevent or delay the 
performance of contractual duties and obligations. In contract law, the 
supervening events are known as force majeure and frustration of 
contract.69 Some of the examples of force majeure events in common law 
include tornadoes, lightning, floods, fire, earthquakes, droughts, and severe 
weather conditions. Typically, epidemics and pandemics are not included as 
examples of force majeure. For a party to a contract to rely on force 
majeure, the contract must contain a force majeure clause as well as either 
the specific events or effects that force majeure may have on the 
performance of the contract. Long-term contracts involving the sale or 
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supply of oil, coal, or natural gas often include a force majeure clause.70 
Regrettably, it is not possible to know if there are force majeure clauses in 
the China-Nigeria oil-backed loan agreements or the type of natural events 
that the clauses cover as the deals are rarely available in the public domain. 
At present, China has begun to issue force majeure certificates to its 
companies in various sectors to give to their overseas business partners.71 
Chinese international oil and natural gas companies such as CNOOC have 
declared force majeure on some petroleum contracts.72  
That being said, Article 8 of the China-Nigeria BIT provides that state to state 
investment disputes are to be settled amicably through diplomatic channels 
and shall be submitted to international arbitration only when the parties 
cannot reach an agreement within twelve months.73 In a similar vein, 
investment disputes between a Chinese investor and a Nigerian business 
enterprise and vice versa are to be settled through negotiations.74 In the 
event of a failure in the negotiations, the dispute shall be submitted to a 
Nigerian court. This aligns with the Declaration of the Beijing Summit 2006 
and Beijing Platform for Action where China and African states agreed to 
address trade and economic disputes that may arise between them through 
friendly consultation and mutual understanding.75  
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
We have seen that there is increased trade and investment cooperation 
between China and Nigeria. We have also stated Nigeria’s debt profile to 
China is on the rise. The outbreak of the COVID-19 and the current nosedive 
in international oil prices have significantly halted the execution of Chinese-
funded infrastructure projects in Nigeria. However, if Beijing fulfills its 
promise to suspend loan repayment and cancel Nigeria’s debt and those of 
other African states who are in deep economic distress, it will not only 
cushion the economic effects of the pandemic in Africa but will also 
strengthen China’s relations with the continent. Furthermore, it will 
enhance China’s global image in the context of its economic engagements 
with Nigeria and other African countries which have for some time received 
a barrage of criticisms based on debt-trap diplomacy and neo-colonialism 
theories. The suspension of loan repayment and debt cancellation by China 
will reinforce Beijing’s economic principle of mutual benefit and its idea that 
international trade should not take a dominance-dependence structure. A 
prospective act of magnanimity of such magnitude in an era of global 
economic meltdown is likely to enhance China’s credibility in its move to 
create a new global economic and investment order. The provisions of the 
China-Nigeria BIT on diplomatic and negotiated trade dispute resolution 
have the potentials to deepen trade and investment relations between 
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Abstract: This article analyses how the emergence of the global health security 
norm of the COVID-19 pandemic has played out as a threat to African security – the 
appearance of the foreign virus. The article provides a framework for understanding 
the securitisation of the COVID-19 epidemic as an international norm defined and 
promoted by the World Health Organisation and cascaded down to the level of 
African member states. However, at an African level, it encounters resistance as a 
‘foreign virus’. This is completely in line with previous epidemics, such as Ebola. The 
predominant reported weakness in West African national responses was a 
pervasive lack of trust in government institutions, mistrust up to the highest level of 
government in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This article derives this consequence from 
West Africa’s ontological security derived through its colonial past and its past 
relationship with Europe. As was the case with Ebola, with COVID-19, several 
communities initially refused to believe that the virus outbreak was real, judging it 
to be part of a conspiracy by Europe and the international community.  




African security during the Cold War was dictated by the geo-political 
interests, manipulations and manoeuvres of the great powers. The countries 
on the continent of Africa, just like other Third World countries, were pawns 
on the political chess board of the great powers. Regimes were protected no 
matter how bad they were as long as they supported either of the great 
powers. Every other source of insecurity such as internal or intrastate 
conflict was unconstitutionally and draconically quelled and subdued. There 
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was no policy to articulate a regional or national security architecture that 
would be in the national or regional security interest of the people. Because 
of this external involvement in the internal politics of African states, they 
became the battleground for proxy wars as conflicts and armed opposition 
to the incumbent regimes escalated. They were managed with military 
assistance from the patron foreign states – the United States of America or 
the Soviet Union. African security thus became a victim of Cold War politics 
in two ways. One is that even after independence there was lack of home-
grown security direction or mechanisms that naturally should flow from 
regional or national security issues. Two, arising from the first, is the ad hoc 
approach in securitization of these issues. In other words, the neo-
patrimonial state actors according to their security interests embarked on 
framing issues as security threats in line with the securitization framework. 
Scholarly works on Africa paid attention to this Cold War impact on African 
security. The support African countries received during this period were 
dependent on which side of the fence they stood - but this hobnobbing 
could not last forever. The end of the Cold War revealed those fault lines 
that were ignored and not securitised. There is no shortage of literature on 
the relations between Africa and the Cold War protagonists. Where the 
literature is silent is in relation to the security challenges that befell Africans 
during this period. Africa and its interests were interpreted, subsumed and 
aligned along the Cold War interests and strategic pursuits of the great 
powers. Africa’s security issues - especially during the Cold War epoch - 
suffered serious attention deficits and hence little or no scholarly work 
addressing them emerged; instead, it was the relationship that benefited 
the superpowers that received academic attention.  
Considering the above, the silence in the literature on African security was 
broken following the withdrawal of the great powers from the continent, 
the shifting of attention to other places such as East Europe, the implosions 
in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the attendant security 
upheavals. For instance starting from Liberia and Sierra Leone, West Africa 
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which is the focus of this article witnessed serious crises. The scholarly 
attempts at discussing the security of the continent started gaining ground 
from this period onwards. However, what is still missing in these works is a 
broader notion of security, from a critical security perspective, vis-à-vis post-
Cold War West African security studies. There is a significant lack application 
of such a valuable idea to the study of West African security: first, 
securitization theory is Eurocentric in both origin and application; second, as 
a result, West Africa’s security challenges are not addressed. It is therefore 
argued here that analysis of West Africa’s security will benefit by addressing 
that significant gap – the aim of this article. 
This article analyses how the emergence of the global health security norm 
of the COVID-19 pandemic has played out as a threat to African security – 
the appearance of the foreign virus. The article provides a framework for 
understanding the securitization of the COVID-19 epidemic as an 
international norm defined and promoted by the World Health 
Organisation, and cascaded down to the level of African member states. 
However, at an African level, it encounters resistance as a ‘foreign virus’. 
This is completely in line with previous epidemics, such as Ebola1. The 
predominant reported weakness in West African national responses was a 
pervasive lack of trust in government institutions, mistrust up to the highest 
level of government in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This article derives this 
consequence from West Africa’s ontological security derived through its 
colonial past and its past relationship with Europe. As was the case with 
Ebola, with COVID-19, several communities initially refused to believe that 
the virus outbreak was real, judging it to be part of a conspiracy by Europe 
and the international community. 
  
                                                          
1
 A. Kamradt-Scott, S. Harman, C. Wenham, and F. Smith, Saving lives: The civil–military 
response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in west Africa (Sydney: University of Sydney, 2015). 
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Global Health Security & Securitization 
Developed in the waning years of Cold War politics, broader notions of 
security have seriously challenged the traditional European and American 
military-realist perspective in security studies. They are more contemporary, 
dynamic and in tandem with emerging global security issues away from a 
static ‘as-it-is’ idea of world security2. One aspect of these new theoretical 
innovations is the idea of securitisation, introduced by the Copenhagen 
School whose main scholars are Ole Waever and Barry Buzan. They have 
defined securitisation as a speech-act process ‘through which an inter-
subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to 
treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to 
enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat’3. 
But the threat only becomes securitised ‘only if and when the audience 
accepts it as such’4.  
In other words, according to Buzan and Wæver (also known as the 
‘Copenhagen School’), security is a ‘speech act’5. It is an intersubjective and 
socially constructed phenomenon. Key concepts in the securitisation 
framework are the ‘securitising actor’, who socially constructs a specific 
issue as a threat to the survival of a given entity, known as the ‘referent 
object’, which therefore requires urgent protection through the use of 
                                                          
2
 H. Stritzel, “Towards a theory of securitisation: Copenhagen and beyond,” European 
Journal of International Relations 13, 1 (2007): 357. 
3
 Barry Buzan and Waever Ole, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
4
 Barry Buzan, Waever Ole and de Wilder, Security: New Framework for Analysis (London: 
Lynne Reinner, 1998). 
5
 Waever Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in On security, ed. R. D. Lipschutz (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Paul Roe, “Actor, Audience(s) and emergency 
measures: Securitization and UK’s decision to invade Iraq,” Security Dialogue 39, 6 (2008): 
615; Thierry Balzacq, “The three faces of Securitization: Political agency, audience and 
context,” European Journal of International Relations 11, 2 (2005): 75; Thierry Balzacq, “The 
policy tools of securitization: Information Exchange; ‘European foreign and interior 
policies’,” European journal of common market studies 46, 1 (2008): 171. 
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extraordinary measures. Another important concept is that of the 
‘audience’. According to the Copenhagen School, ‘[a] discourse that takes 
the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent 
object does not by itself create securitisation – this is a securitising move, 
but the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as 
such’6. To sum up, securitisation is understood as a process whereby a given 
actor frames a specific issue as an ‘existential threat’, which is then 
presented to a target audience for approval in order to employ 
extraordinary means and measures to tackle it7. 
Health issues have become of significant importance to securitisation 
scholars8, often due to global mobility, which can be affected by global 
pandemics9 such as COVID-19. In this debate, questions about the 
normative and methodological dimensions of securitisation of global health 
have been at the forefront, for instance: should health problems be 
securitised?; have securitising moves in relation to health issues been 
successful?10. In this debate, we can identify three important contributions: 
firstly, Elbe’s work on the normative dilemma in relation to the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS11, whereby he contends the fact that 
securitisation leads to raising awareness, and, thus, a wider recognition of 
the negative effects followed by a stronger allocation of resources to curb 
the pandemic. However, he warns of the massive state involvement at the 
expense of other actors, leading ‘toward military and intelligence 
                                                          
6
 Barry Buzan, Waever Ole and de Wilder, Security: New Framework for Analysis (London: 
Lynne Reinner, 1998). 
7
 Sarah Leonard and Christian Kaunert, European Union, Refugees, and Security (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2019). 
8
 Thiery Balzacq, Sarah Leonard and J. Ruzicka, “Securitization revisited: theory and cases,” 
International Relations 30, 4 (2016): 494. 
9
 S. J. Maclean, “Microbes, mad cows and militaries: Exploring the links between health and 
security,” Security Dialogue 39, 5 (2008): 475-94. 
10
 Thiery Balzacq, S. Leonard and J. Ruzicka, ‘’Securitization revisited: theory and cases,” 
International Relations 30, 4 (2016). 
11
 S. Elbe, “Should HIV/AIDS be securitized? the ethical dilemmas of linking HIV/AIDS and 
security,” International Studies Quarterly 50, 1 (2005): 119-44. 
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organisations with the power to override the civil liberties of persons with 
HIV/AIDS’ and the ‘threat-defence logic’12. Building on this, secondly, 
Youde13 agrees with Elbe about the disadvantages of securitising health 
issues, identifying three main costs of the securitisation of avian flu: (1) 
inappropriate responses with traditional security means, (2) increased 
vulnerability to other threats as a result of disproportionate resources being 
allocated to the securitised threat, and (3) an increased gap between 
Western states and the rest of the world. Thirdly, Sjöstedt14 explains the 
securitisation process of HIV/AIDS in Russia in the face of policy-makers who 
did not believe the threat narrative and dismissed it as a Western 
construction. In her contribution, she utilizes Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
account of ‘norm cascade’15. This article follows Sjöstedt16 and, in particular, 
Vieira17, who provides a framework for analysing the securitisation of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic as an international norm defined and promoted by 
multilateral bodies. The article agrees with the conceptualisation of the 
UNSC as an important actor in establishing the global health security norm, 
framed health issue in security terms, but also aimed at replacing one kind 
of security logic with another as a basis for remedial action.  
Ontological Security in West Africa 
The use of ontological security, developed over the last 10 years in 
International Relations, has proved to be of help to better understand the 
                                                          
12
 Ibid., 119. 
13
 J. Youde, “Who is afraid of chicken: Securitization and avian flu,” Democracy and security 
4, 2 (2008): 148. 
14
 R. Sjöstedt, “Exploring the Construction of threats: Securitization of Hiv/Aids in Russia,” 
Security Dialogue 39, 1 (2008): 7. 
15
 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organisation 52, 4 (1998): 887. 
16
 R. Sjöstedt, “Exploring the Construction of threats: Securitization of Hiv/Aids in Russia,” 
Security Dialogue 39, 1 (2008). 
17
 M. Vieira, “The Securitization of HIV/AID Epidemic as a Norm: A contribution to 
Constructivist Scholarship on the Emergence and Diffusion of International Norms,” 
Brazilian Political Science Review 1, 2 (2007): 137. 
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emotional reasons behind the apprehensions and fears of African citizens18. 
Steele’s book19 builds on previous work on ontological security, such as 
Jennifer Mitzen, Catarina Kinnvall, and Jef Huysmans20. The concept is based 
on Anthony Giddens’ definition of ontological security - a “sense of 
continuity and order in events.”21 Steele operationalises ontological security 
through the motivation of states.  Firstly, for a state ‘to be ontologically 
secure’ it must ‘possess answers to fundamental existential questions which 
all human life in some way addresses22. Secondly, agents turn actions into 
‘routines which contribute to their sense of ‘continuity and order’ that is so 
important to their sense of self’23. Ontological security is thus ‘predictability 
in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social 
identities’24. Ontological Security presents a specific type of challenge — a 
‘critical situation’ — and can undermine a state’s identity25. It can cause 
anxiety and shame. Thus, unlike the Copenhagen School definition of 
security as survival, ontological security is ‘security as being’, a concept 
borrowed from the field of social psychology. The concept of ontological 
security is primarily driven by emotion; ‘the primary role of emotion in 
humans is to alert the individual experiencing the emotion that action in 
some situation is necessary26.’ Thus, emotions help coordination actions by 
prioritizing a selection of information.  
                                                          
18
 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self Identity and the IR 




 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security 
Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12, 6 (2006): 341-370; Catarina 
Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity and the Search for 
Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25, 5 (2004): 741-767; Jef Huysmans, “Security! 
What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,” European Journal of International 










 Ibid., 2-3. 
26
 Ibid., 12-13. 
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Ontological security cornerstone is the analysis of autobiographical 
narratives and routines and how they are used as vehicles to exhale one’s 
anxiety. It was also applied the ontological security lens to analyse 
narratives and better conceptualize and understand how different 
perceptions and experiences of menaces to public security fluctuate 
according to identity, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, location, and 
generation. Moreover, according to Catarina Kinnvall27, an ontological 
security approach allows us to unveil how fears and anxieties influence 
groups, states and to understand the psycho-socio-political effects that 
shape political movements, policy debate at the African security level. 
Ontological security seeks, therefore, to dissect biographical narratives and 
repeated practices as way to understand how these practices outline 
political choices and its consequences. In spite of the fact that physical and 
ontological security are theoretically different, they are nonetheless 
intrinsically related. Traumatic events such as being victim of violent crimes, 
being a victim of terrorist attacks or subject to harsh physical traumas, may 
transform negatively personal and collective identities and unleash the 
feeling of ontological insecurity28. Allied to the analysis of the discourses and 
practices, ontological security emerges as an auspicious theoretical and 
empirical input not only to this particular project within West African 
security studies arena, but similarly opens the door to novel theoretical and 
methodological approaches with the security studies in general 
acknowledging providing a more holistic approach to answer research 
questions. Issues related to the emergence of ontological (in) security are 
mainly related to the search for a self-identity that can emotionally 
structure the individual within its community. It turns out that when all that 
is socially known and inherently acquired, and when routines are disrupted, 
there is a destabilization and a shudder of all that gives the individual and 
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the society where he is inserted, a sense of solidity and confidence, paving 
the way for ontological insecurity.  
Development of global health security norms – the case of Ebola 
Kamradt-Scott29 analysed the World Health Organisation (WHO) Secretariat 
as a norm entrepreneur in establishing a new norm in global communicable 
disease control. In his work, he utilised Finnemore and Sikkink’s30 “norm life 
cycle” theory and analysed how the new practice of using ‘unofficial sources 
of information to verify disease outbreaks’ was progressively advanced 
under the guise of revising the International Health Regulations (IHR). 
Notably, Kamradt-Scott31 contends that a new practice was established as a 
norm in the WHO. According to him32, the WHO secretariat promoted its 
ability to manage global health security. According to Davies, Kamradt-Scott, 
and Rushton33, global health governance underwent a significant set of 
reforms in 2005, which resulted in the revision of the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) and focused on disease surveillance and reporting 
mechanisms. Thus, it constituted a broader consideration of issues that 
could potentially entail health risks globally. It also opened the way for the 
intervention of non-state actors in disease notification. Davies, Kamradt-
Scott and Rushton34 demonstrated convincingly how states were able to 
‘reconceptualise their interests in ways that favoured cooperation over 
isolationism’. External shocks (such as the 2002 to 2004 SARS outbreak) 
were interpreted in a broad ideational context whereby states’ preferences 
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were shaped by concerns about what constitutes responsible international 
behaviour. Despite instances of noncompliance, states often adjust their 
behaviour to meet new expectations. In their view, the IHR revision process 
constituted the ‘codification of a new set of expectations’35. Security 
vocabulary and rationality were fundamental in the process leading to the 
implementation of the IHR and helped to convince states that it was in their 
interest to cooperate more closely towards a more effective and 
proportionate international response.  
The WHO was established in 1948 with the express objective of improving 
the health of all populations worldwide36. Within the mandate of its 
objective, the containment and eradication of infectious diseases was 
considered to be the WHO’s primary task, for which it was provided with 
considerable authority and autonomy in order to achieve this as a 
precondition for peace and security. Infectious diseases would adversely 
affect not only the health of populations, but also the global economy, by 
disrupting international trade37. Thus, the WHO was provided with the 
objective of eliminating infectious diseases wherever they arose. The WHO 
has played a significant role in several public health achievements, most 
notably the eradication of smallpox, the near eradication of polio, and the 
development of an Ebola vaccine38. In stark contrast, however, the 
organisation’s response to several pandemics has been questioned39: (1) the 
2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak; and (2) the 
response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and of the 2014 outbreak of Ebola 
Virus Disease (EVD) in West Africa. This has led to several independent 
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external reviews of the organisation’s performance. McInnes40 suggests that 
criticisms of the WHO’s performance, including the subsequent 2014 Ebola 
crisis, but also those earlier epidemics, reflected also tensions between 
different forms of authority.  
Regarding West Africa, the major challenge is the area of health is poor 
health care systems41. The national budget on health by African countries is 
low. This results in insufficient and dilapidated infrastructures due to lack of 
resources. African countries do not have adequate number of trained health 
workers and standby capacity to deal with any domestic surge in health 
crisis. Health workers are leaving in large numbers to other climes for better 
pay and conditions of service. There is continuous surge in medical tourism 
by the rich and privileged while local health services suffer. These were 
evident in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the Ebola crisis. There was no way 
the governments in Freetown and Monrovia could manage the crisis. They 
had to depend on assistance from both and external entities. But they had 
to grapple with the concern of the impression from the population of 
receiving orders from foreign government. However, foreign military 
assistance came majorly from the United States of America and Britain. 
According to Adam Kamradt-Scott et al. (2015), subsequent to West African 
national responses, notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone, brought a pervasive 
lack of trust in government institutions to the forefront. In Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, citizens did not trust their own government, up the highest level, and 
the military was perceived as the only trustworthy actor. This mistrust 
significantly hampered the Ebola response as well as coordination efforts. 
Important communities in Sierra Leone and Liberia did not accept the Ebola 
outbreak as real, perceiving it as part of a government conspiracy with the 
ambition to get funding from Western donors. Furthermore, this suspicion 
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eventually turned against international community. The community started 
to believe conspiracy theories. Notably, the perception of Ebola was shaped 
as intentionally introduced to depopulate West Africa for its mineral 
resources. The conspiracy theories have very clear links to ontological fears 
of colonial and post-colonial times in West Africa. Fears and anxieties 
influenced West African citizens; the psycho-socio-political effects of 
ontological security clearly shaped their perceptions of the pandemic - thus, 
the policy debate on health security. Consequently, there were significant 
incidents of violence against both national health workers as well as NGO 
representatives in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
COVID-19 and Africa 
The devastating 2014–2016 Ebola Virus Epidemic in West Africa showed 
how badly prepared the respective countries were to the crisis. Similarly, 
2018–19 Ebola Virus outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo also 
showed the devastation that can be caused even for health services with 
considerable experience. Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic caused considerable 
fear in West Africa. There is a strong similarity between the approach 
adopted in managing Ebola and the current COVID-19 pandemics. In early 
January 2020, the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention raised 
concern over reported cases of pneumonia coming from Wuhan42. The 
Emergency Operations Centre for the pandemic was immediately put in 
place as four countries in Asia confirmed cases of COVID-19. Experience 
from 2014 Ebola issues was enough to spur African leaders to consider 
COVID-19 a serious security threat to the continent. They were fully aware 
that failing to handle the pandemics would negatively impact on the health, 
economy and security of the continent. The approaches in handling the 
crisis showed some commonality among the countries in Africa43.  
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Towards the end of March 2020, few African countries were beginning to 
record cases of the pandemic (Cameroon, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Togo, 
South Africa, and Senegal). Most of the initial cases in these countries could 
be traced to Europe which had become the epicentre of the disease by this 
period. For example, the index case in Nigeria happened to be an Italian 
citizen returning from Italy to work in Nigeria44. A second case was also a 
Nigerian citizen who had contact with the Italian citizen. Coming from the 
history of disease outbreaks in the continent African leaders needed to be 
serious in managing the issue of COVID-19. It earned priority among all 
other issues at the moment. Tourism, trade, sporting activities, social 
events, and holidays had to be suspended. Bill Gates warned that Africa 
could record as high as 10 million deaths from the disease45. Containment 
and mitigation measures were put in place reflecting the global health 
environment. Since the outbreak of the disease in China, several countries 
became seriously affected by huge numbers of cases of infection and death 
tolls. Countries were beginning to shut their borders from foreigners to 
avoid further spikes in cases. African countries had to follow the same line of 
action as countries in the West and in Asia. They instituted travel bans on 
most affected Asian and European countries including United Kingdom, 
Italy, Germany, China, Iran, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Netherlands, Spain 
and United States. There was also closure of borders except for cargos and 
freights46. Considering that Africa is destination point for most of these 
countries for business and many other exchanges, the benefits from such 
interactions were no longer considered important enough. Health security 
was now given serious attention.  
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The disease was beginning to appear to be a foreign disease. Suspicion arose 
among Africans that COVID-19, like Ebola, was a grand design by the West to 
depopulate the African continent47. There was uproar against the remark by 
Bill Gates that there would be a high death toll from Africa arising from the 
pandemic. News reports of high rise in cases were greeted with high 
nonchalance and disbelief. Leaders were thought to be complicit to such 
unproven complicity. Directives to get people to abide by the rules of social 
distancing were not adhered to because COVID-19 was not accepted as 
‘real’. For instance, in the Kano area of Nigeria, the governor made an 
argument that the cases of deaths recorded were as a result of ‘mysterious 
circumstances’ and issues like hypertension, diabetes, meningitis and acute 
malaria48. Citizens were suspicious as people from heavily infected areas 
were not allowed to go into other areas. COVID-19 also caused serious social 
dislocation as people were no longer able to interact and socialise freely for 
fear of contacting the disease. Social events were discontinued; churches, 
mosques, markets, restaurants were all shut. Considering the nature of the 
local economies, it was not easy to abide by those rules of social distancing.  
It was only a matter of time until the disease started having serious 
devastating impact on African countries and the deficiencies in the health 
services were exposed. Rising cases and deaths were recorded across 
African countries. Makeshift quarantine facilities started springing up in 
different countries. Some foreign assistance were recorded; in early 
February 2020, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation committed US$20 
million to help strengthen emergency operations centres, effective 
surveillance and contact tracing and isolation on the continent’49. Each of 
the 55 countries in Africa also received some medical supplies, such as 
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diagnostics and equipment from Jack Ma Foundation50. However, African 
countries did their best in trying to provide some support to the citizens. 
The citizens resorted to helping themselves by producing masks for instance 
from local fabrics; hand sanitizers put in place in public places like markets. 
Senegal developed a COVID-19 testing kit that would in ten minutes detect a 
positive case current or previous through antigens in the saliva. The country 
is among those in the continent that did not record too many deaths. The 
same thing applies to Ghana with its extensive system of contact tracing, 
utilising a large number of community health workers and volunteers, and 
other innovative techniques such as pool testing in which multiple blood 
samples are tested and then followed up as individual tests only if positive 
results are found. This approach is appreciated by the World Bank. 
Madagascar had to go the way of traditional herbal remedies such Artemisia 
annua which claimed to have provided cure to the country and is being 
exported to other African countries for trial. This was beneficial as African 
countries cannot afford expensive pharmaceutical products. 
In conclusion, the African response to the novel COVID-19 became a self-
help approach with the whole world engulfed in the pandemic. At the same 
time, suspicion that the pandemic was not originally an African disease – a 
foreign disease – resulted in conspiracy theory, as with Ebola. The problem 
was perceived as an imported problem from abroad. Again, as with Ebola, 
these conspiracy theories have very clear links to ontological fears of 
colonial and post-colonial times in West Africa where foreigners were 
bringing in misery, pain and hardship. These fears and anxieties influenced 
African citizens. The ontological security of Africa clearly shaped their 
perceptions of the pandemic - thus, the perception of a foreign virus.  
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This article analysed how the emergence of the global health security norm 
of the COVID-19 pandemic has played out as a threat to African security – it 
appeared in the form of a foreign virus. While the WHO rang the alarm bells 
globally to prevent the spread of the disease, and while this global health 
security norm of COVID-19 was generally accepted, it arrived in Africa as a 
foreign – Western – imposition, despite its origin in China. This is a 
continuation of fears from previous epidemics, such as Ebola51. This article 
suggested that ontological security fears in Africa were driving this process, 
fears derived from its colonial past and its past relationship with Europe and 
the West. As was the case with Ebola, with COVID-19, African citizens 
refused to believe that the virus outbreak was real. The use of ontological 
security, as conceptualised in this article, has proved to be of help to better 
understand the emotional reasons behind the apprehensions and fears of 
African citizens52. Ontological security has been defined here as the “sense 
of continuity and order in events.”53 Ontological security thus achieves 
‘predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable 
social identities’54. The concept of ontological security is primarily driven by 
emotion; emotions help coordination actions by prioritizing a selection of 
information. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, the predictable 
relationship between Africa and the West has been one of exploitation, as 
evidenced by colonial times. Western colonists would acquire African 
territory and resources to enrich Europe and the West. The net losers of this 
geopolitical game were Africans. Consequently, it is only understandable 
that the information from the COVID-19 pandemics, as was the case with 
Ebola, is one of Western exploitation of Africa. Only too understandable that 
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COVID-19 would be a foreign disease – perhaps to acquire African material 
resources. Conspiracy theories that use real existing ontological security 
fears are likely to be accepted, against all medical evidence. Ontological 
security needs to provide a sense of continuity and order in events – and 
this is the established accepted relationship between Africa and the West, 
as seen from Africa.  
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Human Security in Africa during the COVID-19 Pandemic and 
Sustainability of the EU-Africa Relationship System 
 





Abstract: The article, using the example of the human security crisis in Africa and 
the EU caused by COVID-19, explores the likelihood of transformation of the entire 
EU-Africa relationship system. The key threats and challenges to the humanitarian 
security environment of African countries are examined, the example of its social 
subsystem detailed as the most complex and multifactorial. The internal and 
external risks for the EU are analysed in the implementation of the African vector of 
its foreign policy in a pandemic situation. It is argued that, despite the difficulties 
encountered for both sides, the development of the EU-Africa relationship system 
itself will not change its path: the system remains balanced and based on a 
pragmatic approach.  
Key words: human security, Africa, COVID-19, European Union, migration. 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘human security’ first entered the political vocabulary in 1994 in 
the text of the Human Development Report of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP). It was interpreted as a dual concept: firstly, 
as “safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and 
repression”; and secondly, as “protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives—whether in our homes, in our 
jobs, in our communities or in our environment.”1 By the beginning of the 
2000s, human security had become a global norm, understood as a 
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consensus among a large group of states and international organizations 
that individuals and communities have the right to protection from harm 
and that other entities (including states or organizations) can and should 
assist them in providing this protection. 
The European Union considers human security an important part of its 
international political identity. This is reflected both in official documents of 
the European Union—for example, the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and 
Security Policy (2016)2—and in well-known reports: the Barcelona Report 
(2004), the Madrid Report (2007), and the Berlin report of the Human 
Security Study Group (2016).3 
An important direction for the EU’s promotion of human security is Africa. 
There is a wide range of reasons for this, at the core of which are Africa’s 
colonial past and historical memory; the EU’s role in the architecture of 
modern humanitarianism as one of the key providers of humanitarian 
assistance; and the security of the European Union itself, which is in the 
focus of huge migration flows from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Therefore, the EU, together with African countries, has developed a number 
of complementary programs and projects that emphasize the various 
features of the continent so that assistance can be concrete and effective.4 
The ultimate goal declared in the treaties is to create and strengthen the EU-
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Africa relationship system on the basis of mutually beneficial conditions. The 
scenario of cooperation within the framework of the created system has 
been implemented more or less effectively for years. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has proved to be an unforeseen scenario 
malfunction, a black swan that triggered a global human security crisis. 
Freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live with dignity 
have been threatened by both the EU and Africa. The pandemic has 
revealed the need to explore the characteristics of relations between those 
who have relatively sufficient resources to ensure their own human security 
and those who have no guarantees of being protected on their own. 
The key questions of the article: Will the interaction of the European Union 
with Africa help resolve the human security crisis of the continent during the 
pandemic or could it become a trigger to change the entire system of their 
relations? Will the EU’s human security policy toward African countries (in a 
situation of slow growth of financial resources and difficulties in 
compensating for failures in the EU’s management effectiveness caused by 
the pandemic) lead to increased tension in this system, its crisis, or the 
creation of another strategy? 
Hypotheses: The COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, aggravated for the EU by the 
migration threat, is likely to complicate existing and create new problems in 
the EU-Africa relationship system, but the development of the system itself 
will remain in the tube of trajectories. Emissions of accumulated internal 
stresses in the system are inevitable, but not destructive: even such a 
powerful factor as the COVID-19 pandemic is not enough for a total reform 
of the system as far it is necessary to overlap several very significant factors 
(that are not visible in the medium term).  
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Theoretical and methodological frameworks of the study 
For the study of possible changes within the EU itself and in its relations 
with Africa, we rely on the concept of European integration, presented in 
the framework of social constructivism in its conventional version.5  
The article’s human security research is based on the concept proposed by 
Akihiko Tanaka, with a few modifications.  
The human security threats scheme presented by Tanaka indicates the 
locations of various threats within three differentiated systems.6 The first 
system is a physical one: threats come from the peculiarities of geographical 
location, landscape, and access to the oceans, and are associated with 
natural processes. The second system is biological: threats come from 
biosphere specifics and biodiversity. These include the spread of infectious 
diseases and pathogens of unknown origin. The third system is social: 
threats come directly from political and social institutions and from people 
themselves—wars, conflicts, terrorism, economic crises, trafficking, 
migration.  
In his theory, Tanaka further splits each system into subcategories of threats 
to human security; in our opinion, this is excessive, leading to the artificial 
convergence of the systems. There is no need to describe each case of a 
particular human security threat, since then it would be necessary to create 
an exhaustive list of threats (which is impossible), and thereby significantly 
limit the possibilities for further interpretation. The division of human 
security threats into three systems focuses on its core, thereby forming 
certain boundaries and filling them with an essence. At the same time, 
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possible aspects, details, and nuances, and a specific differentiated list of 
human security threats related to the periphery can turn from hypothetical 
threats into real ones depending on specific conditions. In this regard, we 
propose to divide the human security threats into two broad categories: 
conditional and unconditional. Conditional are those that can become a 
human security agenda in an unpredictable specific situation; unconditional 
ones relate to the physical aspects of human security, such as life and 
health, and always exist. 
The key research question of the article is explored on the basis of 
unconditional threats to the social system of human security in the context 
of the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa. 
The social system of human security of Africa in the context of the COVID-
19 pandemic 
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, by the 
end of 2020, up to 3.3 million people on the African continent may die from 
coronavirus.7 The pandemic has caused a change in the structure of budget 
expenditures, falling prices for raw materials, and a revision of social 
obligations that most African states are no longer able to implement fully. In 
addition, the need to tighten belts has caused resentment not only among 
citizens, but also among elites. The social system of human security is the 
most vulnerable, and the key threats to it can be defined by a chain of 
subsets: increased terrorist activity, increased migration trends, 
politicisation of the pandemic, and ‘coronisation’ of the population. 
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The intensification of terrorist activities increasing conflict potential (the case 
of Chad, Nigeria, Niger) 
On April 15, 2020, Abubakar Shekau, leader of the Boko Haram terrorist 
group (connected with the Islamic State terrorist organization), posted 
online an audio recording about the coronavirus epidemic. He characterized 
international measures to combat the pandemic as “part of the war against 
Islam by the forces of evil.”8 He condemned social distancing practices and 
suspension of the pilgrimage to Mecca, arguing that “true Muslims”—by 
which he means exclusively the followers of his extreme Salafi movement—
were “protected from the virus”. 
Earlier (March 23, 2020), Boko Haram attacked the village of Boma near the 
border of Niger and Nigeria (Lake Chad region). It led to the mass deaths of 
civilians; in addition, 98 government soldiers were killed and 47 people were 
injured.9 Following this, the Chadian military started an operation called 
Colère de Boma (‘Revenge for Boma’) launched on March 31, aimed at 
cleansing the territory of the militants. In this regard, it is important that at 
the time of the terrorist attack in Chad, there were only nine confirmed 
cases of COVID-19, but the speech of the militant leader caused serious 
concerns among the population. Such attacks are a kind of test for the 
stability of a state and its institutions. The demonstration of power by the 
Chadian military reinforced the image of the Chadian army as a bulwark of 
the struggle against militant Islamist groups in the region. The operation also 
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increased pressure on neighbouring countries to engage their armed forces 
more actively in the fight against terrorists. 
The ability of Boko Haram to carry out such a massive attack itself, along 
with the previous steady increase in Islamic militants’ activity, clearly 
indicates that Boko Haram and ISIS are gaining great strength, and 
speculation about the threat of COVID-19 offers them more chances to 
legitimize themselves. The possibilities of repeat terrorist attacks are being 
examined, which could lead to fierce and bloody battles in the region. This 
leads to the next threat to Africa’s social security system: uncontrolled 
migration. 
Strengthening migration trends 
More than 25.2 million refugees and internally displaced people live in 
Africa.10 Most organizations dealing with issues of refugees and displaced 
people are chronically underfunded, and most migration hubs are located in 
poor countries with weak health care systems. The vast majority of health 
care systems in African countries are not able to handle a sharp surge in the 
number of people infected with COVID-19. 
This is illustrated by the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), where Ebola and measles have not subsided over the past two years. 
In the DRC, there are only 50 places in intensive care units (in Burkina Faso 
and the Republic of Congo, for example, there are 15 and 20, respectively). 
In Niger, there are only five ventilation systems; in Cameroon and Senegal, 
there are 20 and 80, respectively. The COVID-19 pandemic could lead to 
disaster. 
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In addition, eight of the ten largest refugee camps in the world are located 
in Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan, and Ethiopia).11 According to 
information presented by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 225,000 refugees and asylum seekers, including 
those evacuated from Libya, live in Niger. With continued militant offensives 
in the Lake Chad basin, the region is expected to see an increase in the 
number of asylum seekers. Burkina Faso is also facing a big crisis in the field 
of migration: there are 840,000 internally displaced persons.12 It is 
important that refugee and internally displaced persons’ camps are ideal 
places for the transmission of coronavirus. They are overcrowded and do 
not have sufficient access to water supply, sanitation, hygiene products, and 
medicine in general. 
There is every reason to believe that many thousands of refugees will move 
on the continent and go beyond its borders, to Europe particularly. The 
reverse process is also possible: frightened by COVID-19 and the lack of 
expected living conditions in the EU, many illegal migrants will want to 
return to their homeland. Traffickers have already established such routes.13 
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The politicisation of the pandemic: the risk of using the COVID-19 epidemic 
to achieve political goals 
The scale of the epidemic, unprecedented for the twenty-first century, 
proves that public health care system problems can be used to justify 
repression of opposition politicians and the public, and to manipulate the 
vital humanitarian component. In African states, where authoritarian trends 
existed before COVID-19, the mechanism of restricting the freedoms of the 
population has risks of increasing both autocratic and populist trends.  
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni warned about the risk of political 
opportunism during the pandemic, referring to “the opportunistic and 
irresponsible politicians who try to distribute food for cheap popularity.”14 
He announced that “anybody involved in that effort will be charged with 
attempted murder.”15 At the same time, the presidential elections in 
Uganda, scheduled for August 2021, were postponed indefinitely due to the 
pandemic. The opposition accuses J. Museveni of persecuting anyone who 
dares to challenge his presidency.  
The spread of the COVID-19 epidemic has led to the legitimization of a 
certain set of means and methods of population control, the restriction of 
civil liberties, and the introduction of tracking technologies. The impact of 
digital technology on civil liberties is likely to go beyond the current crisis, 
and African countries also want to keep up with the times. However, only 
some African countries currently have laws on the protection of personal 
data and confidentiality, and an even smaller proportion of them are 
actually implemented. 
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‘Coronisation’ of the population and the perception of ‘strangers’ 
The term ‘coronisation’ means the importation of the virus by foreign 
citizens coming from countries harbouring high-risk epidemiological areas.16 
The term was quickly politicized and began to spread on social networks, 
increasing the African population’s fear of ‘strangers’. This fear has different 
forms and different directions. 
The first direction is anti-Chinese. More and more Africans have expressed 
dissatisfaction with China’s help to Africa in the fight against COVID-19, 
believing that medical equipment supplied as humanitarian aid is “a means 
to legally transport the virus from China to Africa.”17 In the wake of a 
general panic in Nigeria, civil society groups put pressure on the government 
to “close the state’s borders with countries with a high incidence of COVID-
19”18(meaning primarily China), and the Nigerian Medical Association 
expressed its disagreement with the arrival of the Chinese medical group in 
the country. 
The second direction is anti-European. The Africans expressed their 
indignation that many Europeans in the midst of the epidemic in their 
countries were still prepared to come to Africa—for example, in the 
comments on social networks about the confirmation of the second case of 
COVID-19 in Senegal on March 3, 2020 (the patient was a French national 
who arrived in Dakar): “Dear French people, please stay in France until the 
virus is over ... they have always been a part the greatest misfortunes Africa 
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has ever known ... stay home;”19 “They colonise us, they coronise us;”20 “The 
French, as always.”21 
The death of George Floyd in the USA and the vigorous actions of the Black 
Lives Matter movement also got a response from among the African 
population. It affected different countries, and was particularly sensitive for 
South Africa, with its history of apartheid. Zimbabwean officials decided to 
rename the street where the US Embassy is located G. Floyd Street. 
These events not only revealed issues related to police arbitrariness, but 
also the connection between racial discrimination and colonialism, 
neocolonialism, and debt obligations in Africa, as well as gender-based 
violence related to the murder of a pregnant woman, Tshegofatso Pule, in 
South Africa.22  
The European Union’s African policy during the COVID-19 pandemic 
The EU’s position—unlike a number of other significant international actors, 
perhaps—is clear: “We have to help Africa in our own interest because if the 
pandemic spreads there, it will [come] back to Europe.23” Therefore the 
European Union is steadily increasing its cooperation with African countries 
in the fight against the epidemic, increasing humanitarian assistance to the 
continent. This fully meets its own European interests in terms both of 
(political, human, economic) security, and restoring the image of Europeans, 
tarnished by the COVID-19 pandemic, across the African continent. 
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The European Union has the opportunity to provide financial and other 
assistance to African countries—for example, to strengthen the 
humanitarian response by opening safe trade corridors, especially for 
medical supplies, food, and revamping the health care system 
infrastructure. The EU’s financial support measures for African countries can 
be divided into passive (debt relief) and active (assistance). On April 8, 2020, 
the EU launched the Team Europe project. The financial package includes 
18.8 billion euros to assist the most vulnerable countries, in particular in 
Africa (3.8 billion). Most of this funding comes from reorienting existing EU 
funds and programs. Because of the pandemic, the EU is providing an 
additional 105.5 million euros to the countries on the Horn of Africa. This 
package is aimed at financing such projects as supporting medical 
institutions, food provision, and assistance to refugees and internally 
displaced people (providing physical protection, housing, water access, food, 
health care, and education). The proposed measures are fully consistent 
with the new EU-Africa strategy ‘Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with 
Africa’, unveiled in March 2020.24  
The European Union’s internal risks 
The internal risks to the EU cannot be ignored. Ongoing economic and 
political destabilization in Africa is very painful for the European Union itself, 
and the EU’s economy is damaged by COVID-19. The European 
Commission’s summer forecast emphasized that the recession in EU 
countries will reach 7.4 percent. The situation is aggravated by uncertainty 
about the possibility of a second wave of coronavirus and the debates about 
the need for a common European reaction to the problem. Now the 
European Union is discussing, firstly, the new multi-year financial program 
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2021–2027, and secondly, the creation of an €750 billion economic recovery 
fund. 
Therefore, despite the fact that the idea of activating the internal resources 
of African countries with the financial dominance of the EU is not new in the 
European political discourse, it takes on a slightly different meaning in the 
context of the spread of the epidemic and turns into a management 
discourse, exchanging urgent humanitarian assistance to Africa in the 
present for financial control in the future. Not all African countries support 
that policy. Therefore the European Commission uses financial measures—
for example, intends to include such African countries as Mauritius, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Ghana in the list of countries involved in money 
laundering.25 
Another internal risk is serious destabilization on European borders, 
especially from the south. Migration from Africa to Europe has long been 
securitized on the European agenda. It has turned into a situation of 
insecurity: migrants are a threat to the EU’s own security, and at the same 
time they are a vulnerable group and suffer from insecurity. 
Today the European Union’s development policy is an instrument of border 
control. Of course, it is impossible to predict accurately the impact of 
COVID-19 on migration from Africa to Europe, but a number of possible 
consequences are already being observed more or less clearly, among them 
toughening measures to cross European borders and reducing migration 
flows. Hungary used the virus as an excuse to suspend access to the asylum 
system, and deportations of migrants and refugees have become more 
frequent—for example, in Malta and Greece. Attacks on refugee boats in 
the Mediterranean have not been isolated cases for a long time, and are 
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gradually becoming a brutal strategy of intimidation of migrants that 
violates both national and international law. Perhaps this practice will 
continue after the cessation of the spread of the disease.  
The EU-Africa partnership clearly demonstrates who benefits: “A mix of 
positive and negative incentives will be integrated into the EU’s 
development and trade policies to reward those countries willing to 
cooperate effectively with the EU on migration management and ensure 
there are consequences for those who refuse”.26 It seems that if the 
tendency to increase border closures continues, then in the context of 
migration, this will lead to an increase in illegal migration channels, an 
increase in problems in those sectors of the economy of EU countries that 
depend on labour migrants, and the activation of other international actors 
in Africa that will undoubtedly use the EU’s damaged image (the African 
Union claims this too27). 
At the same time, during the pandemic, there were some encouraging 
events in EU countries, such as the release of detained migrants from 
custody, the suspension of deportation, the provision of social benefits and 
medical supplies to undocumented migrants, and specific attempts at 
government level to grant refugee status to persons without documents (for 
example, in France). 
The European Union’s external risks 
The fate of the current EU’s missions and operations in Africa is not clear, 
and European politicians refrain from commenting. Missions and operations 
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of the European Union in African countries, such as the European Union’s 
Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) or the Atalanta 
operation in Somalia, are still active, but it is not clear whether the scope of 
their work will remain as it was before the pandemic. In addition, it seems 
important for the European Union not to fall into the trap of its own 
obligations: instead of ensuring the security of African countries, there is a 
risk of reorienting existing programs exclusively to ensure the EU’s security 
and protection against illegal migration. 
Conclusion 
The EU-Africa relationship system has been built over decades. The 
European Union has to determine its African policy in the form of a 
consistent set of tools and directions that can successfully combine its own 
geopolitical interests with a deep understanding of the complex needs of 
local communities. This involves implementing a scenario of rapprochement 
between the two on economic and political axes. The accumulation of 
organizational skills, coupled with the capabilities of modern 
communications, does not in itself lead to an immediate breakthrough, but 
plays a huge role in the progressive nature of the implemented changes. The 
focus for the EU is the policy of Africa’s development, ensuring human 
security in the continent’s countries, protecting the population and 
protecting the states with the focus on the social system of human security. 
The EU-Africa relationship system is designed to be strong enough and not 
provoke crises. However, some crises are difficult to predict, and their 
cumulative impact can lead to system-wide failures. The COVID-19 
pandemic led to the creation of a generally negative environment, but it did 
not act as a trigger that turned the system in the direction of devastating 
consequences and dead ends. The EU-Africa relationship system continues 
to operate in automatic mode, does not require manual control in terms of 
the intervention of top officials. This means that EU-Africa relations are not 
threatened with dismantling: they still have high potential, determined by 
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Abstract: The 21st century school has become a space for learning and sharing very 
different realities. However, in view of recent events, Coronavirus will be quite 
devastating and it is clear that, in this process, pandemics can compromise not only 
youth future but also their physical and mental health. In developing countries, with 
all their specificities and vicissitudes, managing this type of situation proves to be 
an even more challenging task. The central theme of this work is to share our view 
on the case of Portugal and Spain in Covid19 context of pandemics. As two of the 
less outstanding countries in Europe, with strong historical links to Africa, the 
Iberian Peninsula School has been dealing rather positively with the situation of 
social isolation, while keeping on with teaching and learning routines, monitoring 
the health, educational and economic situation of its students and families. 




As stated, it is our intention to present a showcase in Portugal and Spain. 
We must highlight, however, that, in the case of Spain, since it is divided 
into seventeen Autonomous Communities, we are going to focus our study 
in Castilla-La Mancha. 
The Spanish Case 
The coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) was first diagnosed in the city of Wuhan, 
China, in December 2019 (at least, this is the data we have at the date of 
closing this contribution; subsequent studies may shed light on it). It is 
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assumed, however, that month before there was considerable concern in 
this regard. On 31st December 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health and 
Sanitation Commission (Hubei Province, China) reported 27 cases of 
pneumonia of unknown etiology. On 7 January 2020, Chinese authorities 
identified as the causative agent of the outbreak a new type of virus in the 
Coronaviridae family, which has subsequently been named SARS-CoV-2. The 
disease caused by this new virus has been named by international 
consensus COVID-19. 
In Spain, on 31st January 2020, a case of COVID-19 coronavirus was 
confirmed in La Gomera (Canary Islands) in a German citizen, who had had 
close contact with another case confirmed in Germany, originating in 
Bavaria. On 4th March 2020, Spain recorded the first death from coronavirus 
and a total of 198 positive cases. 
On 11th March 2020, the World Health Organisation elevated the public 
health emergency caused by COVID-19 to an international pandemic. On the 
same day, Spain recorded 47 deaths and 2128 positive cases. These figures 
rose to 120 and 4209, respectively, on 13th March 2020. That day, through 
an institutional declaration, the President of the Government, Pedro 
Sánchez, declared a state of alarm throughout the entire national territory, 
which came into effect on 14th March 2020, upon publication in the Official 
State Gazette (BOE) of Royal Decree 463/2020, of 14th March, declaring the 
state of alarm for the management of the health crisis situation caused by 
COVID-19. In accordance with its article 3, the duration of the state of alarm 
declared by this royal decree was fifteen calendar days. However, the 
Government soon began to prepare society for the real possibility of the 
state of alarm being extended beyond fifteen days, with the prior 
authorisation of the National Parliament).1 
                                                          
1
 University Institute of Migration Studies, “Coronavirus COVID-19 outbreak in the EU - 
Fundamental Rights Implications,” European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 24 
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In the face of this unprecedented situation in contemporary society, rapidly 
disseminating the scientific results on COVID-19 is vital to allow rapid action 
on results with the prospect of success.2 Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic 
requires a rapid response from researchers to help address biological, 
medical, and public health problems in order to minimise their impact. In 
this rapidly changing context, academics, professionals and the public need 
to quickly identify the situation to address the problem and make 
appropriate decisions. 
In Spain, after the declaration on 14th March of the state of alarm for the 
management of the health crisis situation caused by the COVID-19 crisis,3 
the Regional Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports under the Regional 
Government of Castilla-La Mancha decided to provide the corresponding 
information to teachers, students and their families, in order to carry out 
timely monitoring of the situation and the actions generated by the 
coronavirus crisis. The regional government of Castilla-La Mancha, in 
coordination with the University of Castilla-La Mancha and the Ministry of 
Education itself was in charge of planning and adopting the corresponding 
measures in the different foreseeable scenarios. 
Also, the Regional Government,4 the Regional University – UCLM5 – and the 
Regional Ministry of Education6 enabled a permanent space on their 
respective web pages with updated information on COVID-19. 
                                                                                                                                                      
March 2020, <https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/spain-report-covid-19-
april-2020_en.pdf> (accessed 14 July 2020).  
2
 P. Song & T. Karako, “COVID-19: Real-time dissemination of scientific information to fight 
a public health emergency of international concern,” BioScience Trends 14, 1 (2020): 1-2, 
doi:10.5582/BST.2020.01056. 
3
 Advance HE, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) updates,” Advance HE, <https://www.advance-he. 
ac.uk/coronavirus-COVID-19-updates> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
4
 Sanidad Castilla La Mancha, “Consejería de Sanidad,” Sanidad Castilla La Mancha, 
<https://sanidad.castillalamancha.es/ciudadanos/enfermedades-infecciosas/coronavirus> 
(accessed 14 July 2020). 
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Since the beginning of March, the UCLM and the Ministry of Education 
agreed to adopt the first preventive measures and public health 
recommendations directed at the educational community as a consequence 
of the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus,7 which were reinforced in mid-March 
with the adoption of the general non-attendance regime for the operation,8 
always in accordance with the decisions and recommendations made by the 
authorities and in accordance with Decree 8/2020, 12th March, from the 
President of the Community Board, on extraordinary measures to be 
adopted on the occasion of the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2).9  
These first measures were intended to adapt the operation of teaching to 
non-classroom teaching activity, minimizing the interaction of people10 in 
the context of classrooms and laboratories, libraries, coffee shops, events 
and sports activities, ensuring the normal development of the different 
                                                                                                                                                      
5
 Universidad de Castilla - La Mancha. “Información y recomendaciones durante la 
evolución del coronavirus (COVID-19),” Universidad de Castilla - La Mancha, 
<https://www.uclm.es/Misiones/LaUCLM/Institucional/UCLMSaludable/SaludEntornoLabor
al/COVID-19> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
6
 Portal de educación - Castilla La Mancha, “Información para Docentes / Coronavirus,” 
Portal de educación - Castilla La Mancha, <http://www.educa.jccm.es/es/coronavirus/ 
informacion-docentes-coronavirus> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
7
 Simon Burgess & Hans Henrik Sievertsen, “Schools, skills, and learning: The impact of 
COVID-19 on education,” VoxEU & CEPR, 1 April 2020, <https://voxeu.org/article/impact-
covid-19-education> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
8
 K. Iwata, A. Doi & C. Miyakoshi, “Was School Closure Effective in Mitigating Coronavirus 
Disease 2019 (COVID-19)? Time Series Analysis Using Bayesian Inference,” Preprints 2020, 6 
April 2020, doi: 10.20944/preprints202004.0058.v1. 
9
 UNESCO, “Education: From disruption to recovery,” UNESCO, <https://en.unesco.org/ 
themes/education-emergencies/coronavirus-school-closures> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
10
 J. Casey & P. Wilson, “A practical guide to providing flexible learning in further and higher 
education,” Enhancement Themes. Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education, 
Scotland, 2005, <https://www.enhancementthemes.ac.uk/docs/ethemes/flexible-delivery/ 
a-practical-guide-to-providing-flexible-learning-in-further-and-higher-education.pdf?sfvrsn= 
1c2ef981_8> (accessed 14 July 2020); S. Duffield & D. O’Hare, “Teacher resilience during 
coronavirus school closures,” British Psychological Society: Leicester, 7 April 2020, 
<www.bps.org.uk/sites/www.bps.org.uk/files/Member%20Networks/Divisions/DECP/Teach
er%20resilience%20during%20coronavirus%20school%20closures.pdf> (accessed 14 July 
2020). 
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educational activities with the least possible use of face-to-face meetings. In 
the management of the health crisis, the Ministry and the UCLM prioritized 
the general interest of public health in the field of the educational 
community, anticipating and basing their actions on the available health 
information and scientific studies in the framework of the advisory bodies 
created for this purpose, and in accordance with the proposals and 
recommendations of the coordinating bodies that affected them, such as 
the Sectoral Conference on Education.11 
At the same time, meetings were held at different levels according to the 
prospects for the evolution of the health crisis.12 
The different previous meetings agreed that the evolution of this health 
crisis was not compatible with the resumption of face-to-face activity within 
the 2019/20 academic year. In this sense, there were no reasonable 
expectations that massive meetings could be held such as those that 
characterize the teaching activity or that they implied the realisation of face-
to-face tests and exams. 
Faced with these expectations, the Department of Education and the UCLM 
decided to implement a series of measures in order to organize early 
enough that students could finish their studies.13 The objective was to make 
the necessary adaptations, allowing educational centres to plan the rest of 
their teaching activities. 
                                                          
11
 Niall McCarthy, “COVID-19's Staggering Impact on Global Education,” Statista, 24 March 
2020, <https://www.statista.com/chart/21224/learners-impacted-by-national-school-clo 
sures/> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
12
 Kaliope Azzi-Huck & Tigran Shmis, “Managing the impact of COVID-19 on education 
systems around the world: How countries are preparing, coping, and planning for 
recovery,” World Bank Blogs, 18 March 2020, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/education/ 
managing-impact-covid-19-education-systems-around-world-how-countries-are-preparing> 
(accessed 14 July 2020). 
13
 University of British Columbia, “What is Flexible Learning?” Flexible Learning, University 
of British Columbia, <http://flexible.learning.ubc.ca/> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
1 6 / 2 0 2 0  
 
158 
In accordance with the aforementioned considerations, when the 
educational and political leaders were consulted in the pertinent meetings, 
it was decided to adopt the general non-attendance regime for the 
operation of the educational group in the region as a consequence of the 
situation, evolution and prospects of the coronavirus (COVID-19). 
The impact of Covid-19: closure of higher education institutions in Europe14 
                                                          
14
 Eurydice Network, “The impact of Covid-19: closure of higher education institutions in 
Europe,” Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, 16 April 2020, 
<https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/impact-covid-19-closure-
education-systems-europe_en> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
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As a consequence of such decision, the Ministry of Education, Culture and 
Sport and the UCLM authorized the teleworking modality for all staff, 
reiterating the request to the different sectors of the educational 
community for maximum collaboration to follow the public health 
recommendations made by authorities.15 
 
A Cyclical approach to education in emergencies.16 
After the first week of suspension of the face-to-face activity and the 
confinement decreed by the Government of Spain (from 16th to 22nd March), 
both the Ministry and the UCLM considered the serene, responsible and 
committed response of the entire educational community as very positive, 
publicly expressing their appreciation. Normality in non-face-to-face 
teaching was possible thanks to the commitment of teachers, students, 
families, and the support of technological resources. 
                                                          
15
 R. Huang, G. Chen, J. Yang & J. Loewen, “The New Shape of Learning: Adapting to Social 
Changes in the Information Society,” in Reshaping Learning SE – 1, ed. R. Huang & J. M. 
Spector, 3–42 (Berlin: Springer, 2013), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32301-0_1> 
(accessed 14 July 2020); Joseph Crawford, “COVID-19: 20 Countries’ Higher Education Intra-
period Digital Pedagogy Responses,” Journal of Applied Learning and Teaching 3, 1 (2020): 
1-20. 
16
 Azzi-Huck & Shmis, “Managing the impact of COVID-19 on education systems around the 
world: How countries are preparing, coping, and planning for recovery.” 
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The teaching activity was developed through different non-face-to-face 
methodologies, allowing students to continue their training and finish their 
studies for the academic year 2019/2020, even though the various 
modalities of practices were affected that for obvious reasons do not allow 
their development on -line.17 
Solidarity translated into the generosity of educational centres, laboratories, 
administration personnel and services ... Furthermore, a considerable 
number of teachers volunteered in some cases and were required in others 
to collaborate with the health system, not only in the Autonomous 
Community of Castilla-La Mancha but also moving to other parts of the 
country. Likewise, almost half a thousand final year students of the 
Medicine and Nursing degrees offered to collaborate as health support to 
the Castilla-La Mancha Health System. For their part, professors and 
researchers were working on the design of respirators to improve them and 
to facilitate their faster production due to their scarcity. And it goes without 
saying that facilities that could be useful for better health care for citizens 
were made available to the authorities. 
At the end of the second week of suspension of the face-to-face activity 
(from 23rd to 29th March), initiatives continued to take place, which were 
being launched from all sectors of the educational community to collaborate 
in the fight against the pandemic: the realization of preparatory tests for 
COVID-19 diagnoses, 3D printing of protective material for toilets, design 
and manufacture of respirators, facilitation, collection and transfer of 
masks, gloves and other elements, or the provision and conditioning of 
facilities. 
                                                          
17
 Tai-Kuei Yo & Tai-Yi Yu, “Modelling the factors that affect individuals’ utilisation of online 
learning systems: An empirical study combining the task technology fit model with the 
theory of planned behaviour,” British Journal of Educational Technology 41, 6 (2010); R. M. 
Viner et al., “School closure and management practices during coronavirus outbreaks 
including COVID-19: a rapid systematic review,” Lancet Child Adolescent Health 4 (2020). 
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Likewise, an extraordinary patronage program was opened so that any 
citizen, company or institution could make contributions in order to defray 
the expenses that these initiatives entail. The response was immediate and 
generous from members of society. As a curiosity, in the first 24 hours more 
than 180 contributions were made for an amount greater than 24,000 
euros. 
In the week of 30th March to 5th April, various coordination meetings were 
held, in which it was found that the evolution of the health crisis was not 
compatible with the resumption of face-to-face activity within the academic 
year. Consequently, it was agreed to establish the end of the academic year 
in a non-face-to-face way in general, guaranteeing that any student could 
finish the studies in which they were enrolled. 
Work was then carried out on adapting the evaluation and promoting the 
preparation of a proposal on the criteria for adapting the evaluation systems 
to the distance system. The change from a face-to-face modality to a non-
face-to-face modality in the evaluation system should preserve the 
acquisition of the legally indicated competences.18 
Specific guidelines for conducting the face-to-face assessment 
A. Temporary nature of teaching and evaluation 
It was decided to keep the academic calendar in force at that time. 
B. Evaluation system 
The evaluation system should pivot on a non-face-to-face continuous 
evaluation model in such a way that the final grade of the student in each 
                                                          
18
 International Association of Universities, “The impact of COVID-19 on higher education 
worldwide. Resources for Higher Education Institutions,” International Association of 
Universities, 24 April 2020, <https://www.iau-aiu.net/IMG/pdf/covid-19_and_he_resour 
ces.pdf> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
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subject was obtained, as a general rule, from a combination of progress 
tests, content development work and test final, trying to increase the weight 
relative to continuous evaluation and limit the weight of the final test. 
In this exceptional situation, asynchronous tests, that is, tests carried out 
not simultaneously by all the students and without the presence of the 
teacher, made available to the students for a certain period of time 
(generally long), should become the preferred tool evaluation, since they 
minimize technical difficulties. 
On the other hand, synchronous tests, that is, those in which the group of 
students connects simultaneously during the same period of time (generally 
short) and with the teacher's online supervision, would be applied on time. 
There is a wide diversity of assessment methods applicable in this situation 
such as rubrics, individual or group work, case studies, problem solving or 
cases, qualified discussions in forums, test-type exams, live or recorded 
presentations by students, class participation records with achievement, 
self-evaluation activities, coevaluation and portfolio, etc., as well as 
evaluation resources such as the so-called “Task”, “Workshop”, 
“Questionnaire”, “Chat” or “Forum”. 
C. Technological support systems 
The different evaluation activities should be carried out through the 
institutional system of the corresponding Virtual Campus, complemented by 
corporate virtual class and videoconferencing platforms (Teams, Skype for 
Business, Google Hangouts ...) and email. These systems are available for 
mobile devices (m-learning)19 with full support for synchronous or 
                                                          
19
 Z. Zayapragassarazan, “COVID-19: Strategies for Online Engagement of Remote Learners,” 
[version 1; not peer reviewed]. F1000Research, 9 (2020) (document), <https://doi.org/10. 
7490/f1000research.1117835.1> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
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asynchronous assessment tasks,20 thus promoting inclusiveness21 with less 
exposure to the risk of digital gap by students.22 
D. Record of evaluation evidence and reviews 
In the new context of face-to-face evaluation, the evidence of evaluation of 
the acquisition of the competences and learning results by the student 
should continue to be recorded as established in the quality guarantee 
systems of the degrees. In the particular case of tests carried out by 
videoconference, teachers should record and keep the recording for the 
purpose of reviewing the qualification of these tests and registration. These 
videos would be stored in shared institutional spaces, respecting current 
regulations on the protection of personal data. 
On the other hand, the teaching staff should foresee the necessary 
mechanisms for the review of assessment tests using the videoconference 
systems discussed above. 
E. Accreditation systems for identification and fraud control 
To verify the identity of the student as the author of a test or work, access 
to the systems using user credentials has been used. 
 
                                                          
20
 J. Littlefield, “The Difference Between Synchronous and Asynchronous Distance 
Learning,” ThoughtCo, 14 January 2018, <https://www.thoughtco.com/synchronous-
distance-learning-asynchronous-distancelearning-1097959> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
21
 Texas Education Agency, “COVID-19 FAQ: At Home Learning Resources for Students with 
Disabilities,” Texas Education Agency, 7 April 2020, <https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/ 
files/covid-19_-_at_home_learning_resources_april_7.pdf> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
22
 S. Petrina, “Instructional Methods and Learning Styles,” Advanced Teaching Methods for 
the Technology Classroom (2011), https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-337-1.ch004 
(accessed 14 July 2020); UNESCO, Handbook on Facilitating Flexible Learning during 
Educational Disruption, International Research and Training Centre for Rural Education, 
March 2020, <https://iite.unesco.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Handbook-on-Facilita 
ting-Flexible-Learning-in-COVID-19-Outbreak-SLIBNU-V1.2-20200315.pdf> (accessed 14 July 
2020). 
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F. Curricular external practices 
The external curricular internships were considered passed when at least 
50% were completed, complementing the remaining credits, if necessary, 
with seminars or other training activities directly related to these 
internships. 
In the cases in which they started and did not reach 50% of completion, they 
were considered to have been passed, compulsorily complementing the 
remaining credits with seminars and other activities in order to consider 
them equally passed. 
Digital gap 
In order to support the students, the students who suffer the most from the 
digital gap began to be provided, from the middle of April, on loans, as well 
as high-capacity 4G data lines. 
At the date of closing this contribution, you can venture a satisfactory 
development of the training activity, as well as the teaching evaluation. It is 
not an easy task, as the Spanish educational system as a whole proves, but 
apparently, and despite various incidents, adaptation to non-face-to-face 
assessment can be inferred. 
THE PORTUGUESE CASE 
The SARS CoV2, commonly known as COVID-19 Pandemic, officially hit 
Portugal on 2nd March 2020 when it was reported that two men, a 60-year-
old doctor who was on vacation in northern Italy and a 33-year-old man who 
was in Spain at work, tested positive to COVID-19.  
As of 27th July 2020, there were 50,299 confirmed cases, with a total of 
1,719 deaths and 35,375 already recovered.  




Source: ESRI Portugal (https://www.esri-portugal.pt/pt-pt/landing-pages/ 
covid19, accessed on July 14th 2020). 
However, experts warn that the current number of infections is probably 
much higher than the number of confirmed cases, since tests are limited to 
a specific number of people with symptoms and because many people with 
mild or even asymptomatic symptoms do not seek medical attention, even 
though they are actively transmitting the virus.23 
As a result of this situation, it became urgent to mobilize critical actors in the 
production and diffusion of scientific and technological knowledge, 
especially in the context of the situation of increasing uncertainty and social 
alarm countries are living in. 
Therefore, rapid adaptation to an exceptional time impelled Portuguese 
society to a greater sense of civic duty, commitment to public health and 
                                                          
23
 zap.aeiou, “Coronavírus / Covid-19,” zap.aeiou, <https://zap.aeiou.pt/thread/covid-19> 
(accessed 14 July 2020). 
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safety of all, particularly the elderly and the most vulnerable. The actions 
and initiatives launched and in progress include: 
1. The identification and enhancement of a set of scientific and 
technological initiatives and projects with immediate and effective 
implementation, where we can find, among others: 
 The PCR diagnostic test, implemented by the Institute of Molecular 
Medicine (iMM) based on the test developed by the CDC “Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), following all guidelines 
regarding the handling and analysis of clinical specimens, having 
been certified by INSA. It has the great advantage of using reagents 
produced in Portugal, by the biotechnology company NZYTech. The 
protocol implemented in iMM will also allow estimation of viral load, 
a parameter that may be relevant in the assessment of clinical 
prognosis; 
 The “Smart” screening of the company Biosurfit being implemented 
at the Field Hospital already installed at the Portuguese Red Cross, 
based on an early identification of patients at higher risk and 
allowing the early detection of the disease even before the patient 
has marked respiratory problems. This early identification allows 
medical action, prior to the deterioration of the clinical condition of 
patients, facilitating the prevention of the spread of COVI19; 
 The first development in Portugal of invasive ventilators, namely by 
CEiiA, in close collaboration with medical institutions and the 
industry, as well as other types of ventilation systems (e.g. pandemic 
ventilators) by INESC TEC and INEGI, in close International 
collaboration; 
 The development of Personal Protective Equipment, PPE, by CITEVE 
in close articulation with the industry; 
 Other equipment and support systems, designed and produced in 
various academic and scientific institutions throughout the country; 
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 The efforts to mobilize many higher education and science and 
technology institutions, especially with activities in the biomedical 
field, to gather and donate various types of support equipment and 
tools to the hospitals and health care units to be particularly 
recognized. 
2. Portugal participates in a large task force at the level of the General 
Directorate for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) of the European 
Commission, that allowed the launch of a financing line of 47.5 million 
euros through the program “SC1-PHECORONAVIRUS -2020: Advancing 
knowledge for the clinical and public health response to the [COVID-19] 
epidemic”.24 Its results were already released. One of the approved 
projects involves the National Institute of Health. 
Doctor Ricardo Jorge (INSA): “RESEARCH 4 COVID 19”: FCT,25 in 
collaboration with AICIB - Agency for Clinical Research and Biomedical 
Innovation, launched an exceptional financing line to support the 
reorientation of current R&D teams. Its goals include developing 
research projects and initiatives (R&D) that may respond to the 
immediate needs of the National Health Service (SNS) in the fight against 
the new Coronavirus. Some of them are new prevention tools, 
therapeutic development, diagnostic methods, clinical and 
epidemiological studies, as well as R&D activities that include a socio-
cultural component and actions promoting a resilient society with the 
capacity to face the current context of uncertainty in which we live, 
especially in the older population and in groups at higher risk. The 
financing of each project is up to 30 thousand euros, with the Faculty of 
Science and Technology (FCT), from Universidade Nova de Lisboa having 
a budget available for this line in the amount of 1.5 million euros. 
                                                          
24
 Funding and Tender Opportunities, “Pan-European COVID-19 cohorts,” European 
Commission, <https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/ 
opportunities/topic-details/sc1-phe-coronavirus-2020-2d> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
25
 Instituto Nacional de Saúde, “Diversidade genética do novo coronavírus SARS-CoV-2 
(COVID-19) em Portugal,” Instituto Nacional de Saúde, <https://insaflu.insa.pt/covid19/> 
(accessed 14 July 2020). 
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3. “Science 4 COVID19”: FCT and AICIB are also preparing, in partnership 
with health authorities and scientific research institutions, public and 
private, the “Science 4 COVID19” portal to mobilize scientific 
communities in projects and joint Research and Development (R&D) 
activities aimed at combating COVID-19 in line with the National Plan for 
Preparing and Responding to Disease from the General Directorate of 
Health (DGS), as well as with the strategies of other European and 
international health authorities. The portal groups metadata, datasets or 
hyperlinks, problem registration, research results in epidemiological 
surveillance and other secondary public health and anonymous data 
necessary to combat the coronavirus epidemic, such as clinical, 
analytical and demographic results.26 
Along with all the scientific effort that has been made so far, to deal with 
the pandemic, the government has approved a set of legislation to 
coordinate, manage and organize institutions, in order to create the possible 
“normality”, as far as schools, hospitals, enterprises, commerce and industry 
are concerned. 
In Education, important measures were taken, to allow students, teachers 
and families to continue working, despite the pandemic. Decree-Law nr. 14-
G/2020, from 13th April, for instance, establishes exceptional and temporary 
measures in the area of Education, in the context of the COVID-19 disease 
pandemic.27 
The government has also published a set of guidelines to help 
Multidisciplinary Support Teams for Inclusive Education, commonly known 
                                                          
26
 DGES, “Covid-19: avisos,” DGES, <https://www.dges.gov.pt/pt/pagina/covid-19-avisos> 
(accessed 14 July 2020). 
27
 Estabelece as medidas excecionais e temporárias na área da educação, no âmbito da 
pandemia da doença COVID-19, Decreto-Lei n.º14-G/2020, Diário da República n.º72/2020, 
2º Suplemento, Série I de 2020-04-13, <https://dre.pt/web/guest/legislacao-consolidada/-
/lc/133723698/view?p_p_state=maximized> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
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as EMAEI (Equipas Multidisciplinares de Apoio à Educação Inclusiva) in the 
frame of a Distance Learning (E@D).28 
These guidelines were developed around four axes of action that are 
considered priorities in the current context, despite the importance of other 
EMAEI attributions: 
Axis 1 – a support to teachers and technicians from the educational 
community. 
Axis 2 – the continuity of implementation / identification of measures to 
support learning and inclusion defined or to be defined in the RTP / PEI / 
PIT. 
Axis 3 – a support to families in the context of the E@D modality. 
Axis 4 – the articulation with several community services. 
All the work to be carried out in the current context is linked to the 
decisions taken by the school/groop regarding the channels of 
communication with students and families and guardians, taking into 
account, in particular, the Guiding Principles for the Implementation of 
Distance Learning (E@D) in Schools (made available in the online space to 
support schools: https://apoioescolas.dge.mec.pt/), where resources and 
tools for inclusive education are also found. 
Therefore, and as far as Axis 1 is concerned, some measures were 
suggested: 
 To define a work plan regarding EMAEI's performance in the context of 
implementing the E@D modality, considering the specific resources to 
                                                          
28
 DGE, “Orientações para o trabalho das Equipas Multidisciplinares de Apoio à Educação 
Inclusiva na modalidade E@D,” DGE. 8 April 2020, <https://www.dge.mec.pt/sites/default/ 
files/informacoes_escolas/orientacoes_emaei.pdf> (accessed 14 July 2020). 
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support learning and inclusion, human, organizational or existing in the 
community, which will be necessary to mobilize, organize and articulate, 
in close articulation with the full professors / class directors / special 
education teachers, with a special focus on online communication.  
 To define moments of joint work, at a distance, organizing synchronous 
and/or asynchronous sessions, with the full professors/class directors of 
the students with selective and additional measures, in order to support 
and adapt inclusive practices and the development of skills to the E@D, 
using the teaching and learning platforms and communication channels 
that the respective school/grouping has defined for this purpose.  
 To take care of ways of accessing information to students who cannot do 
so from oral or visual sources, involving, for this purpose, teachers from 
the Learning Support Centres (CAA), from the ICT Resource Centres 
(CRTIC), Portuguese Sign Language (LGP) and technicians from the 
Resource Centres for Inclusion (CRI), taking into account the specialized 
knowledge and experience in adapting materials and using assistive 
technologies, in online learning environments, EMAEI being responsible 
for more regular and intensive use of these situations. CRTICs will be able 
to support the use at home of support products for each student (e.g. 
braille machines, braille displays). 
As far as Axis 2 is concerned, it was suggested the continuity of 
implementation/Identification of support measures for learning and 
inclusion defined or to be defined: 
 To develop a close and systematic monitoring plan for students who, for 
various reasons, face greater weaknesses in learning (e.g. students with 
additional measures and students who do not have access to digital 
media), stabilizing the communication channels with students and with 
families and guardians, in order to continue their participation in the 
curriculum and learning, facilitating and encouraging the participation of 
each person at a distance and, thus, maintaining the social interaction 
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and the bonds already created. Define, if it does not exist, an element of 
EMAEI to function as a reference person for each student.  
 To establish, in agreement with the parents, a schedule of regular and 
frequent contacts (by phone or internet) with the reference person.  
 To maintain contact with teachers, ensuring that support measures for 
learning and inclusion, namely those defined in the Pedagogical 
Technical Report (RTP), are being implemented considering: 
a) respect for social isolation, using moments of flexibility with 
flexibility. online and offline interaction;  
b) the family dynamics and feasibility of the measures, without this 
being an unaffordable task for families;  
c) the learning pace and ability to execute each student;  
d) advising on ways to resolve and overcome difficulties in participation 
and interaction at a distance. 
 To collaborate with the head teacher / class director, interlocutors with 
parents and guardians, in the elaboration of a work plan for students 
with the additional measure (s): development of teaching methodologies 
and strategies structured; development of personal and social autonomy 
skills and / or significant curricular adaptations, ensuring that 
a) it allows families to establish a daily routine in which everyone’s 
needs and well-being are taken care of;  
b) if there is a need to establish a timetable, this is compatible with the 
family schedule / functioning; 
c) the proposed activities and the use of specific software, if necessary, 
consider the student’s family context and personal situation in this 
particular context of E@D. 
 Designing and agreeing between the parties a monitoring plan that 
allows identifying possible constraints in the work developed with 
students with weaker family background, using all available mechanisms 
to open channels of communication with these families and seeking 
specific support from the CRI, with the Children and Youth Protection 
Commissions (CPCJ) and other institutions that can mobilize resources 
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that guarantee the evolution of the learning of these students, their 
physical and emotional balance in the current context of social distance. 
Axis 3, focused on the support for families in the process of adapting to the 
E@D modality, designed a set of measures: 
 To define a close and systematic monitoring plan that ensures open 
communication with the families of students with selective and / or 
additional measures and students with special health needs, taking into 
account the expectations of the students and their families. 
 To encourage and support full professors and class directors in the 
participation and interaction of networking, involving and connecting 
students with greater difficulties in terms of interaction and 
communication with their peers, in order to maintain the sense of 
belonging and social contact, although not in person. 
 To support families whenever there are situations in which the 
management of emotions, resulting from the situation of social isolation, 
is creating barriers to the learning process and the well-being of the 
student, using the defined communication channels and using others; to 
be defined on a case by case basis, mobilizing, if necessary, the 
psychology services or the CRI psychologist. 
 To encourage and support the creation of support groups between 
parents, whenever the parents wish to do so. 
 To collaborate in the identification and elimination of constraints placed 
on the participation of students with selective and / or additional 
measures and families in the E@D modality.29 
Axis 4, on the other hand, sets the articulation with various community 
services, as a means to: ensure the continuity of activities foreseen in terms 
of therapies, in close collaboration with families; collaborate in the 
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 DGS, “Novo coronavírus COVID-19,” DGS, 17 March 2020, <https://covid19.min-
saude.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/17.03-Comunidade-Escolar.pdf> (accessed 14 July 
2020). 
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elimination of constraints placed on the participation of students and 
families in the E@D modality, mobilizing, if necessary, partner entities of the 
community, which may involve other forms of support, in a logic of network 
work, based on territory, that facilitates online interaction and thus ensures 
the school-family-community connection. 
Together with these measures, a roadmap, composed of eight guiding 
principles for the Implementation of Distance Learning (E@D) in Schools was 
also outlined.30 
Furthermore, the “Mobilize for Change” principle aims to involve the 
educational community in the search for the most appropriate E@D Plan for 
the School - direction, pedagogical council, coordinators of class, 
establishment, pre-school education, citizenship education, coordinators 
departments, class directors, teachers, course directors, resource centres 
for inclusion, entities promoting curricular enrichment activities, parents / 
guardians, student representatives - but also Parish Councils, Libraries, 
Parents Associations, Social Solidarity Associations, Firemen, NGO 
mediators, Social Economy organizations, among others, can be a way to 
reach all children and all students. 
The principle of “Communicating in a network” stipulates: the fixed or 
flexible weekly timetable for students; the adaptation of the weekly 
workload of each discipline / UFCD; the definition of the time interval 
between each proposed task (tasks with a maximum of 20/30 minutes, 
according to the age groups); temporal flexibility in the execution of tasks; 
the different rhythms of learning. 
The same document also equates the realization of ways of working at a 
distance, making careful use of synchronous sessions; clarification of doubts, 
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 DGE, “8 Princípios Orientadores para a Implementação do Ensino a Distância (E@D) nas 
Escolas,” DGE, 23 March 2020, <https://www.dge.mec.pt/sites/default/files/roteiro_ 
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with a fixed weekly schedule, for establishing routines and providing 
security to students. Fosters collaboration, articulation and inter-help 
between teachers, promotes teaching methodologies that promote an 
active role of students in the search for new learning - interdisciplinary 
projects, which lead students to mobilize the learning of various disciplines / 
components or tasks focused on problem-issues, case studies, projects, 
among others. 
It promotes the development of student’s emotional well-being and 
confidence in relation to school, while learning from home, with distance 
activities with students who should focus on creating work routines that will 
give them the sense of safety. At the same time, activities of a playful nature 
have been developed to promote the emotional well-being of the student, 
such as sending messages in video, SMS, or on paper. The contact between 
students through digital spaces is encouraged, or by any other technological 
means, to prevent situations of isolation of students, being essential for 
maintenance of social interactions and their motivation to perform tasks. 
The proposed activities include, as well, spaces for interaction and 
conviviality, promoting group work and breaking the isolation the students 
find themselves in. It is important to foresee the role to be played by 
psychologists and teachers who supported students in specific tutorial 
support, mobilizing all available resources. 
At the same time, mutual help between students is promoted, both in terms 
of carrying out tasks and in terms of peer regulation, creating the figure of 
the digital consultant, who assists his colleagues in the use of technological 
means; in turn, the class delegate encourages the participation of colleagues 
in the execution of the proposed tasks and helps to monitor them, among 
others. 
In order to monitor the work carried out, quality and quantity indicators, as 
well as collection frequency, have been defined. These quality indicators 
measure the degree of satisfaction of teachers, students and parents / EE, as 
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well as the quality of feedback given to students. As indicators of quantity, 
we choose, for example, the rate of completion of the tasks proposed by the 
teachers, the number of tasks sent by the teachers, depending on the work 
plan prepared, availability of technological means of E@D, support for the 
development of digital skills of teachers and students; development of 
support mechanisms, aimed at students without a computer and internet 
connection at home.31 
Conclusions 
Our intention with this contribution has been to show how Portuguese and 
Spanish schools have been dealing with an unexpected pandemic situation, 
according to daily updates, as well as in anticipating further necessity to 
come back to a possible second confinement, like the one we have just 
come out of.  
This possibility will, undoubtedly influence young students’ both health and 
school education. Coronavirus will have a huge impact especially on 
emerging countries and managing this type of situation is to be a huge 
challenge. 
As we have shared our view on the case of Portugal and Spain, two of the 
less outstanding countries in Europe, that have been able to manage the 
situation, despite all constraints and errors, it is our opinion that this reality 
may serve as a good example to be followed by other countries. In the 
particular case of Portugal situation, and its strong historical links to Africa, 
this can be seen as a possible starting point to what African countries can 
learn from our own experience in this matter. 
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 DGE, “Formação para a docência digital e em rede,” DGE, 3 April 2020, 
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Furthermore, since we have at our disposal the means to network, we can 
establish partnerships that will permit to find responses to the specific 
needs of every country, taking into account their respective specificities. 
As far as the evaluation made, up till today, both by students, families and 
teachers, to the models that have been put into practice in these two 
countries, we have come to the conclusion that the Iberian Peninsula 
Schools are dealing positively with the situation of social isolation, while 
keeping on with teaching and learning routines, at the same time as it serves 
as an active participant in the management and monitoring of the health, 
educational and economic situation of its students and families. 
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The Teaching and Learning Process during the Covid-19 
















Abstract: COVID-19 has paralysed all sectors worldwide including education. There 
has been, therefore, a necessity to shift from offline to online teaching and learning 
as a means of containing the pandemic. As a new situation facing students and 
teachers, little is still known about their experiences with regard to online teaching 
and learning especially in developing countries. The study at hand explored 
university students’ experiences about teaching and learning during the Covid-19 
lockdown in Rwanda.  Through a triangulation of questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews, data was collected from a sample of 256 students. Data was analysed 
using descriptive statistics and thematic content. Results show that a variety of 
online platforms were used, but that WhatsApp and Moodle were those most 
frequently used. Despite the limited access to internet, the introduction of the e-
learning mode created learning and socio-economic opportunities. These include 
self-responsible and self-regulated learning, digital literacy and time management. 
Students’ direct university costs declined due to limited movements involving 
transport and accommodation at university. Findings suggest Government and 
Universities should invest in digital infrastructures and staff capacity- building. 
Key words: Teaching and learning process, Covid-19 lockdown, e-learning platform, 
university education, students’ perceptions. 




This article seeks to explore teachers’ and students’ experiences of teaching 
and learning in Rwandan higher education during the Covid-19 lockdown. 
COVID-19 was first detected in December 2019 in China. Since then, it has 
been expanding all over the world and declared as a world pandemic by the 
World Health Organization on 11 March 2020.1 The pandemic has become 
one of the most difficult times faced by humankind. It has paralysed the 
functioning of all sectors worldwide. Lockdowns have been imposed across 
the world as a means to contain the spread of the pandemic. Schools and 
universities, public events and travel were respectively closed and prohibited 
as measures to stop the spread of the pandemic. Universities suspended 
face to face teaching and learning.2 
This has required a rethink of teaching strategies. It is in this perspective that 
universities across the world have shifted in unprecedented fashion from 
traditional face-to-face to online teaching via a variety of online platforms in 
order to ensure the continuity of learning.3 This implies reframing the 
pedagogical and didactical reflections and practices especially enhancing 
students’ responsibility for their own learning. The unprecedented situation 
and related changes as well as challenges need empirical investigations in 
order to understand how teaching and learning processes take place 
especially in the global south. This paper focuses on reflections on teaching 
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situation-report-51-11-march-2020> (accessed 14 December 2020), 1. 
2
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 Wahab Ali, “Online and Remote Learning in Higher Education Institutes: A Necessity in 
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and learning during the lockdown as experienced by teachers and students 
in Rwandan higher education.  
1. Background and relevance 
Rwanda is one of the Sub-Saharan African countries which aspires to reach 
upper middle income country status. In this regard, Information, 
Communication Technology (ICT) is considered as engine for such 
development. For example, internet connectivity has increased from 9.3% in 
2014 to 17.2 % in 2018. Moreover, the use of mobile phones has increased 
by 3.2% from 63.7% to 66.9%.4 With regard to the development of ICT 
infrastructure in educational institutions, a number of strategies have been 
put in place including the ‘one laptop per child’ initiative. This is a 
programme launched in 2008 by the Rwandan government to improve 
active learning in primary schools through the introduction of technology. To 
date, 269,116 laptops have been distributed to 933 primary schools across 
the country.5 The programme was expected to reduce the digital divide.6 For 
example, computer: student ratios reached 1:10, 1:8 and 1:2 and the 
internet accessibility is 34.8%, 61.1% and 100% respectively in primary, 
secondary and higher education. This has been accompanied by integration 
of ICT related courses in order to equip students with digital competencies. 
Research conducted in some schools shows that the programme has both 
positive and negative effects on the learning process. On the one hand, 
some learners have used it to improve their performance, and on the other 
hand, laptops are perceived as a source of distraction in the classroom.7  
                                                          
4
 MINEDUC, Education statistics (Kigali: MINEDUC, 2019). 
5
 See Rwanda Education Board, “One laptop per child,” <https://reb.rw/main-menu/project 
/olpc/> (accessed 16 December 2020). 
6
 Munyantore, J. D. & Mbalire, M., “The role of one laptop per child project in academic 
performance in primary schools,” International Journal of Management and Applied Science 
3, no. 6 (2017): 41-45. 
7
 Fajebe, A. A., Best, M. L., & Smyth, T. N., “Is the one laptop per child enough? Viewpoints 
from classroom teachers in Rwanda,” Information Technologies & International 
Development 9, no. 3 (2013): 2-429. 
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Despite the increasing accessibility to internet connectivity and higher 
computer-student ratio in higher education, familiarity with technology 
among students is very limited. Research shows that a significant number of 
incoming students at the University of Rwanda do not have any previous e-
learning experience. Moreover, students have smart phones but never use 
them for learning purposes.8 This may be due to the fact the use traditional 
face-to-face teaching mode was still predominant in the great majority of 
higher learning institutions in Rwanda. This is a shared situation with other 
countries in the same region as Rwanda. In Kenya, for instance, eLearning 
was adopted for responding to high demand in higher education provision. 
However, as of 2016 only eleven universities had e-learning programmes.9  
With regard to Covid-19, the first cases of Covid-19 were identified in 
Rwanda at the end of the first trimester of 2020. A lockdown in all services 
including educational institutions was then announced. Other services are 
open for the moment, except schools and universities, which were closed 
mid-March, expecting to reopen in September 2020. The Ministry of 
Education encouraged the continuity of teaching and learning in a number of 
ways. Firstly, the Rwanda Education Board started delivering courses for 
primary and secondary students via radio and television. Secondly, 
universities were requested to support students’ learning through different 
social media and online platforms.10 Higher Learning Institutions have 
started to face numerous challenges, some of them significant, on their 
functionalities.11 Several of them have already ceased teaching and learning 
activities because of financial difficulties, as for most of them, school fees 
                                                          
8
 Jean Claude Byungura et al., “Familiarity with Technology among First-Year Students in 
Rwandan Tertiary Education,” The Electronic Journal of e-Learning 16, no. 1 (2018). 
9
 Kibuku, Rachael Njeri, Ochieng, Daniel Orwa, and Wausi, Agnes Nduku, “e-Learning 
Challenges Faced by Universities in Kenya: A Literature Review,” The Electronic Journal of e-
Learning 18, no. 2 (2020): 150-161. 
10
 MINEDUC, Keeping the Doors Open for Learning: Response Plan of Ministry of Education 
to the COVID-19 Outbreak (Kigali: MINEDUC, 2020). 
11
 Celestin Nsengiyumva, How local Non-Government Organizations in Rwanda (NGOs) are 
affected by COVID 19 (DME for Peace, 2020). 
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are the only source of income. Some HLIs whose teaching and learning 
activities have survived, have adopted online platforms to continue teaching 
and learning activities during the lockdowns. However, the literature 
highlights certain deficiencies such as the weakness of the infrastructure of 
online teaching, the inexperience of teachers, low literacy in ICT for both 
students and teachers, the information gap and the complex environment at 
home.12 Moreover, research conducted in South Africa on the context of the 
IT literacy environment in the education sector show that the population, 
especially those living in disadvantaged areas, face problems relating to cost, 
inadequate access and slow internet connection.13 A large digital gap 
between the urban and rural areas is also observed in Kenya, and lack of 
technical competencies as an additional challenge to eLearning. 
Furthermore, asynchronous modes of delivery and interaction characterised 
by the uploading of learning materials on the universities’ eLearning portals 
to be downloaded by students in due course are the methods most 
frequently used.14 
There are a number of questions which it is worth raising as regards how on-
line teaching methods have been adopted and quickly implemented, 
especially in respect of the experiences and challenges of both teachers and 
students, as well as mitigation measures in regard to this unprecedented 
situation. How is teaching and learning organised? What kind of platforms 
are being used? How are quality and equity ensured?  
Education in an emergency situation such as COVID-19 should put into place 
certain principles to ensure both quality and equity. For example, education 
in an emergency has to be inclusive in a way that it takes into consideration 
                                                          
12
 Wahab Ali, “Online and Remote Learning in Higher Education Institutes: A Necessity in 
light of COVID-19 Pandemic,” Higher Education Studies 10, no. 3 (2020): 16-25. 
13
 Oluwole O. Durodolu and Samuel Maredi Mojapelo, “Contextualisation of the 
Information Literacy Environment in the South African Education Sector,” The Electronic 
Journal of e-Learning 18, no. 1 (2020). 
14
 Kibuku et al., “e-Learning Challenges Faced by Universities in Kenya: A Literature Review,” 
(2020). 
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the diversity of students in terms of socio-economic background and 
learning challenges to ensure that no-one is left behind15. This might be 
more significant in the context of Rwanda where internet connectivity is 
relatively low. Therefore, this study seeks to explore both teachers’ and 
students’ experiences about online teaching and learning during the COVID-
19 lockdown. This study intends to answer the following research questions: 
What kinds of online platforms that are used for continuing teaching and 
learning process during the closure of universities due to COVID-19? What 
types of interventions in order to support teachers and students? What 
perceptions do teachers and students have about online teaching and 
learning? What challenges do they face and how do they overcome them?  
2. Methods and methodology 
In this study, a mixed approach has been used. The survey research design 
which used both qualitative and quantitative approaches was found 
appropriate to this research. The target population is 2,539 students and 64 
lecturers from two selected universities in Rwanda. The sample size initially 
intended was 334 students and 55 lecturers. It was determined using the 
sampling table developed by Krejcie and Morgan, considering 95% as the 
confidence interval with a margin of error of 5%.16 However, ultimately, a 
sample of 236 students was established because face-to-face contact was 
prohibited in order to comply with COVID-19 prevention measures. Simple 
random and purposive sampling techniques were used to select participants. 
The qualitative data were collected via semi-structured interviews led by 
two student representatives, and related data were analysed through 
thematic content analysis. The results drawn from these interviews served 
as the basis for designing questionnaires to collect quantitative data from 
                                                          
15
 INEE, Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early 
Reconstruction (Paris: Inter-Agency, 2004); Margaret Sinclair, “Education in Emergencies,” 
in Commonwealth education partnership 2007, ed. Commonwealth Secretariat, 52–56 
(Cambridge, UK: Nexus Strategic Partnerships, 2006). 
16
 Robert V. Krejcie and Daryle W. Morgan, “Determining sample size for research 
activities,” Educational and Psychological Measurements 30 (1970). 
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the two categories: students and teachers. The questionnaires were 
composed by pre-structured close ended questions especially in the form of 
the Likert scale. Survey Monkey was used for online administration and data 
collection for both categories: students and teachers. Descriptive statistics 
were employed to analyse the quantitative data from the survey. 
3. Results and discussion  
In line with the research questions designed at the outset of this study, the 
findings are presented under five headings: the profile of the participants, 
the supporting mechanisms, the platforms used and their appreciation, the 
perceived quality of online teaching and learning by students, as well as any 
related challenges. 
3.1. Demographic profile of participants: Gender and programme  
Out of the 234 students who participated in this study, 65.81% were male 
while 34.19% were female. Of the 229 students who indicated their 
programme of study, 66.81% were pursuing programmes in education, 
24.02% were following programmes in humanities and social sciences, 7.42% 
health sciences programmes and 1.75% were pursuing sciences and 
mathematics programmes. The proportion of students per programme 
recruited to the study reflected student numbers on the respective 
programmes in the sample institution, which has higher numbers enrolled in 
education and social sciences. 
3.2. Supporting mechanisms for e-learning 
The results of the study show that students were supported in different 
ways. Firstly, training was organised in order to introduce students to e-
learning. Findings revealed that the sample institutions were able to provide 
training on E-learning tools to facilitate online learning during this university 
lockdown period, as confirmed by 76.5% of respondents. However, not all 
students (in fact only 23.50%) were able to attend scheduled training on e-
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learning for a variety of reasons. On a 5-point Likert scale, the quality of the 
training received was rated 2.69 on average. The latter was an indication 
that students rated the quality of training as neither good nor bad. This 
finding shows a need for further empirical studies to understand the context 
and processes of such training and the need for further review for the 
purpose of improving the organisation of e-learning-related training. 
Secondly, data from interviews shows the importance of private-private 
partnerships and of regular monitoring due to the financial challenges faced 
by students. Participants indicated that telecommunication companies like 
MTN and Airtel made a significant impact by allowing free internet access to 
eLearning platforms.  
3.3. Platforms used during online teaching and learning  
The respondents were asked to indicate the platforms lecturers used to 
teach during this lockdown period. The findings showed a combination of 
different platforms during online teaching. The use of Whatsapp and Moodle 
was mentioned by 74.79% and 68.80% of respondents respectively. Google 
classroom and Zoom were also used in different courses as indicated by 
11.97% and 10.68% of respondents respectively. Other platforms such as 
Skype and Google Meet live session were used to a limited extent. 
Respondents rated the frequency at which different platforms were in use.  
 
Table 1: Types and frequency of online platforms  
 






































































































































Source: Primary data (July, 2020) 
Data in Table 1 showed the use of WhatsApp dominating with a weighted 
average of 3.88, with Moodle in second place with a weighted average of 
3.65. Use of e-mails came third with an average of 3.41. For the 
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respondents, use of WhatsApp dominated in the teaching and learning 
process especially in sharing experiences and explanation between students 
and faculty members. Whatsapp was affordable in terms of internet bundles 
for many students and who already had experience using it in everyday life. 
Due to low internet connectivity, it was claimed that WhatsApp was suitable 
for on-line learning. Moodle was among the top platforms used. According 
to respondents, it was used as a university official e-learning platform, 
mainly in retrieving and upload learning materials or submission of 
assignments. The respondents indicated Moodle as a good platform for e-
learning but costly for many of them. It is bundle-consuming compared to 
WhatsApp. Consequently, some students were unable to use it for e-
learning. As an alternative, they waited for their colleagues to retrieve the 
learning materials posted and then to share them through WhatsApp and e-
mails. Other platforms mentioned were used at the beginning of the 
lockdown and then abandoned in favour of Moodle and WhatsApp. They 
were considered not affordable and inaccessible to many students. Many 
students (216 out of 234) used smartphones in learning rather than other 
devices. Only 30.3% combined smartphones and laptop in their e-learning. 
Despite the unexpected situation, the leadership of some private universities 
worked hard to ensure the continuity of teaching.  
3.4. Appreciation of the quality of online teaching and learning  
Before the unprecently alarming situation of COVID-19, the sample 
universities used face-to-face teaching as a priority with limited used use of 
e-leaning. One of the aims of the study was to discover how students 
appreciated this new approach to learning. The findings are presented 
below: 
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Table 2: Appreciation of online teaching and learning  
How do you rate the 
following statement 
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Source: Primary data (July, 2020) 
Data in Table 2 indicates student respondents were satisfied with the quality 
of online teaching and learning activities. The quality of teaching and 
learning process was rated satisfactory with a weighted average equal to 
3.84. For the respondents, this new way of studying offered learning and 
economic opportunities to students. Learning opportunities mentioned were 
scaling of self-responsibility and self-learning among students. Each 
participating student was obliged to make an effort to understand the 
learning materials shared with them by lecturers. This was also expressed by 
one interviewee who said that:  
‘… but you see the newness is that I had enough time to work on my 
own, doing research. You see, sometimes I say I am working on my 
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own. You may say for example that when you are at university, you 
work with your classmates and share ideas. However, I had enough 
time to sit and do assignments without any help. Consequently, it 
gave me [an] opportunity to sit, work and then evaluate the status of 
my own learning …’ (Interviewee B: 182-186). 
Self-learning and reflection are seen to be enhanced by online learning. This 
was in contrast with face-to-face teaching, which was perceived as a 
motivating factor for ‘spoon-feeding’ of learning. Additionally, online 
teaching and learning processes cut some costs relating to transport and 
accommodation for students who attended classes during the weekends and 
holiday sessions. However, respondents acknowledge the existence of 
distractions at home which would stop them concentrating on their learning 
more in comparison to the face-to-face context at the university. 
Moreover, respondents showed high levels of satisfaction with the content 
and practical experience they had in the course of study skills and ICT. The 
course introduced them to the use of ICT tools in learning. The study skills 
unit, according to respondents, helped them to engage in self-learning and 
time management. However, some respondents showed a skill gap in the 
use of e-learning platforms. They, therefore, suggest integrating a section 
about modes of e-learning into study skills and ICT courses. 
With regards to the readiness of students to continue with online learning, 
the respondents rated their readiness with an average of 3.91 to engage in 
online learning. This result, in one way or another, validates the idea that 
online teaching and learning did offer learning and socio-economic 
opportunities to students, which in turn became motivating factors. Findings 
from interviews show the benefits of e-learning. For example, students at 
private universities, where a large number of students study part time, that 
is, at weekends, during the holidays or in the evenings, normally need 
money for transport and living costs to attend university classes. In regard to 
eLearning during the COVID-19 time, students stated that by learning from 
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home, they benefitted in various ways including social and economic 
respects. If they study from home, they do not need extra money for 
transport and living costs, and more especially they have time to spend with 
their families. 
It appears from interviews that students have different perceptions of online 
teaching and learning during university closures. Some found this a positive 
experience whereas others did not, and they reacted to the challenges 
which emerged in different ways. Some see the online system helpful as 
they continued learning from home without interruption. However, one 
participant indicated that he travels 3 km to reach somewhere with internet 
connectivity. Another student said that he had to climb either a tree or a hill 
to get good internet connection. Some students said that with remote 
learning, they are more actively involved in comparison to the previous 
model of face-to-face teaching. They see themselves playing a considerable 
role in the learning process. They have to conduct research and organise 
themselves for effective learning. On the other hand, some students saw this 
as challenging because of their low IT skills. It became difficult for them to 
cope with online learning because they did not have the IT skills required for 
this process. These students decided to stop following online classes and 
wait for the universities to reopen. Through the interviews, they explain that 
they found the experience very stressful. Some students developed a sense 
of responsibility for their learning, but on the other hand remote learning 
represented a real challenge for some students as it was a completely new 
situation. Furthermore, it demonstrated the fragility of the former face-to-
face teaching and learning system, and especially the skill gap as far as IT is 
concerned. This questions the very nature of teaching, of the content and 
practice of assessments with regard to study and IT skills. But at the same 
time, online teaching has opened up opportunities in regard to ICT use. 
Students with basic ICT skills have found time to apply them.  
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Additionally, participants, especially those from education programmes, 
show that e-learning is a tool for enhancing competence-based teaching and 
learning. One interviewee said:  
‘…the method is helpful and useful for teachers who are 
implementing CBC: it gives hints on how to keep students busy 
working. Not only working but also working hard for them to reach 
[their] own and learning objectives…’ (Interviewee A: 50-53). 
3.5. Challenges faced in the use of online learning 
The findings from both questionnaires and interviews revealed teaching- and 
learning-related challenges faced by students during the lockdown period. 
The respondents indicated poor internet connectivity (64.81%) and lack of 
internet data bundles (57.51%). It appears from interviews that limited 
internet bandwidth and high cost are one of the main problems faced by 
students, especially those coming from poor economic backgrounds, and / 
or living in deprived areas. In this regard, teachers make use of social media 
like WhatsApp in addition to institutional eLearning platforms, maximizing 
students’ participation. However, from what one of the students 
interviewed said it seems that some teachers are not yet conversant with 
the use of Moodle eLearning planning. This student said: 
‘… this is because you realise that it is due to some lecturers, it is not 
only students, you realise a gap even on the side of lecturers who do 
not understand how to use those platforms and then escape to use 
such media [i.e. WhatsApp]. Therefore, all do not know how to use 
the online platforms especially Moodle. You see there some who 
invest a lot of energy to use it but others do not manage to put more 
efforts…’ (Interviewee B: 122-127).  
Some students, especially those dwelling in remote areas, faced a complete 
lack of internet network as testified by 10.30%. In addition, the problem of 
internet connectivity hindered timely access to the information provided by 
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faculty members through the Moodle. The situation was worse for those 
who did not have appropriate devices (smart mobile phone or laptop) for e-
learning as indicated by 15.02% per cent of respondents, and this was 
especially problematic for old fashioned smartphones. Other challenges 
mentioned in the interviews include lack of IT facilities for some students, 
and difficulties regarding checking students’ participation, especially 
concerning assignments and attendance. 
4. Conclusion and recommendations  
This study has considered the experiences of students with regard to online 
teaching and learning during covid-19. Based on the findings, it was 
concluded that higher learning institutions organised crash training on e-
learning platforms for students to ensure the continuity of learning during 
the covid-19 lock-down. However, the quality of training was rated to be 
neither good nor bad. Poor internet connectivity and lack of internet data 
bundles were the challenges facing students in that regard. Consequently, 
some students became discouraged from participating in online learning. 
The study revealed the existence of a skills gap in the use of IT tools in 
learning. Thus, the use of WhatsApp was preferred by students. It was 
considered to be easy to use and not bundle-consuming as compared with 
other platforms. Moodle was the official e-learning platform for universities, 
but it was considered not affordable by all students. Students in remote 
areas were more vulnerable in accessing Moodle or/and downloading large 
documents from WhatsApp. They frequently struggled due to complete lack 
of internet connectivity. The situation worsened to those who did not have 
appropriate devices (smart mobile phone or laptop) for e-learning.  
Despite the challenges faced by students, the introduction of e-learning 
modes of study created learning and socio-economic opportunties. Due to 
sharing of learning materials and strucutral exercises, students developed a 
sense of responsibility for their learning learning, intensive use of ICT tools 
and time management skills. E-learning discouraged a spoon-feeding 
1 6 / 2 0 2 0  
 
196 
learning system, and each student was conditioned to engage in self-
learning and reflection on topics and assignments provided. Faculty 
members played the role of learning facilitators. E-learning cut some costs 
related to transport and accommodation though investment had to be made 
in internet access. Furthermore, students who are heads of households were 
able to organise their learning so that they could also fulfil their family 
responsibilites. Generally, the findings revealed high student satisfaction 
with the quality of the online teaching and learning process they went 
through.  
The use of e-learning was therefore commended by respondents after the 
lockdown. Universities should make the use of e-learning platforms an 
integral part of study skills and ICT courses / modules to ensure that every 
student is equipped with knowledge and skills to use a variety of platforms. 
Universities through public and private partnership should explore 
possibilities to provide students with IT tools enabling them to use different 
e-learning platforms. Higher learning institutions should invest in IT 
infrastructures and regularly train faculty members.  
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Deepening International Collaboration in a Post-Covid-19 Era 





Abstract: In humanitarian emergencies, education is usually hard hit, with countries 
faced with the difficult decisions of how to respond and recover from such crisis. 
Consideration for resources towards education might not always take priority. More 
vulnerable in such humanitarian emergencies are low-income African countries. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the education of the world's children and youths, 
from pre-primary to university. The disruption caused by this pandemic to 
communities and survivors alike is linked to both physical and emotional damage. 
Major concerns pertain to the inequity gap as it concerns families with low 
educational background and limited physical resources to support distance 
learning. Furthermore, the challenge, and fear, is that youths could fall through the 
cracks and disappear from the schooling systems. The pandemic continues to 
present challenges to even consider some form of restriction lifting in schools for 
most countries in Africa. 
Key words: Education, Youth, Health crisis, SDGs, international collaboration, sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
This paper explores the opportunity for developed countries to deepen 
collaboration with the African continent on youth and education in the post-
COVID-19 pandemic era. Despite frustrations faced in these unprecedented 
times, it recognises the potential to turn challenges into opportunities for 
improving education systems through calling on and enhancing international 
cooperation and solidarity. The United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goal 4 – ‘Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote 
lifelong learning opportunities for all’ - is a priority area for the members of 
the United Nations General Assembly. Likewise, ‘Investing in youth for 
accelerated inclusive growth and sustainable development’ was the driving 
theme of the African Union-EU Summit in 2017. The key objective was to 
invest in the continent’s young population and in future generations as a 
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prerequisite for building a sustainable future for African countries. There is 
no time like now to deepen policy dialogue on efforts to reform higher 
education in Africa, enhance collaboration and reaffirm the commitment of 
the EU and the AU. 
Introduction 
The unprecedented scale of the COVID-19 pandemic has had devastating 
effects on humanity. The crisis has put enormous pressure on countries 
around the world on how best to protect their population from the virus. 
Developed countries with advanced health systems and stronger economies 
in the past few months had struggled to curtail the spread of the virus and a 
few countries like Spain and Italy became overwhelmed by the scale of the 
crisis1. Worrisome was the impact on low-income countries that met the 
crises from a weak position with limited resources to mitigate against the 
social and economic disruption caused by the crisis2. 
When the virus first hit the African continent, it brought along a myriad of 
challenges and countries had to figure out how to resolve the resultant 
economic consequences3. Following standard epidemiological advice, 
various restrictive measures were introduced by some governments in the 
continent to curb the spread of the virus as with the rest of the world4. For 
instance, in Nigeria, there were swift actions taken to slow down the spread 
of coronavirus in Africa’s most populous country. The country’s government 
initiated the closure of its airspace and airports, and also issued a lockdown 
                                                          
1
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3
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4
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order in three of its populous states, Lagos, Abuja and Ogun. It has been 
widely reported that the lockdown restrictions were hitting the most 
vulnerable on the African continent the hardest, indicating some negative 
impacts and highlighting a vast array of issues impacting on low-income 
countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, about 23 million people are likely to go into 
extreme poverty due to the economic recession caused by the pandemic5. 
Generally, these African countries were already struggling with existing 
socio-economic vulnerabilities that included fragile health systems, huge 
infrastructure gaps, weak governance systems, poverty, increasing food 
insecurity and inequality challenges6.  
One of the immediate negative impacts has been food insecurity, civil unrest 
against shortages of food and basic necessities has occurred in South Africa, 
Malawi, and Nigeria7. Parents have faced prolonged challenges finding 
adequate food for their children, especially, in the absence of school meals 
due to the temporarily closure of educational institutions as part of 
restriction measures to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Schools 
serve as the largest national childcare scheme in countries around the 
world; more so, attendance at schools provides groups of children from low-
income and food insecure families with the much-needed social protection 
assistance and social stability. It goes without saying that school 
programmes that provide food rations and other support incentives act as 
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powerful vehicles for delivering social and economic protection to families 
with limited resources.  
In April 2020, about 1.6 billion students globally, that is approximately 91.3% 
of the world’s students in 194 countries, were affected by school closures. 
Currently, countries like Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Norway and 
South Korea have reopened schools. There are still about 1.06 billion 
students, 60.5% of the world’s students in 105 countries affected by school 
closures8. These figures refer to students enrolled at pre-primary, primary, 
lower and upper secondary schools and at tertiary levels of education. 63 
million primary and secondary teachers have also been affected by school 
closures9. 
This paper discusses and analyses the impact of the health crisis on children 
and youth and education in the sub-Saharan region of Africa. The paper 
comes from the perspective that there is an opportunity for developed 
countries; specifically, European countries to deepen collaboration with the 
African continent on youth and education in the post-COVID-19 pandemic 
era. The paper refers to key goals and declarations stipulated in the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals10; specifically SDG 4 – ‘Ensure 
inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all’ and in the European Union and African Union (EU-AU) 
2017 Summit themed – ‘Investing in youth for accelerated inclusive growth 
and sustainable development’11. 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) 
were set in 2015 by members of the United Nations General Assembly, 
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these SDGs were designed to achieve a better and more sustainable future 
for all, and it is the aim to achieve them by the year 2030. The EU-AU 2017 
submit declarations had a recommitment to invest in youth as a prerequisite 
for building a sustainable future. Priority areas in the declaration are to 
provide the youth with the skills and opportunities that they need through 
the deployment of smart and targeted investments. The paper discusses 
some of the evolving challenges that necessitate the reinforcement of 
Africa’s relationship with the European Union (EU) through deepened 
international collaboration and solidarity as part of the global United 
Nations efforts in education. 
Challenging times for education in sub-Saharan Africa 
Africa is considered demographically as the world’s youngest continent. In 
sub-Saharan Africa for instance, 43% of the population are reported to be 
younger than 15 years old and 3% are 65 years or older. In the European 
Union, 17% of the population are considered younger than 15 and 20% are 
65 years or older12. 10 to 12 million youths enter into the workforce each 
year and it is predicted that by 2030, one-fifth of the global labour force 
which is approximately one-third of the global youth labour force will come 
from Africa13. Education is a central feature to childhood and an important 
driver in human capital investment. While school closures was a logical 
solution in enforcing social distancing rules within communities in sub-
Sahara Africa, the impact of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic has opened 
up some disparities in education in low-income countries14. The immediate 
response to education provision has been to deploy nationwide remote 
learning tools such as TV and the internet. In some communities however, 
there are fewer opportunities for learning at home and being out of school 
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in some cases presents economic burdens for parents due to challenges 
posed in finding prolonged childcare15. It goes without saying that, certain 
groups of children and youths in sub-Sahara Africa countries are likely to 
suffer most from the economic impact of limited access to education and 
lost learning16. A report indicated that sub-Sahara Africa has the highest 
rates of education exclusion with over one-fifth of children between the 
ages of about 6 and 11 out of school and one-third of the youth population 
between the ages of about 12 and 14 are out of school. It also indicated that 
nearly 60% of the youth population between the ages of about 15 and 17 
are out of school17.  
The long school closures present a worrying picture in terms of the negative 
impact on the learning of students, the extent remains difficult to say, but it 
is not without certain consequences for students. Such consequences can be 
attributed to loss of human capital from losing out on future opportunities 
and economic benefits that can be suffered by students who receive far less 
education, most especially students from the poorest and most vulnerable 
populations. Sub-Sahara Africa already significantly lags behind other 
continents in human capital development due to the negative impact of the 
shortfall in health and education. It has been suggested that the loss of 
learning during the World War II had negative impacts on the lives of 
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students over 40 years later18. In essence, long-term disruption in education 
provision will harm sub-Sahara Africa’s future productivity and economic 
competitiveness. Further decline in health and education would lead to 
widened productivity gaps between workers in Africa and in EU countries as 
well as having negative impact on Africa’s long-term economic 
competitiveness. On the other hand, if the region achieves the highest 
health and education scores the GDP per worker will increase by 250%19. 
Sub-sections 4.1 - 4.4 of the SDG 4 state the following; 4.1 By 2030, ensure 
that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and 
secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes; 
4.2 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early 
childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are 
ready for primary education; 4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women 
and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary 
education, including university; 4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the 
number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and 
vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship20.  
The finance of education depends majorly on parents in countries sub-
Sahara Africa has compared to wealthier EU countries. Considering the on-
going restrictive measures, not all parents would be able to send their 
children back to school because of the impact the pandemic has had on 
their livelihood. Increase in school drop-outs are more likely to happen as 
family finances dwindle leaving children at risks of child labour, family 
violence, trafficking, forced marriage and exploitation. The challenge faced 
in most countries sub-Sahara Africa is ensuring that more children do not fall 
between the cracks.  
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Crisis impact on vulnerable children and youths in sub-Sahara Africa 
Education was hit hard by the Ebola epidemic during the 2014-2016 
outbreak in West Africa. This was a humanitarian emergency that affected 
primarily the West Africa countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Adults, children and youths were confined at home with social distancing 
rules and other required behavioural changes. Schools were closed for up to 
nine months leaving five million children out of schools21. These three worst 
hit countries already had large out-of-school populations with only about 
61% of children in Guinea completing primary school, 72% in Sierra Leone 
and 65% in Liberia22. After the Ebola outbreaks a lot of students never went 
back to school. 
There are fears that during this COVID-19 pandemic many more children 
and youths will fall through the cracks, drop out of the school systems 
completely and are at a higher risk of becoming victims of the crisis. This is 
more worrying for female children who are further exposed to psychosocial 
and physical risks and are in time of crisis twice likely to drop out of school. 
Exclusion rate at primary school age for girls is 23% compared to 19% for 
boys and at secondary school age 36% compared to 32% for boys. More 
generally, across sub-Sahara 9 million girls between the ages of about 6 and 
11 will never go to school, compared to 6 million boys23. In Sierra Leone, 
during the Ebola epidemic, school closure led to an increase in sexual 
assaults and teenage pregnancies, unfortunately when schools reopened 
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pregnant girls were not let back to their studies24. The country’s government 
signalled that allowing pregnant girls continue their studies was bad for their 
health and that it would encourage teenage pregnancy. It has taken about 
five years of campaigning by education and human rights activists for the 
government to overturn the ban25. In recent times, girls’ education in Africa 
has become a major priority, due to the great barriers to education and 
other gender-based vulnerabilities they face. The EU-AU 2017 submit 
acknowledges the importance of youth, especially girls and young women, 
and those living in fragile environments, to have access to the knowledge 
and skills that are necessary to enable them to be active citizens in their 
countries. So also a recommitment to increase efforts in both urban and 
rural areas to ensure universal, inclusive, and equitable access to quality 
education at all levels, from pre-school to higher education, for all children 
and youth, especially girls26. This is coming on the back of the 
implementation of the AU roadmap on harnessing the demographic 
dividend through investment in youth. 
Vulnerable, other marginalised children and youth groups that are often 
forgotten and most at risk during this crisis period are displaced and migrant 
children. It is very easy for this vulnerable group to fall through the crack 
because national policies may not always include this group in their national 
responses to crisis. Children and youth with disabilities and those affected 
by trauma or mental health issues are other groups of vulnerable young 
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people. For these two groups, schools and learning centres are places in 
communities that act as support systems for their wellbeing and 
development. When considering SDG 4, sub-section 4.5. By 2030, eliminate 
gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of 
education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with 
disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations27. The 
extent of government’s continuous support of educational activities during 
the pandemic has a direct implication for the extent of learning loss for 
students. It should be noted that there is the risk of regression for children 
classified as the most vulnerable who do not have access to digital schools 
and virtual platforms where students can interact with their teachers28. 
Widely accessible mediums like radio and television centred on mass 
education will be difficult to target children that are not learning under 
normal school settings29.  
The case for deepened international collaboration in sub-Sahara Africa 
education 
Due to the extent of economic contraction caused by the unprecedented 
crisis, many governments in the region are in a difficult position on how to 
expend their resources to ensure education is not left out of the on-going 
response and recovery strategies. Revenues are dwindling and education 
budgets are being cut in order to put public health, social protection and 
economic stimulus ahead in response to the pandemic. During the 2008 
financial crisis, governments were able to maintain education budgets by 
issuing debt, however, sub-Sahara’s current public-debt burdens are already 
huge, and borrowing conditions are not quite favourable30. As governments 
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plan their next policy move, it is pertinent to recognise that education is a 
paramount tool in securing future opportunities and in enhancing economic 
recovery initiatives31. The sacrifice being made by students as a result of 
learning loss should be taken into great consideration because ignoring 
continuity in education provision would have future consequential impacts 
on the region’s productivity and competitiveness. 
The move of school systems from traditional approach to learning, to 
remote technology-based learning is perceived as a welcome development. 
In fact, about 25% of countries in Africa are providing online and broadcast 
learning opportunities32. The approach supports students learning, allowing 
them to develop new skills and computer literacy. On the other hand, such 
move to remote learning has excluded the less-privileged learners from 
accessing online resources because not many schools have in place 
contingency plans to deal with the large-scale crisis that has led to many 
months of school closures. In addition, not many families can afford the 
internet charges or cost of equipment that are needed for remote 
learning33. According to figures released from UNESCO, about 89% of 
students in sub-Sahara Africa do not have access to home computers and 
82% have limited access to the internet34. In other words, online classes 
serve only a limited number of the student population. Inadequate 
investment in the provision of education widens the inequality gap. The 
inequality issue that stems from this situation is that a learning gap is 
created for students who cannot access digital tools and these students will 
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for long after the pandemic is over struggle to catch up with their peers35. 
87% of children in sub-Saharan Africa already have limited skills to function 
in a dynamic labour market36. 
The many challenges faced by the education sector as a result of poor 
governance across the continent left most schools underprepared to survive 
migrating to remote learning37 38. Worsening this problem is the limited 
technological infrastructure, erratic electricity supply and access to qualified 
teachers who can offer online learning39. It is evident that there is a critical 
gap in providing continuous quality education remotely in Africa’s education 
sector that would support not only learning, but also help maintain some 
normality during the crisis for the psychosocial well-being of both students 
and teachers40. A multi-stakeholder support is necessary to mobilise 
resources and to finance the education gap41. As part of the EU-AU 2017 
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Summit Declaration, a pledge was made to deepen collaboration and 
exchange in education, technology development, knowledge, skills, research 
and in development to respond effectively to the specific needs of the EU 
and AU economies and to launch innovative actions in the fields of Scientific, 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training and, youth employment 
and entrepreneurship, aimed at increasing the employability of young 
people42. This pledge was made with the recognition that the fourth 
industrial revolution and its consequences impact on economies, including 
unlocking the potential of the digital economy for Africa and Europe in the 
creation of jobs, skills and economic development for the youth. 
A central principle in post Covid-19 crisis recovery is to take advantage of 
the current situation to rebuild better and encourage children to go back to 
school43. Education systems in sub-Sahara Africa can use this crisis as an 
opportunity to rethink some of their practices and to create innovative 
solutions for the transformation of their educational system. There is no 
better time than now to follow through on the pledge to mobilise financial 
and technical resources to support the joint priority projects; specifically, 
Joint Strategic Priority Area One by using appropriately integrated 
instruments and mechanisms to invest in people through education, 
science, and technology and skills development. There are an increasing 
number of global partnerships that have been formed to provide guidance 
and support as countries move towards some form of remote learning44. 
Strategy tools that enable schools develop effective responses at the onset 
of a crisis are heavily influenced by the level of preparedness and 
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contingency planning45. For instance, Malawi’s education ministry long 
before the pandemic has been working with civil-society organisations to 
successfully use solar-powered offline tablets to deliver effective literacy 
and numeracy instruction46. Strategies and frameworks advocating this 
approach has been published by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), World Bank and Department for International 
Development (DFID)47. These strategies encourage an inclusive learning 
approach during emergency education. More so, collaborative responses 
that utilise locally available infrastructure and services should also be 
encouraged. 
Towards building resilient sub-Sahara African education systems  
In education emergency responses, collaboration is paramount towards 
joint work in support of governments. A diverse set of actors that have built 
experience from previous outbreaks and understands the options available 
is required to proffer innovative education solutions in crisis situations48. 
Two main drivers of such collaboration are the budgetary challenges that 
necessitate the mobilisation of funding from international collaboration and 
the transfer of efficiencies from such international collaboration49. This is 
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achieved by gaining access to their specialised capabilities and innovative 
approaches. These diverse actors usually operate through international 
collaboration; they work keenly with national governments and the private 
sector in areas of education and information communication technology 
(ICT) to develop and finance various innovative solutions for the continuity 
of education and to build capacity to respond to any future crises. The 
Education Commission’s learning generation report estimated that spending 
on education would rise steadily in low and middle-income countries from 
$1.25 trillion per year to nearly $3 trillion between 2015 and 203050. 
International collaboration helps to close the funding gap and scale up 
targeted efforts. Such education finance is raised through a number of 
collaborative means that include funds from indigenous government’s 
domestic resources, foreign aid and private and philanthropic aid. Generally, 
governments in low-income countries spend less than $200 on education 
per school-age child; this is compared to wealthier countries that spend over 
$12,000 on education per school-age child51 52. As international agencies 
deploy their in-built agility and emergency response design to assist local 
bodies, their efforts should support innovative and cost-effective 
approaches. 
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In consideration of SDG 4 sub-sections 4.6 – 4.753: 4.6; By 2030, ensure that 
all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, 
achieve literacy and numeracy; 4.7: By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire 
the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, 
including, among others, through education for sustainable development 
and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a 
culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of 
cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development; 
4.a Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and 
gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective 
learning environments for all; 4.b By 2020, substantially expand globally the 
number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least 
developed countries, small island developing States and African countries, 
for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and 
information and communications technology, technical, engineering and 
scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing 
countries; 4.c By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified 
teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in 
developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island 
developing States.  
In line with the SDG 454, sub-section 4.1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and 
boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education 
leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes, extensive consultations 
during this crisis, with national governments, local actors and international 
response teams are paramount to assess and determine the entire 
educational needs of children and youth. International collaboration 
assisted many countries to achieve basic education in the 1990s and 
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2000s55. Much more of such collaboration is needed in sub-Sahara Africa 
countries to enhance their secondary and higher education. It should be 
noted that countries that moved up the World Bank’s income group 
classification in the last 30 years educated their population at secondary and 
at higher levels56.  
In the EU-AU 2017 submit, a declaration was also made to commit to 
stronger mutual engagement and to a more coordinated approach to ensure 
effective multilateralism, including through stronger AU-EU collaboration at 
the UN and other international institutions and to also commit to 
strengthen AU-EU-UN trilateral cooperation. This requires in-depth 
consideration so as to ensure holistic approaches that cover child 
protection, quality of learning, gender equality, hygiene education and 
training of teachers57. The various international agencies that coordinate 
with bodies like the UN to support responses at country levels comply with 
the UN’s guidance to crisis response by determining critical areas for risk-
assessments, priorities and directives. International collaborative responses 
that encourage increase access to learning and opportunities for girls as well 
as the prevention of barriers like the marginalisation in the home and 
inequitable distribution of learning resources should be prioritised, so also 
responses that provides structure and support for mental health issues. To 
provide quality education to children and youth beyond the pandemic, 
proposed interventions by the global education community need to take 
into consideration that the circumstances of each country are different, and 
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one policy measure imposed by donor and aid agencies would not work in 
every context. Imperatively, acknowledgment of local actors such as 
international bodies, educational administrators and policy makers in each 
context would support inclusiveness, build trust and confidence. Localised 
information, support and response are paramount to achieving any form of 
successful outcomes. The current situation is by all means challenging, but 
lessons must be learnt from countries that showed great resilience in past 
crises, building on the experience of this will generate quick response 
(Ebola, SARS)58. This potentially provides the opportunity to improve 
education systems.  
Teachers are at the centre of the learning process; a modern and effective 
education workforce can keep pace and respond to the shift in world’s 
demographic and evolving curricula. Teacher quality is a very important 
determinant of learning outcomes at any school level. They should be 
recognised as a workforce of change makers. The transitioning period to the 
reopening of schools provides the opportunity to build a motivated and 
qualified teaching force during and after the pandemic. To meet SDG 4, an 
estimated 69 million teachers must be recruited globally by 2030, with over 
76% of these in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia59. In some of the poorest 
countries, the required increase in teachers is equal to at least half of the 
projected number of tertiary education graduates, given low secondary 
completion rates (less than 25% in Sub-Saharan Africa60.  
Continuity of salary in terms of the welfare of teachers and job security is 
paramount. Collaborative responses and decision-making processes to 
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achieve should not lead to lengthy bureaucratic processes in obtaining 
approvals for the deployment of much needed fund61.  
In conclusion, collaborative responses should channel creative thinking on 
how to deliver education differently, especially in terms of time 
intensiveness, amount of input and accessibility. If well implemented, it 
supports the mental health of children and youths, giving them a sense of 
stability and supporting them as they develop strategies for coping in the 
new normal amid rapid changes. While sub-Saharan African countries have 
started to gradually lift lockdown restrictions, life as we know it would not 
be as normal as it was before the pandemic. In the current, recovery mode, 
governments’ approaches to implementing educational policies must be 
forward thinking in regaining lost time. The continuity of appropriate 
educational activities in addition to the public health safety messages is one 
of the broadest reaching activities pertinent in supporting children and 
youth through the process of adjusting to their changing external 
environment. Education has always played an important role in past public-
health campaigns and in recent times, in reiterating lifesaving COVID-19 
health messages, such as keeping social distance, temperature checks, 
wearing facemasks, handwashing and sanitising and sanitation practices. 
Schools can, therefore, serve as important front-line sites for public health 
interventions and could empower children with much needed knowledge 
that would translate into changing the behaviours of their families. 
Furthermore, these public health measures would serve to allay the fears of 
parents for when decisions are made for safe reopening of schools.  
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